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
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
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
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UNIVERSALISM

AGAINST

PARTIALISM:

IN A

SERIES OF LECTURES

DELIVERED IN

NEWBURYPORT, MASS.

BY WOODBURY M. FERNALD.

"Speak thou the things which become sound doctrine."
Titus ii. 1.

BOSTON:
PUBLISHED BY B. B. MUSSEY.
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PREFACE.

In submitting these lectures to the public, the author has proceeded upon the utilitarian principle. He would not have this volume considered a competitor with other and more voluminous works upon the same subject, which have recently made their appearance; and he is happy in being enabled to inform the reader that he has not chanced to follow the same track of thought which has been marked out in the works referred to. In the publication of these lectures, he has complied with a request from the people who attended their delivery. The *Universalists of Newburyport* have been the means of placing this book before the public; and I rejoice that *Newburyport, the* darkest town in the Com*monwealth, has* issued forth *something* in the

shape of a book, humble though it may be, which treats of the SALVATION OF THE WORLD. May it not be the greatest nor the last. Amen.

TO PARTIALISTS.

One word about the title which I have thought proper to prefix to this work. By the term *partialism* I mean no disrespect. Here I have consulted propriety and the fitness of things. We call ourselves *Universalists* because we believe in the ultimate, universal salvation of the world. In these lectures I have labored to present the claims of two opposite doctrines. You believe in but a partial salvation; and what, therefore, for an argument of this kind, could I have chosen more appropriate to *contrast* with Universalism? I beg, therefore, that you will consider it no disrespect; and, as long as you hold to what you now do, to be content with the fitting title we have chosen to indicate the contents of our book, — *Universalism* AGAINST *Partialism.*

Again, these lectures, remember, were delivered under peculiar circumstances. With a sincere desire to elucidate and promote the *truth, liberty* was publicly advertised, and

freely offered, at the close of each, for any, and especially clergymen, to controvert the sentiments promulgated. No *clergyman* appeared. Now it must have been for one of three reasons: either, first, that they had not sufficient confidence in their own partial systems; or, second, that they feared that the more they stirred the matter, the worse it would be for them; or, third, that they could not *stoop* to such a defence of their theory. If they have not confidence in their partial systems, we advise them to cease preaching them: if they feared to stir the matter, we refer them to John xi. 48: if they could not stoop to such a defence of their theory, we refer them to the conduct of St. Paul, who could "dispute" even "in the *market* daily with them that met with him, (Acts xvii. 17;) and also to the "awful responsibility" which, if their doctrine be true, rests upon them, in suffering so many to be misled, when opportunity was offered to undeceive them; for the delivery of the lectures *has* made some converts, and the reading of them *may* make more.

TO UNIVERSALISTS.

In perusing the following lectures, you may not be *struck* with any thing particularly

new. If we have presented old matters in a new light, or even decently well in an old light, we are contented. Our object has been, not to kindle any strange fire, but to hold the light to those who "walk in darkness, and dwell in the land of the shadow of death."

Again, some apology is necessary for the appearance of about twenty pages, in the first and second lectures, which have been before published in a pamphlet. The reason is, as it was found necessary to present the same subjects again which had been reviewed in the pamphlet, and as the matter of the pamphlet had not been read or delivered in this town, a transcript was made from it into two of the lectures. But the matter is but small, and the bare mention of it is sufficient.

May the whole be instrumental in leading many to the truth, through Jesus Christ our Lord.

W. M. F.

Newburyport, Mass. 1840.

CONTENTS.

LECTURE I.

Use of Human Reason, p. 12. Argument from the Wisdom of the Deity against the Calvinistic System, 18 Argument from the same Attribute against Arminianism, 20. Free Agency in Eternity, 22. Calvinism in reference to the Power of God, 24. Arminianism inconsistent with this Power, 25. Argument from the Justice of God, 26. Object of Justice in administering Punishment, 28. Argument from the Foreknowledge of God, 30. Degree of Punishment which Justice requires, 32. Infinite Sin, 33. Dr Jonathan Edwards's distinction between *Infinite* and *Endless* Punishment, 36. Endless Punishment as a consequence of Endless Sin, 36. The glory due unto Calvinism, 43. The admitted Justice of Endless Punishment inconsistent with the exposure to it, 44. Brief notice of the Attributes of Love and Mercy, 46. Truth and its Influence, 47.

LECTURE II.

The threatening of Endless Punishment not found in connection with the Divine Law, 50. Concession of eminent Orthodox Commentators, 52. Objection considered that a future *Life* was not revealed, 54. The supposed Penalty of Endless Misery would subvert the very Law itself, 56. This Doctrine maintained at the Expense of God's Immutability, 60. Objection considered, 61. This Doctrine detracts from the glory and efficiency of Jesus Christ, 64. It also attaches more importance to the Works of Men than to the Grace of God, 66. Comparison of the Sunshine, the Labor, and the Harvest, 67. Argument from Christian Charity, 69. Endless Punishment for all Mankind, 71. Moral influence of the Doctrine of Endless Punishment, 72. What ought to be the effect of it, 75. Believers in this Doctrine act from different motives, 76. The Doctrine of Endless Punishment contradicted by the Scriptures, 78. Conclusion of the whole Argument against it, 78.

LECTURE III.

Distinction between things which are, and things which are not, proper subjects of Human Reason, 82. Orthodox presumption upon the Powers of Human Intellect, 87. The doctrine of Universal and Eternal Salvation the only one but what insults our Reason at the very first consideration of it, 89. The doctrine of Annihilation, 90. Endless Misery compared with Atheism, 92. "All partial Evil universal Good," 93. Extract from Soame Jenyns, 95. Consideration of Moral Evil, 99. Dr. Thomas Chalmers arrayed against himself, 101. A new Thought upon the supposed conflicting Attributes of Justice and Mercy, 105. The inconsistent Nature of God's commands, in connection with Partialist Theology, 108. The parental Relationship of God to all Mankind, 111. Does Sin destroy this Relationship? 114. The *honor* of the Universal Father, 115. The doctrine of Universal Salvation congenial with all holy desires, 117. The conflict between "Orthodox" preaching and praying, 118. Dr. Clarke on this Subject, 119.

LECTURE IV.

Facility with which Men apply the Threatenings to a Future State, 123. The first Promise in the Bible, 124. The promises to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, 125. Affirmed conditionality of the Promises, 127. *Connection of testimony* in the order of Theology, for the Salvation of the

World, 130. Promiscuous Scriptures in establishment of the same Truth, 134. Dr. Clarke on Romans 5th, 137. God the Saviour of all, especially of those that believe (critical examination,) 142. General Remarks on the passages made use of to establish Endless Punishment, 148.

LECTURE V.

Character of the Opposition against Universalists, 154. General nature of the Objections to Universalism, 156. Objection that Universalism is the devil's doctrine carefully considered, 159. Who *has* espoused the sentiment of Satan? 162. A guess at what the devil's doctrine would be, all partiality for him aside, 165. Objection that Universalism is a species of Infidelity, 169. The dishonesty of those who bring this Charge, 170. Universalism the only cure for Infidelity, 172. "Orthodoxy" the great engine for its promotion, 174. Objection that Universalism is a *new* Doctrine, 175. Historical reference to the introduction of the Doctrine of Endless Torments to the Church, 178. Character of its Introducer compared with that of Christ, 179. Historical reference to the doctrine of Universalism, 180. Objection that Universalism is the production of a *one-sided* view of the Bible, 182. Universalist's special study of the nature of God's denunciations, 184. Objection that Universalism involves a denial of the Justice of Jehovah, 186. Objection that it is the result of an unprincipled perversion of the Scriptures, 189. Orthodox Manufactures, 189. Ignorance of our Exposition of the Scriptures, 191. Objection that Universalism is particularly pleasing to the Carnal Mind, 192. This Objection with reference to a Knowledge of the *tendency* of Carnal Mind, 195. Endless Damnation a doctrine of the Carnal Mind, 196. Objection that Universalism is "too good to be true," 197. Objection that Universalism is built upon a denial of the Free Agency of Man, 199. Objection that the Doctrine will not do to die by, 201. Failure of Partialism in the dying hour, 204.

LECTURE VI.

Orthodox manner of appropriating honors and virtue, 207. Illustration from comparison, of the recklessness of sinning in view of abounding Grace, 213. The terrors of the Evil Way, 217. Objection that Conscience may become seared, 219. What is true Morality? 221. Influence of Love in securing the Duties which we owe to God, 223. The same influence with reference to Social Duties, 223. What are the means or measures best adapted to produce Love to God? 224. What are the means best adapted to produce Love to Man? 226. The other half of the Orthodox influence, 227. Facility with which Orthodoxy turns the Almighty, 228. The thing to be done, 229. The utter futility of the popular Motives for Obedience, 230. Two Horns of a Dilemma, 231. The cloven foot of the concealed abomination, 232. The demoralizing tendency of Partialism, 2 3 The enginery of our Moral Power, 234. An Appeal from theory to fact, in defence of the moral tendency of Universalist sentiments, 235. History of Saul and David, 237. Reference to Howard, 239. To Oberlin, 240. To Penn, 241. Connecticut State's Prison, 242. Reference to the Insane, 246. What Endless Misery is fitted for, and what it does, 247.

APPENDIX.

Objection that Universalism, if true, renders preaching useless, 249. What might be the foulest imaginable impiety, 254. A Question for Partialists, 254. Argument of the two chances and the safe side, 255. The "Orthodoxy" of Newburyport, Mass. 257. The true Doctrine of Forgiveness, 258. True use of Repentance, 261. The new *Birth, 264. Hell,* 265. Improvements of "Orthodoxy," 265. The *only thing necessary* for its destruction, 266.

LECTURES.

LECTURE I.

ARGUMENT AGAINST THE DOCTRINE OF ENDLESS PUNISHMENT.

Thou art weighed in the balances, and art found wanting. *Daniel* v. 27.

THE present is an age of free and fearless investigation. I rejoice that it is so. In every department of the public good — in politics, in morals, in religion, especially the latter — inquiry is on the wing. It has gone forth, and will go forth — to the enlightening of the great body of the community, to the subversion of some systems and the establishment of others — till *truth* alone, unmixed with error, shall pervade and purify the entire mass of mind. Doctrines and systems venerated for their antiquity, and received upon authority of ancestral instruction, untouched for centuries by a quiescent complacency in supposed indubitable truth, are now being questioned, doubted, and rejected;

and the most keen and searching glances are sent into every creed. The day should be hailed as a day auspicious to the cause of human liberty. Unfettered thought will rise, and assert its high supremacy. God will yet show that his name is honored in the truths which had their origin in him; and ours be the task to be first in the sacred cause, and zealous for the honor of his glory.

The subject and the object of these lectures we would have distinctly understood. The affairs of time are unworthy to be compared with the concerns of eternity; and this fact alone is a sufficient reason for inviting your attention again and again to the question of our immortal interests. There is no subject so important as this. All controversy is waived in reference to the importance of the matters which we now present; though there is a sect of Christians who seem to think a silence, or a non-committal policy, is the more safe or expedient course in reference to this most stirring subject. We, however, have no sympathy for this opinion. If the Scriptures, professing to be a revelation from God, and especially the gospel, the great and main object of which was to bring "life and immortality to light," does not inform us of the *state* or *condition* of our immortality, enough to satisfy us concerning its blessedness or misery, then this professed revelation is unworthy of the name. We hold, that, if *any* subject should be presented in *definite language*, it is this; or if *any* truth should

be revealed most clearly in the sacred volume, this should be written in *characters of* LIGHT, that all might see, and either tremble or adore, and that none might plead obscurity in the Scriptures as an excuse for unsettled opinions, or modesty in declaring them. We believe that such is the character of the revelation which we have. "We believe, and therefore speak."

To those who do not admit the authority of the Scriptures, of course, we have now nothing to offer. Our argument is with those who are willing to go with us "to the law and to the testimony."

Let me caution you, too, against *prejudice*. This is a mountain barrier to truth. Some of you, my friends, may be wofully set against the doctrine we shall endeavor to establish; and you may, perchance, deem the speaker an advocate of a most pernicious *heresy*, which, if persisted in, will land him in the regions of never-ending night. But we cannot stop to argue these things with you now: we only invite your attention, your candor, and your good, unbiased judgment. We *may* be in error. *You* may be in error. It becomes us all, then, to submit the matter to an impartial judgment; to "prove all things, and hold fast that which" seemeth to us "good."

You will perceive, my brethren, that we have chosen rather a motto than a text, as the foundation of our two first lectures. It was a part of the interpretation *of the* mysterious hand-writing on the

ning: "We indeed grant that the use of reason in religion is accompanied with danger. But we ask any honest man to look back on the history of the church, and say whether the renunciation of it be not still more dangerous. The worst errors, after all, have sprung up in that church which proscribes reason, and demands from its members implicit faith. The most pernicious doctrines have been the growth of the darkest times, when the general credulity encouraged bad men to broach their schemes and inventions, and to stifle the faint remonstrances of reason, by the menaces of everlasting perdition."

We endorse these sentiments on the subject of human reason. It would have been well, at least for the first quoted author, if, in some essential matters, he had adhered himself to the principles which he laid down for others. When, therefore, we appeal to the Bible, or to the nature of God, or to the principles of his government, we do it in a *rational* manner. We do not prostrate our reasoning faculties in humble obeisance to any creed. We go to the work as though no creeds under heaven were in existence. We go to it, in short, not to *support* a creed, but to *examine* its support; and with just as little reverence for human creeds as though the Bible stood point blank against every creed in existence.

Now, of the various systems of arrangement *which we might* select for the prosecution of our

subject, we know of none more in order, or better fitted to produce conviction, than to begin, in the argument, with the nature of that God who is the author of all truth, and then to appeal to the written records of his truth as given to the world.

But here it is necessary, before we come directly in contact with the subject, to anticipate an objection in the outset. This objection is founded on human agency. It is assumed, at the onset, by some controversialists, that the Deity, in the plan of creation and providence, had this point determined on and settled,—that he must make man a free moral agent. And if this was in the great plan, as of absolute necessity to a wise moral government, and could not, on any condition, be given up or changed, we must not be allowed, in any of our conclusions from the nature of the Deity, to rest in any thing which would overturn this truth. For instance, if we reason, from the goodness of Jehovah, against the doctrine of endless punishment, we must not rest in the conclusion, if free agency opposes it. This truth must be admitted at all events. And if, notwithstanding the goodness of the Deity, he could not make man a free moral agent without setting before him "infinite joy and endless wo," then we must admit the truth and reasonableness of such a punishment, even though, without the consideration of human agency, the goodness of God might first seem to be in opposition with it.

Now, without entering at all into the vexed question of human agency and divine sovereignty, which has formed the debates of ages, and the matter of innumerable folios, we are so fortunate as to be freed from this perplexity, even admitting the truth of the sentiment in question. Even admitting, I say, the truth of the proposition that the Deity did set out with one point determined on — that of constituting man a free agent, in the broadest Arminian sense of the phrase — yet this does not stand at all in the way of our argument from the nature of the Deity, against the doctrine of unceasing punishment. The way we are cleared from this maze is this: the one may be true without the other. Free agency may be true, and endless punishment false. The two points are not necessarily connected. God might, as far as we can see, and, permit me to say, as far as *you* can see, have made man a free agent, without exposing him to an endless curse. What if the penalty of the law was intolerable torment for millions of millions of protracted ages? — a period of time which no mortal can comprehend; surely, it would not be necessary to double and treble it, and protract it through all eternity, for the insignificant reason that man was a free agent. The penalty, we may at once perceive, may be more or less, at pleasure, entirely irrespective of any consideration of human agency. Whoever denies this, must *take it upon himself* to prove that omnipotence and

omniscience combined could not leave a man free to incur, by disobedience, a punishment of one year, or a thousand years, or any limited time, however great and awful; but freedom of will consists solely in being able to incur an *endless* penalty, — to ruin himself forever!

We see, then, that we are clear from this argument. It is altogether useless to resort to the matter of free agency, to shut up the way to an argument from the nature of the Deity, against the doctrine of interminable punishment. For the free agency of man, and the endless punishment of man, are two things no more necessarily connected than the Koran of Mohammed and the Christian's Bible. However precious, then, this sentiment may be, we proceed in our argument without touching it. And we may prove the doctrine of endless punishment false, leaving the dear sentiment of Arminian liberty in an undisturbed repose.

We begin with the proposition that the doctrine of endless punishment is contrary to all the attributes of God. But, when we make this statement, we have not an exclusive reference to Calvinism or Arminianism, but a combined reference to both. It is indeed confessed that, in the system of Calvinism, the doctrine in question may be consistent with the *power* and the *knowledge* of the Deity; but these are the only two attributes with which it is reconcilable; while, in the Arminian system, it is opposed *to every attribute* of God. These attri-

butes are seven; or, at least, these may be considered the "seven spirits of God," mentioned in the book of Revelation, and to comprise all the communicable attributes of Deity, viz. wisdom, power, justice, knowledge, mercy, love, and truth.

I. We begin with the attribute of wisdom. The doctrine of endless punishment, both in the Calvinistic and Arminian systems, is glaringly opposed to this perfection of the Infinite. Let us ask, what *object* had the God of Calvinism in view, in the foreordination of the reprobate part of the creation to the torments of eternity? The "Confession of Faith" shall answer. "By the decree of God, *for the manifestation of his glory*, some men are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death." Then it appears that it was for the manifestation of God's glory, that this decree went forth from the Eternal. And now the only question to be settled is, whether this object is accomplished, or whether the glory of God is thus magnified. Be it questioned, in the first place, if the happiness of the elect was foreordained for the glory of God, how could the everlasting torments of the reprobates be foreordained for the same purpose? that is, how can two things as opposite as light and darkness, how can absolute final evil and absolute final good both and equally redound to the glory of a Being who is admitted, on all hands, to be goodness alone in his *nature, wholly* opposed to all evil, and wholly in-

clined to all good? This question, as will at once be perceived, is unanswerable. And it is not only felt to be so by us, but it is felt to be so by the very persons who have espoused this doctrine. And, accordingly, they have resolved the matter into this, — that the absolute, final evil of the reprobates does not, in itself considered, redound to the glory of the good Creator; but that their misery is made to *result in good*, not to themselves indeed, but to the whole universe taken together. It has been sagely affirmed, that the endless damnation of a part will conduce, and is essential, to the greatest good of the whole. We will not here ask how; we will content ourselves with showing that the supposition is a palpable absurdity; though it is one which the system in question is driven to, to maintain the appearance of benevolence. "The greatest good of the universe, of the whole, is what it professes to speak of, at the same time that it excludes a part of the universe, a part of the whole, from all share in that good; for it does not pretend that the reprobated portion is benefited by the arrangement. Accordingly, what is here called the universe, or the whole, does not embrace the excluded part; in other words, *it is not the universe, it is not the whole, but a part only*, though perhaps by far the greatest part. And the hypothesis is, in reality, this, — that the good of the universe, or of the whole, is impossible; and that the greatest good which *is* attainable in the divine

economy is but *partial*, and connected with *absolute evil*." *

It is a point established, then, that the divine wisdom, in the light even of the Calvinistic system, is utterly opposed to the endless punishment of man. For its design was to impart the greatest amount of happiness to mankind at large, which it does not do; and even the attempt to make this benevolence appear involves the absurdity that the whole excludes a part. This is *partialism* of the very first order.

If we now look at the other system, which is more generally advocated, the same want of wisdom is manifest, and even worse difficulties presented. This system boasts of benevolence and harmony. It claims the honor of exculpating the Deity from the foul charge which Calvinism would fix upon him, and of making the final misery of man the result of his own imprudence. It chimes with Calvinism, however, in admitting that the *design* of the Creator was to impart happiness to moral beings. This design is all we want. It is an invulnerable point with us, that the grand designs of Deity, with reference to the ends of his government, must be accomplished. Let us see what thing this is that will oppose them. It is the free will of man! But did not God's design take

* Expositor and Universalist Review, vol. ii. new series, *p. 14.*

in that matter? Did he design to save, and yet make no provision, no successful provision, for the difficulties? Can difficulties exist with God? Is the will of man a thing unconquerable with him? True, he may not force the creature. But may he not turn, and influence, and attract, and bring into a willing subjection? My friends, there never was a sinner saved yet, without an influence from exterior motives on the human will. There *never will* be a sinner converted, but by a subjugation of his untoward will. And God, who is mighty in goodness, may yet ply and influence the heart of man by the force of motives which will not be resisted. But, again, was it wisdom to set about a work and use the very means which were seen would defeat it? Did not the Almighty know, when he called up man from nothing's strange abode, and gave him a multitude of faculties for his future progress and moral elevation, — did he not know, when he did all this, and then when he added another power, the power of free will, that this would be the very one, among all the rest, which would defeat his object, and procure the endless ruin of the creature? Did he not know it? Answer me this, and tell me, — was it wisdom in the Deity thus to set about to defeat his own design?

"But," says an objector, "there was one point in the plan of the Omniscient that could not be given up or changed: that is the very point which presents the *difficulty* in question." Did not God

know it? Did he voluntarily involve himself in an insurmountable difficulty? But we have shown that man *might* be free, free as the Lord could make him, and yet *endless* punishment be as false as man was free. It does not follow, from the fact that man must be free, that he cannot be left free to incur, by disobedience, a limited penalty. In other words, it is not true that man must be left free to bring an endless curse upon himself, or else he cannot be made free at all.

Open, if you please, the depths of eternity itself. Transport the sinner beyond the shores of time. Leave him his freedom, and look upon your system then. Will endless rebellion and endless punishment be the portion of a free agent there? Will the very fact of his freedom eternize the transgression and the suffering? Rather the reverse; for time far short of eternity would turn the sinner to the way of wisdom, which is peace. Look, then, ye free will advocates of endless wo, look at your system stripped of its disguise. The decree of God, if not in favor of *introducing* the sinner into that world of misery, does, according to your theory, *perpetuate the misery*, after the creature has got there by the abuse of his free will. Can ye say, then, that God *desires* the well-being of them all? Talk not of justice here: this shall be noticed in its place. Consider the *wisdom* of the Deity. You say he desires and designs the *happiness of* all, but he has given, in wisdom, free

will to the creature; but even this does not prevent the accomplishment of the object in time far short of eternity, and yet the object is not accomplished! We would have this matter understood. We believe it has been almost wholly overlooked. It is always supposed, by the advocates of the exalted system of free-will-endless-misery, that God is exculpated from the charge of bringing this misery on mankind himself, and that no one is to blame but the creature who has so foolishly abused his privileges. And the sound has gone out, and the *sound* only, that it is not the decree of God, but the foolishness of man, that brings this misery upon him. But, in consideration of the fact that free agency and endless punishment are not necessarily connected, I wish to know what prolongs the misery to all eternity? What, in the name of reason, but the DECREE OF GOD, who employs his almighty power to keep up this suffering beyond the time which, without any violation of human agency, might produce a true and thorough reformation? It was not, according to this system, an awful, unconditional decree which placed those sufferers in misery at first; but it is, to make the best of it, an awful, unconditional decree which *keeps* them there, for no good purpose under heaven. And, rail as much as you will against the horrible decrees of Calvinism, talk as much as you will of the desire of God to effect the salvation of all his creatures; it is *your* decree, without that

desire — yes, it flashes upon our minds like day-light — it is this which casts a stigma on the character of God, after all is said, and obscures the lustre of his wisdom. Wisdom is outraged; and, with either system, we must figure in our minds a God who desires and contrives for the greatest good of the universe, but who either could not see that the entire misery of a part was inconsistent with the good of all, or who cannot, or else will not, devise means to overrule a punishment for good, after it may have accomplished a beneficial purpose.

If it is said that the Deity could devise such means, did justice permit, but that he cannot, consistently with justice, this involves the attribute of power.

II. The doctrine of endless punishment, then, is opposed to the attribute of *power*. It is not, we confess, in the Calvinistic system. Here we recognize omnipotent power. And there you behold it in the tremendous operation of creating, saving, and damning millions of immortal creatures, according to the dictates, or the caprice, of unjust, unguided, arbitrary sovereignty, — a power which, even if admitted to be infinite, reflects no honor on the Deity, but is the vilest imaginable imperfection.

It is, however, in the Arminian system, that the doctrine in question is opposed to the power of the Almighty. This system does indeed allow the *Deity to be almighty* in physical force. In the

heavens, among the orbs of immensity, far, far beyond this nether world,

> "Where other systems circle other suns,
> And worlds on worlds compose one universe,"

it does indeed recognize the power of God walking in greatness among the wonders of space interminable, and wheeling through infinity the ponderous orbs of light. But, for a perfect Deity, something more is wanted than mere physical strength, however overpowering or gigantic. And while this system, in common with all others, ascribes *such* perfection to the Holy One, it limits him in *moral* power, on which depends the whole efficiency of the plan of our redemption. It is here that we find it "wanting." It says, virtually, that God *cannot* accomplish what he designed to do. He cannot, for he has given man a free will which God cannot control! Yea, even against his own desires for the salvation of the world, and against his plan for the accomplishment thereof, he has made man the strongest, and God's power is baffled in the conflict! Say not that he cannot *force*. We tell you that he cannot *draw*, *influence*, or *attract*, in a willing or consenting mind. You say he designed so to do, and yet he does not. It must be, then, either because he *will* not, or because he *can* not. You will not admit the former; you must, then, acknowledge the latter. The will of man is thus made an obstacle which God cannot

overcome. And yet God gave the will, knowing the perversity with which it would oppose him. Did he, then, design to do that which he knew he could not? Did he thus clothe man with a power greater than his own? We say, your theory involves this absurdity: that God, in the creation of man, designed to exalt him in glory and honor, but gave him a power which made the accomplishment of this design impossible. It is not omnipotence to be unable to do that which is desired. But if your system is true, God has established a government which requires what he cannot desire, — the infliction of endless pain; which demands a full satisfaction for all requirements, by which his power is crippled in effecting what he desires, — the salvation of the world! O ye who love simplicity, what shibboleth is this!

III. But I know it will be said that justice must be executed; that Jehovah cannot strip himself of one of his perfections out of tenderness to his guilty creature, man; that come it must, upon the heads of the ungodly, all the punishment of an outraged, violated law.

But I trust we need not spend time to show that *Calvinism* is opposed to the justice of God. Its unequivocal declaration is, that those elected to everlasting life are thus secured "out of his mere free grace and love, *without any foresight of faith or good works, or any other thing in the creature, conditions or causes moving him thereto.*" And

those reprobated are made so by a decree equally unconditional, arbitrary, and unjust. The most cruel tyrant that ever disgraced the earth on which he trod would be infinitely humane and merciful, compared with this outrageous conception of the Deity. But, after all, the existence of such a system is not so great a wonder as that men of sense and virtue have so long believed it. We dismiss it, as unworthy a more patient argument.

Take, now, the system of Arminian partialism. Its benevolent offers are all worth nothing, if the punishment it inflicts for the rejection of them can be proved to be unjust. Let the question, then, be fairly stated: Is the penalty in question opposed to the attribute of justice, even though it may be sometimes escaped?

Here, then, we have an opportunity of looking into the nature of that attribute which is so frequently held out as opposed to the mercy of Jehovah, and which, alone, must seal the endless condemnation of the sinner. Let us see if the doctrine of endless punishment is not opposed to this distinguished attribute of Deity. We are frequently accused of magnifying the goodness, the mercy, and the love of the Creator; these, it is said, are our darling attributes, on which we delight to expatiate, and to build the lovely visions of a world regenerated into purity and bliss, but to the woful neglect of that justice which calls aloud for satisfaction. But *we plead not* guilty to this accusation.

plying the lash to another with unmitigated severity, and, on being questioned as to the object he had in view by such procedure, should reply, he had no *good* object, what should we call such a punishment, or what name should we apply to such unprofitable suffering? Should we call the person good or just, or the misery punishment? No, my friends, the individual would be branded as a cruel tyrant, without one spark of goodness or justice in him, and the misery he was causing, produced for the purpose of glutting a vindictive and revengeful spirit, or else for no assignable purpose under heaven. And what shall we say, when the same conduct, only infinitely worse, is ascribed to the Creator and Governor of the universe? O! we need not confine ourselves to goodness, to love, or mercy, or any other principle of relenting or tenderness whatever in the Deity, to ground an argument against the idea of endless punishment; only give us justice, assure us that this attribute exists among the perfections of the Godhead, and around this we will build our hopes, our expectations, and our arguments, for the eventual well-being of the whole family of man.

But, again, look at the subject in another light. Imagine the time before the sovereign word went forth to usher into being a race of intelligent creatures. Look at the Deity before the creation of man, existing in his own self-sufficiency, wanting *nothing to* augment his happiness, revolving in his

mind a plan for introducing millions and millions of rational creatures into an existence which he *knows* will prove an everlasting curse to them! Here, no sin can be taken into the account, for man had not existed. Man was in peaceful non-entity. Nothing, absolutely nothing, can here be brought in the shape of a rational argument against us. For nothing existed on the part of man, and nothing but the arbitrary will of Deity on his part. Now, justice puts forth her claims. Justice cries aloud for some assignable reason for such an act of creative power. As the Deity created all things from nothing, or was under no obligation to give existence unto man, but still did, of his own sovereign will and pleasure, in *justice*, we say, he seems compelled to render that existence, on the whole, a blessing. The consideration of man's free agency weighs here not one feather in the scale. Free agency did not exist before the creature who, it is said, possesses it. The state of the matter in brief is this: nothing existed, and *out of nothing* the Deity produced an *endless curse!* O, would it not have been an act of mercy not to have animated lifeless dust, rather than to do it, in full view of the tremendous and unutterable consequences which it is said will result from it? Talk not, I say, of free agency. God, you say, gave the agency, *knowing*, at the time he gave it, that it would prove the instrument of the creature's ruin. Why, then, *did he give it?* Or, at least, why did

he create *that part* of mankind whom he *knew* would abuse their agency to their endless sorrow? We can here feel the justness of the plea so affectingly set forth by the poet:

> "Father of mercies! why from silent earth
> Didst thou awake and *curse* me into birth?
> Tear me from quiet, ravish me from night?
> And make a *thankless* present of thy light?
> Push into being a reverse of thee,
> And animate a clod with misery?"

We conclude, my friends, that the doctrine of endless punishment is in opposition to the justice of Jehovah.

But, again, we are to determine the *degree* of punishment which justice of right requires. And we presume that all will agree in the statement, that punishment must be proportioned to the crime. We are exceedingly happy in stating that in this all sects in Christendom agree. We have, then, got one starting place from which to proceed, in hopes of condemning the opposer in the very thing which he alloweth. Punishment must be proportioned to the crime, or else it is manifestly unjust. Now, what proportion is there between the sins of time and the punishment of eternity? We may, on an average, or rather to the furthest general extent, limit all sin to the brief space of three score years and ten. For this short space, a mere point, as it were, in the line of our existence, a whole eternity *of unutterable* pain must be administered! Should

a father inflict upon a disobedient child a severe and unrelenting punishment for seventy years, for a few sins committed in the days of childhood, he would be infinitely more just than God is represented; for there is a proportion between a few days and seventy years, but there is none between time and eternity.

But we are aware this argument may be evaded. We know that another thing is resorted to, to prove the justness of interminable punishment; and that is, the infinite and holy character of that God against whom sin is committed. In other words, it is said that sin is an infinite evil, and therefore deserves an infinite punishment. As many times as we have had occasion to combat this argument, we have no objections to going over the ground again, in hopes that conviction may be fastened upon some mind, and the cause of truth be promoted. Sin, it is affirmed, is infinite, and therefore justice demands an infinite punishment.

To attack this argument in its fortress, and dislodge it thence, we should ask immediately, — how is it known that sin is infinite? The answer given is, that the *law* is infinite, therefore the transgression of it is. But this is not going far back enough. How is it known that the *law* is infinite? The only answer is, — God is infinite — God made the law — therefore the law is infinite. *Therefore* is a dangerous word to use. It seems, then, that

the whole argument for the infinite nature of sin is based upon the simple fact of the infinity of God. God is infinite — God made the law — *therefore* the law is infinite, and *therefore* the transgression of it is. Where could *Tekel* be more appropriately written than on such an argument as this? It can be exploded best by a few applications of it. God made a mountain — God is infinite — *therefore* the mountain is infinite. God made a man — God is infinite — *therefore* the man is infinite! And why, in the name of reason, is not this as logical a conclusion as that respecting the magnitude of sin? We might rest here in the conclusion that sin is not an infinite evil because committed against an infinite God, but we prefer to look a little further, and to offer a few reasons why sin, in its nature, cannot be infinite.

In the first place, we might ask the simple question a thousand times put, if man, a finite cause, can produce an infinite effect.

But, again, if sin is infinite, then there can be no *degrees* in transgression. When speaking of infinities, it is absurd to talk of greater or less. One infinite thing cannot be larger than another. And so, if sin is infinite, all sins are of equal magnitude, and the most trifling transgression is as flagrant as the blackest crime, which is an absurdity.

Again, if sin is infinite, where is the propriety of this language of the apostle: "Where sin

abounded grace did much more abound?" But is there any such thing as any thing abounding *much more* than *infinite*?

Once more: and here is a conclusive argument, if all the rest are worth nothing. If sin is infinite, because of disobedience to an infinite law, then virtue is infinite, because of obedience to that same infinite law. For "it is a poor rule that won't work both ways." Accordingly, a man may be an infinite sinner, and an infinite saint, at the same time; deserving, at once, of an infinite reward, and an infinite punishment. And I leave such a being, subject to such a law, for the disposal of wiser heads than mine, and better initiated into the mysteries of popular divinity.

Now, the question returns upon us — and we deem it a hard one — where is the justice of God in inflicting an infinite punishment for a finite sin? We rest in the conclusion, that the doctrine of endless and infinite punishment, whether we regard the object of justice in punishing, or the magnitude of sin, is plainly opposed to the justice of the Almighty.

There are only three objections which can be urged against the justness of the conclusion to which we have now arrived.

First, it is contended that, in spite of all our reasonings, the Scriptures assert the infinite nature of sin. Does not the inspired penman say, (Job xxii. 5,) "*Is not thy wickedness great*? and thine

INIQUITIES INFINITE?" Is not this written in the Scriptures? Yes; and so it is written in the Scriptures concerning Christ, "Behold a man gluttonous, and a wine bibber." But this is not the language of truth. It came from the *enemies* of Christ. So, in the former instance, it was not the declaration of God that iniquity was infinite. It was the language of Job's enemy. It was Eliphaz the Temanite who made this affirmation. It formed no part of the oracles of truth, but was, on the contrary, a false and unjust reproach of Job's character.

Again, if this language proves that sin is infinite, then we can prove that *human strength* is infinite. For it is written in the book of Nahum iii. 9, concerning the city of No, "Ethiopia and Egypt were her strength, and it was *infinite*." But can any human strength be absolutely infinite, *unlimited*? The passage from Job, then, proves nothing to the purpose. There are two strong arguments against it. In the first place, it was a falsehood of Eliphaz the Temanite; in the second place, the same word is used by an inspired prophet, and applied to finite nature.

Secondly, it is objected that we argue against what no one contends for, and that we leave the doctrine of endless punishment untouched. Our argument has been this: sin is not infinite, therefore it deserves not infinite punishment. But we are now told that "nobody contends for *infinite*

punishment, but only for *endless*. For punishment to be absolutely infinite, two infinities would be required, infinite duration, and infinite severity or magnitude; whereas, nobody believes this. In spite of our argument, then, against 'infinite' punishment, *endless* punishment remains untouched and true."

We should not, I think, have noticed this metaphysical argument, had it not been wielded by the gigantic, metaphysical, double-and-twisted intellect of Dr. Jonathan Edwards. It has been put forth by him, and the doctor talks wisely on it. "Here you see," says the doctor, (I give his argument, and not his words,) "is an infinite *line*, infinite in *length*; now, here is an infinite *superficies*, infinite in *length*, and *breadth*; and here, now, is an infinite *solid*, infinite in *length*, and *breadth*, and *thickness*. So you see, there is but one absolute infinity, after all; or, rather, infinities may be of an infinite difference in quantity, according to the nature of the object. Now, when you talk of infinite punishment, you overpass the mark. You argue against what nobody contends for. *Endless* punishment, is not *infinite* punishment. Despite of all your argument, then, from the nature of sin, against infinite punishment, endless punishment may still be true, and this is all the word of God declares."

Yea, doctor, but what does all this mighty reasoning prove? In the first place, it only makes *you* more *inconsistent*. For you still hold to the infinite

nature of sin. If sin is infinite, then, it *deserves* infinite punishment. And yet you only teach *endless* consequences! Be careful, else thine own trap will ensnare thee. I call on all who hold to the infinite nature of sin to advocate, in justness, infinite punishment, infinite in severity and duration. Else do not accuse *us* of denying the justice of God. Then your doctrine will be more monstrous, and, if possible, more worthy of the devil than it now is. Be consistent, now; either give up infinite sin, or else hold to what your conscience and your better feelings revolt at, — punishment infinite in magnitude, and endless in duration.

In the next place, let us inquire how the argument affects us. Let it be observed, then, that it does not disprove the finite nature of sin. On the contrary, it rather establishes it, and disproves its infinity. For if sin does not meet with absolute infinite punishment, it cannot be that God views it an infinite evil. So that, admitting the argument all its force, it confirms rather than destroys our views of the finite nature of sin.

Again, how does it affect the doctrine of endless punishment? Does it prove it true? No; for although finite sin (finite, as we have proved) disproves *infinite* punishment, yet it does not at the same time *prove* endless (finite?) punishment. Who can say that, because infinite punishment *cannot be* inflicted for finite sin, yet endless punishment *must be*? This would be jumping at conclu-

sions indeed. Therefore, all the argument proves is, that infinite punishment is *not* true; but that endless punishment *is*, is the very point remaining yet unproved.

But, to quit the labyrinth of metaphysics, if absolute infinite punishment, in degree and duration, is not believed, why do we hear so much of the word in the preaching and writing of the partialist clergy?

Again, do not their common representations of the torments of the damned — sometimes terrific beyond all description — countenance the idea of unimaginable punishment in degree as well as duration? And if it is not absolutely infinite, is it not represented so unutterably horrific as to give the argument an overwhelming force against the justice of such a punishment, protracted through the ages of eternity, for the sins of a few years this side the grave? Here, then, we rest. Metaphysics do not affright us. Our faith remains unharmed. Infinite punishment, or endless punishment, we care not which — the latter is infinite in one sense — must ever be repelled when it looks the Bible or sound reason in the face.

Thirdly, it is objected that we misapprehend the subject; that it is not contended that endless punishment is inflicted for the sins of this life alone, but that those who die impenitent will continue to sin throughout eternity, and "eternal punishment,"

as Dr. Beecher says, "will tread upon the heels of eternal transgression."

In reply to this we remark, in the first place, that this is neither the common representation of the subject, nor is it the idea attached to those scriptures which are usually made use of to establish the doctrine in question. It is not the common representation of the subject; for we do not hear, generally, when this doctrine is advanced, that endless punishment is the consequence of endless sinning; that men will go away into everlasting sin; that God will inflict upon them endless transgression, &c. No; it is endless punishment for the sins, the unrepented sins, of mortal life. This is represented as the state of probation; and if we do not improve it, then, *for our abuse of privileges here*, we are threatened with the torments of eternity. I say, this is the *common* manner of representing the subject, despite of all attempts to shield themselves from inconsistency, by resorting to the hypothesis of endless sin. And we cannot but view the hypothesis in question as a necessary though unscriptural refuge, to rid themselves of the charge of enormity and injustice which the doctrine of endless punishment for the sins of a moment, as it were, fixes, deathlike, upon their appalling theory.

Again, it is not the idea conveyed by those scriptural passages which are usually made use

of to establish the doctrine in question. There is nothing in the Bible which speaks of endless sin. On the contrary, we are informed that the Messiah shall "finish sin, make an *end* of transgression, and bring in everlasting righteousness." We repeat, the Bible knows nothing about endless sin. The phrase is as unscriptual as *mortal virtue*, or *temporary immortality*. Yea, the Bible and the pulpit too, tell us that we are to receive "according to that we *have done*, whether it be good or bad," not according to that we *shall do* throughout eternity. Away, then, with the unscriptural and unreasonable idea of *endless sin*.

We remark, in the second place, that, admitting this true, it does not vindicate the justice of the Deity in inflicting endless punishment. It only magnifies the *evident* injustice into more *enormous* injustice. It is adding enormity to enormity. In the first place, it should be observed, that the argument admits at once, that endless punishment is an unjust one for the sins of this life. We would have this point remembered. Be it known, then, that the "orthodox" clergy in general have openly acknowledged that endless punishment for the sins of this life is a most flagrant, and enormous, and infinite act of injustice! All this comes from the argument that it is endless sin, and not the sins of time, which alone vindicates the justice of the punishment.

But *if endless punishment* for the sins of this

that the knowledge of God is presented in a strange light. The desire and the design of God are here represented to be the final happiness of all; and yet, with a full sight of the prospective damnation of a large portion of his creatures, he sets in operation a set of means which he KNOWS will prove abortive, and secure it! Here is knowledge, absolute and perfect knowledge, hard against the desire and the deliberate design! And, indeed, so glaring is this consequence of the theory in question, that Dr. Clarke has gone so far as to question outright that God *has* knowledge of all things. "I conclude," says the doctor, after a long argument on this subject, "that God, although omniscient, is not *obliged*, (!) in consequence of this, *to know all that he can know*." * Pardon the comparison, doctor: although I am a boy in comparison with thee, I conclude that, if a person should *try hard* to *remember* to *forget* a thing, he would exhibit about as much wisdom as thou hast exhibited on this point to us thy scholars. And here shall be an end.

While on this subject, we cannot refrain from noticing again the subject of endless punishment in connection with human agency. We will here *allow* what never can be proved, — that the Creator could not have constituted man a free agent without exposing him to endless ruin. "He could

* Clarke's note on Acts ii.

ıot," say you, "have made moral beings without ;iving them an agency to choose the good and efuse the evil; and the evil, in justice, required :ndless punishment." We have just shown, how-:ver, that it does not. Still, admit that it does,— hat thus the agency came to exist, and that thus he creature was, in justice, exposed to endless ɔunishment; yet, still, God must have known what ɔortion of mankind would have made good use of, ınd what portion would have abused, their agency. Now, with this knowledge, if his desire was for the ıappiness of all, why did he not leave in non-:xistence *that part* of mankind whom he foreknew would abuse their agency, and prevent the accom-ɔlishment of his design? This he was at perfect iberty to do. He knew, to an individual, how many, and who they were, who would make good ıse of, and, on the other hand, how many and who would abuse, their agency. And had those whom he foreknew would abuse their agency *never been created*, then, notwithstanding thé admitted justness of even *endless* punishment, God would have satisfied his desires and accomplished his design in the salvation of the whole race! But, notwithstanding the Deity foreknew every ndividual who would go counter to his desires, yet ıe brought them into existence, to the known frus-ration of his designs. We say, notwithstanding free agency, and even the admitted justness of endless *punishment*, the Creator might have dis-

pensed with *that part* of mankind by whom alone the punishment would have been rendered necessary, and by whom alone his desires were defeated. For he had the knowledge that would have enabled him to do it. Admit, then, that man is a free agent, that endless punishment is just, yet that God's desire is not for it, and *yet* that he had the knowledge which, *in perfect* CONSISTENCY *with this agency and this punishment*, would have enabled him to prevent the punishment, and how is this doctrine opposed to the attribute of knowledge? It looks to us like the force of a mathematical demonstration.

V. There are three remaining attributes,—mercy, love, and truth. To attempt a labored argument to show that Calvinism is opposed to the *mercy* of Jehovah, would seem like laboring to prove a truism. *There is no mercy in it.* But stop: there may be a *partial* mercy, and it must bear the impression of partial-*ism*.

Is there any mercy in the Arminian theory? To do our brethren justice, we must notice them. It is not pretended that there is any mercy in the actual *infliction* of torment through eternity. The mercy, it is contended, consists in the offer to escape it. To this it is replied again, God knew, when he determined to offer, who would accept and who would reject it. It would, then, have been an act of mercy *not to have created* that part of *mankind* whom he knew would reject the offer

to their own damnation. As it is, there can be no mercy in it. And the very offer, under such circumstances, is but an offering of hypocrisy.

VI. We come to the attribute of love. Is there any *love* in Calvinism? There is the love of partialism, but the love of God is not in it.

Is there any love in Arminianism? Just as much love as there is in its offering of mercy.

Again, "Love worketh no ill." Arminianism works an infinite ill. Love differs from mercy in this: mercy regards its objects when in danger or suffering; love regards its objects under any circumstances whatever, and is ever ready to bestow the good. Now there is no good in endless punishment. It cannot be overruled for good to those who suffer it; and it cannot result in good to the universe, taken as a whole; for we have already seen the absurdity of this. It is an *end*, and not a *means*,—a final state of positive and unmixed evil. To talk of love as permitting an endless evil, is no more reasonable than to talk of hatred as permitting an endless good. We cannot dwell upon the subject. It must be that partialism, in all its forms, is at jarring discord with the infinite, universal love of God. Indeed, with regard to this attribute, it is represented as the very nature of the Deity. "God is love;" in which, we conclude, all the other attributes must harmonize.

VII. Lastly, *the truth* of God remains to be

LECTURE II.

ARGUMENT AGAINST THE DOCTRINE OF ENDLESS PUNISHMENT, CONTINUED.

Thou art weighed in the balances, and art found wanting.
Daniel v. 27.

In our last lecture, we considered, briefly, the attribute of divine truth. We found enough, even in that argument, to disprove the doctrine which professes to be founded on it. But we may now look more particularly to the records of that truth, though not so fully as in a future lecture for the purpose, where the Scriptures will be especially appealed to. Our present argument will be grounded on some prominent features of divine truth, together with certain admissions and professions of those who advocate the "contrary part."

I. *The doctrine of endless punishment is nowhere inculcated in the* LAW *of God.* A few reflections will convince us of the importance of this, our first proposition. Where, my friends, shall we look for the threatening of unceasing punishment, if not in connection with the *law* of God? Where could we expect to find this tremendous *truth, if it is* a truth, with more consistency than

in connection with that law which was given amid thunderings and lightnings, as an appropriate intimation of its terrific character? The law was a "ministration of condemnation and death." "By the law," says the apostle, "is the knowledge of sin." It merely states its requirements and its penalties, and here it leaves us. Surely, then, with such a view of the nature of the law, together with the fact that endless punishment is always declared by its advocates to be its penalty, we may consistently expect to find that penalty here, if any where, annexed to the law, and enforcing the authority of its sanctions. In short, the matter is this: endless punishment is declared to be the penalty of the law. Of course, then, we must look for the penalty where we look for the law. And if we cannot find it here, where can we find it? We cannot more rationally expect to find it in the gospel, or in the promises. While the law is a "ministration of condemnation and death," the gospel is styled a "much more glorious ministration of life." We must, then, look for the penalty where we look for the law.

Now it is a fact, which strikes us forcibly, that the law of God knows no such penalty as our ministers of wo assign to it. The law does not contain it. It was not threatened to Adam on the first transgression — it was not mentioned to Cain — not a lisp of it to the antedeluvians, who were swept from the *earth by a flood* — not an intimation of it

to the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah — to the Egyptians, for their treatment of the Israelites — not a particle of it in all the law given in terrors from mount Sinai — nor in the case of Abimelech, the sinful Shechemites, the wicked king Ahab, Jezebel, and the sinful Amorites, — in all these cases of abominable wickedness not the most distant allusion is made to a world of unceasing torment for any who were guilty.

We have not alluded to these instances of iniquity without a sufficient reason. More than three thousand years had now passed, from the creation of the world, and yet, notwithstanding all this wickedness, not a word, not an intimation, do we find of the common doctrine of unceasing misery. Can a sufficient reason be assigned? How can it be accounted for, admitting the truth of such momentous suffering? Where was the kindness of God in not warning his creatures of their danger? Peruse the whole code of Jewish laws, and you cannot find such a penalty so much as intimated.

And this, you will observe, is not our own declaration merely, but admitted even by the opposers of our faith: they are forced to admit it, for the Bible, thus far, is as silent as death about it. And what must further astonish us, is a still wider admission, from some of the most eminent Orthodox critics themselves, that the *whole Old Testament must* be given up, as affording no proof at all of the *horrid doctrine* of unending woe! This is a fact

which but few, comparatively, are aware of. Dr. Campbell, the celebrated Scotch Presbyterian, declares, "It is plain, that, in the Old Testament, the most profound silence is observed in regard to the state of the deceased their joys or sorrows, happiness or misery." Dr. Whitby, an eminent English Episcopalian, says of the word rendered *hell* in the Old Testament, "It is the place to which the good as well as the bad go; not the place of punishment, but the *grave*, or place of death." Dr. Adam Clarke, the great Methodist luminary, says, on Matt. xi. 23, "The word *hell* (the same as *sheol* in the Old Testament) conveys *now* an *improper* meaning of the original word, because hell is (now) only used to signify the place of the damned." Professor Stuart, of one of our own institutions at Andover, Mass. has given it as his opinion that there are but *five* texts in the Old Testament wherein the word hell occurs, which even teach *future* punishment; and these, he says, do not determine its duration.

What a concession is this from avowed and eminent defenders of the eternity of punishment! What would *common* Christians think, those who have not the facilities of knowledge which these writers had, should they hear their faithful ministers declare a truth like this? Now, is it right, can it be right, that thousands should be kept in ignorance of a fact so important, and so unfavorable to the theory in question? Is it right that so

many should remain in darkness, unaware of a truth admitted even by their own commentators, that the Scriptures of the Old Testament, especially that word hell, does not countenance the doctrine which is, time after time, and Sabbath after Sabbath, pressed upon them, as the stay and pillar of social order, morality, and virtue? Verily the time has come when the people should mistrust their teachers, and search the Scriptures daily as the only guide to truth. Let earnest, careful, prayerful search take the place of mere submission to authority of men, and God will be honored, and his truth glorified among us.

But, to keep the line of our discourse, we have seen, and we have seen that others opposed to us have seen, that the law of God, whether we regard the commands and threatenings before the deliverance at Sinai, or the whole of those laws given amidst thunderings and lightnings, and even the whole Old Testament itself, does not intimate the threatening of unceasing misery.

But now I am aware that it may be said that such a revelation could not be expected, since the doctrine of a *future life* was not revealed till Christ brought life and immortality to light through the gospel. To this we reply, a future *life was* revealed, though perhaps in not so distinct a manner as Christ declared it to the world. A future state of being is recognized in many places in the Old *Testament.* Christ blamed the Sadducees for not

learning it from Moses at the bush. "Now that the dead are raised," says Jesus, "even Moses showed at the bush, when he calleth the Lord the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. For he is not a God of the dead, but of the living." Again, we are informed that the dust returns to the earth as it was, but "the spirit unto God who gave it." This was revealed in Old Testament times. Also in many other places, where men are said to have "slept with their fathers," &c. there is recognized some vague idea of a future state, though not so definite and distinct as is set forth in the gospel. If, then, a future *life* was revealed, why not the tremendous idea of unending torment shadowed forth? Yea, even admitting all that this argument wants, that a future life was *not* revealed, still we are inclined to press the question, *why* not, if endless punishment is true? This, it is pretended, is the penalty of the law. The law was revealed; why not this penalty? Yea, why not blazed in characters of light throughout the Old Testament Scriptures, that all might have seen and known their danger? Where was the kindness of God in not sounding the alarm? Think you, my brethren! millions and millions of creatures exposed by their Creator to torments inexpressible in their nature, and endless in their duration, and yet all as silent as death about it for the space of three thousand, and, as some admit, four *thousand* four hundred years; and

thousands and tens of thousands going down, perhaps, to welter in these torments; and still no voice of warning, nothing at all from the Deity. Strange to conceive, his law was given in awful circumstances of terrific grandeur, but not a word about this penalty; only temporal calamities, which, to the idea of endless sufferings, are as but a particle of flying dust to the boundless universe around us! Why was this? Can any one tell? We are satisfied that, if this had been a truth, we should have heard, at least, something of it in connection with the law of God. But the law is silent, and our proposition is established.

II. *The very nature of the law renders it utterly impossible that such a penalty as endless misery should be annexed to it by a God of wisdom.* What is the nature of the law? What is the sum and substance of all the divine commands? "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and thy neighbor as thyself. On these two commandments hang [or depend] all the law and the prophets." Here, then, is the sum and substance of the law. Whatever may be contained in all the various rules and directions relative to moral actions, it is all embodied in this, — love to God and man. Here we have the subject simplified exceedingly. Here, too, all sects are agreed. We have, then, got another starting place from which to proceed, in hopes of condemning the objector *in the* thing which he alloweth. God, it

seems, has enacted a law that his creatures shall love him with all their hearts, and their neighbors as themselves. To this all men assent. But to this law he has annexed a penalty, it is said, of endless misery. But we wish to inquire, for what are penalties annexed to laws, if not to secure obedience to those laws? You would marvel much at any human legislature who should enact laws, and attach such penalties as were not at all calculated to secure obedience. And you would marvel still more, should those penalties be rather calculated to *prevent* obedience, and perpetuate hatred and rebellion. But how has God conducted, according to the system of jurisprudence in question? According to the doctrine of endless punishment, God has enacted a law of love, that his creatures shall love him with all their hearts, and love one another as themselves: to this he has annexed a penalty which, instead of securing his design in the obedience of that law, goes directly to defeat it, and perpetuate eternal disobedience and hatred! For in that world of wo, it is affirmed, no love dwells, no reconciliation exists, but its wretched inhabitants are eternally employed in works of malice, hatred, and rebellion. Is it to be supposed that a God of wisdom would have thus conducted? Make a law requiring obedience, attach a penalty which, instead of securing it, *compels* the disobedient to go on *eternally* disobeying! My candid *hearers*, the law of God requires and

will accept of nothing but obedience. Surely, it will not accept of disobedience as a substitute. But, says one, it is plain that the law of God must have some penalty, that some punishment must be inflicted for the disobedience of it. True; but where is the wisdom of inflicting a punishment which, instead of securing the design of the law, goes directly to defeat it?

Suppose a similar case. Suppose a human legislature should enact a law for the prevention of theft, requiring the subjects of the government to be honest men. Now it is reasonable to suppose that the government would accept of nothing *but* honesty. But, contrary to this, a penalty is annexed to this law, which, inflicted, compels the thief to go on stealing all his life-time! And this satisfies the government! Notwithstanding the law requires honesty, it accepts perpetual dishonesty instead! In fact, the penalty is such that it *compels* the criminal to repeat his crimes, and makes obedience impossible.

Now this, in sober truth, is precisely the way of the Creator, as represented by modern misnamed Orthodox divinity. He enacts a law requiring love, and accepts eternal hatred as a substitute. He requires obedience, yet the penalty compels to eternal disobedience. We had always thought that penalties were annexed to laws to make obedient subjects. But here is a case, and it arrogates the *name of Orthodoxy*, where the penalty of the law

of love to God insures eternal hatred to him; where obedience is required, but the law is satisfied with eternal disobedience! We consider our proposition abundantly established,—that the very nature of the law renders it utterly impossible that such a penalty as endless misery should be annexed to it by a God of wisdom.

But this conclusion is confirmed by a declaration of Jesus Christ, concerning the *fulfilment* of the law: "Think not," said he, "that I am come to *destroy* the law, or the prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to *fulfil*. For, verily I say unto you, till heaven and earth pass, *one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law* TILL ALL BE FULFILLED." (Matt. v. 17, 18.) Who will oppose this declaration? God will never accept disobedience and hatred for obedience and love. If all the law is contained in love to God and man—and it is, for on these two commands hang *all the law* and the prophets—and if not one jot or tittle shall pass from this law till it all be fulfilled, evidently the time must come when it *will* be all fulfilled, all disobedience done away, all hatred destroyed, and love to God be universal! How much more consistent is this beautiful harmony of sacred truth than the maze of confusion and absurdity which we have just examined! Our proposition, then, is established and confirmed, and the conclusion thus far is, that the doctrine of endless punishment *is nowhere* found in connection with

the law of God, and is, moreover, opposed to the very nature of the law.

III. *This doctrine, with its connections, denies the unchangeableness of God.* That God is unchangeable is also a truth admitted on every hand; and here, again, we are all agreed in the outset. But look at this fact in connection with the divine goodness, as set forth by the advocates of endless wo. Endless punishment can be nothing less than the effect of endless wrath. Without endless wrath, or enmity, or hatred — call it either name you please — endless punishment could not be administered; for, certainly, it cannot be pretended that complacency, or love, or friendship, would inflict such a misery. As, then, endless punishment is dependent on endless enmity, by showing that endless enmity denies the unchangeableness of God, we shall show that endless punishment does likewise; for this latter is entirely dependent on the former. Now look throughout the world, and observe the effort, the exertion, the countless means put in operation to save mankind from the endless enmity of God, and ask yourselves what all this in reality is. Disguise it as much as you will, — talk about saving free moral agents, doing the work of an evangelist, preaching the word of reconciliation, — what, in reason's name, do we see, in reality, but one wide and presumptuous attempt to change the unchangeable God, to turn away his *enmity, to obtain* his favor, to convert him from an

enemy to a friend of man? I have no doubt that I am addressing some Christians now who are accustomed to listen, week after week, to the appeals, the entreaties, and the exhortations of their ministers, who are laboring to subdue their stubborn hearts, and turn them from the ways of wickedness to virtue, and all this for the purpose of making God, who is now declared to be their enemy, their faithful and enduring friend. And is it not strange, passing strange, that the monstrosity of this attempt should never have been suggested to the mind? To turn man from the ways of wickedness to wisdom is a laudable work; but to do this in hopes of changing the affections of the almighty and unchangeable One, — to do it in hopes of averting his enmity and procuring his favor, — to do it, in fact, and then to assure the deluded converts that the change is effected, that the wrath of the Almighty is turned to grace, that God, the immutable, has experienced as great, and, in truth, a greater conversion than the sinner, is a presumptuous and open defiance of the immutability of Jehovah.

This argument, my Christian friends, is not only felt to be of some force with us, but it is felt by the rejectors of our doctrine; and, accordingly, they have resolved the matter into this: that God's unchangeableness in this respect consists in ever approving virtue and condemning sin; and, accordingly, while the individual lives in sin, he *may experience the* enmity, and, when he turns

from sin to virtue, he may then experience the friendship of God, without any change on the part of Deity; for, from the beginning, he has ever been the enemy of sin and the friend of virtue. The Deity does not, then, hate and love the same object at different times, but the object becomes changed, which at first was sinful, and afterwards virtuous, — first the sinner, and then the saint.

This argument is composed partly of truth and partly of error. It is true that God's unchangeableness consists in ever approving virtue and condemning sin. But the conclusion does not follow that he may hate the sinner, and love the same individual when turned to virtue, without manifesting any change. A discriminating mind will detect this distinction, — a difference between sin and the sinner. God may hate sin, and still love the sinner. This may be, in the same way that a parent hates the wickedness of a disobedient child, but still loves the child. Now, when it is affirmed that God's unchangeableness consists in ever hating sin and loving virtue, we will agree in this. But, mind you, it is the sinner, not sin, who is represented to experience the enmity of God. And when the sinner turns to virtue, it is not the virtue, but this same individual, who is then declared to be the friend of God. The Deity, then, does hate and love, according to this doctrine, the same *object at different* times.

We hope this argument is understood, for it is

an important error which is here exposed. There is surely a distinction between sin and the person who sins. Now the doctrine of endless punishment declares that not only sin, but the person who sins, is an object of God's hatred. And, when the sinner turns to virtue, it is not the virtue alone, but this same person who sinned, who is now declared to be an object of God's unfailing love; and all this without any change on the part of Deity. Thousands of preachers and exhorters are going forth into the world, not merely to induce people to give up their sin and to become virtuous, that thus they may escape a punishment and insure a reward, but they are inducing men to give up sin and become virtuous, that they may thereby change God's enmity to love! Yea, they are trying, with Herculean power, to *convert Jehovah* from the deadly enemy to the enduring friend of man! A mind with any reverence for its Maker ought to tremble at the blasphemy of the thought. And yet, strange to conceive, thousands and hundreds of thousands of Christians are assenting to this truth, and giving it their full and cordial support, as the truth of Him who is the same, yesterday, to-day, and forever! Alas, for the blinding power of human creeds and educational prejudice! We consider our third proposition fully established,—that the doctrine of endless punishment, as commonly held forth, denies the unchangeableness of *God.*

IV. *This doctrine declares the inefficacy of the labors, sufferings, and death, and the everlasting disappointment and dissatisfaction of Jesus Christ.* For what did Christ labor in the earth? He had a work to do while here in the flesh. "My meat," says he, "is to do the will of him that sent me, and to finish his work." What was the will of him that sent him? Jesus himself shall answer: "I came down from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of him that sent me. And this is the will of him that sent me, that of all which he hath given me, I should lose nothing." But how many were given to Christ? "The Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hands." Then it seems that the work which Christ came to do was the will of God, and the will of God was, that of all which were given to Christ, he should lose nothing. This was the work for which Christ labored, suffered, and died. Indeed, it is now generally admitted that Christ died for all, according to the import of the Scriptures which declare that he "gave himself a ransom for all," and "tasted death for every man."

But how inefficacious will his labors, sufferings, and death prove, if a considerable portion, or any for whom he died, are never to experience his salvation, but exist forever in misery and sin! It is useless to say that men will not come unto him *and* be saved. This is the most trifling evasion. *d saw the* difficulties, if any, which would result

from man's free agency; and when he sent his Son to die for the human race, these difficulties must have been contemplated. And if, notwithstanding these, his plan of salvation is to fail, what a reflection upon his efficiency! It would be singular, indeed, should Christ fail in this benevolent undertaking, for he himself has reproved the folly of setting out in a work without first calculatiug the difficulties attending it. "Which of you," he says, "intending to build a tower, sitteth not down first and counteth the cost, whether he have sufficient to finish it? Lest, haply, after he hath laid the foundation, and is not able to finish, all that behold it begin to mock him, saying, This man began to build, but was not able to finish. Or what king, going to make war against another king, sitteth not down first and consulteth whether he is able, with ten thousand, to meet him that cometh against him with twenty thousand." (Luke xiv. 28—31.) Surely he who delivered this instruction, and administered this reproof, would never himself set out in a work, — the work of universal redemption, — without first sitting down and calculating the difficulties attending it, whether from free agency or any thing else. And do you think, then, he will not accomplish his work?

But the case of Christ, according to popular theology, was different from either of the former. The conduct of him was more unwise than a man who *should set out to* build a tower, or a king who

should go to war against another king, without first looking at their situation and capacity. They might have some ground for beginning their work on uncertainties, — some ground for expectation of aid from some human source or other; and, accordingly, they commence their work, although at first incompetent to finish it, not knowing but they may be competent from growing means. But look at the work of Jesus Christ. He undertook a work which, according to the common theory, he not only cannot finish, but which he *knew*, at the commencement, he could not! But if he did not know, but only labored and desired, why reprove others for engaging in an enterprise without first counting the cost and difficulties? And if he did not know, but only *endeavored* for the good of all, he must, according to the theory in question, be everlastingly disappointed and dissatisfied. For he labored, suffered, and died for all, and only a part are to reap any benefit from his mission. But what saith the Scriptures on this subject? "*He shall see of the travail of his soul, and be satisfied.*" (Isa. liii. 11.) Therefore, our fourth proposition is established, — that the doctrine of endless punishment declares the inefficacy of the labors, sufferings, and death, and the everlasting disappointment and dissatisfaction of Jesus Christ.

V. *This doctrine, with its connections, attaches more importance to the works of men than to the grace of God.* There is no one truth respecting

our salvation set forth with more clearness, than that it is "the gift of God; not of works, lest any man should boast." This truth is repeated with such frequency and distinctness in the New Testament, that not only ourselves, but all Christian sects, acknowledge it, and are free to confess that the doctrine of *free grace* is at least one item in the true Christian faith.

But, notwithstanding these professions and pretensions, what do we perceive, in reality, in the theory of a partial salvation? Evidently, that the works of men, — the independent works of men, — independent of the grace of God, are absolutely necessary to secure salvation. "But stop," says an objector; "it must be palpably evident that, notwithstanding the free grace of God, something is requisite on our part; for, although the sun shines as a free gift upon the lands of all, yet, without our labor, we should never secure the productions of the earth."

We admit the justness of the comparison, but cannot admit the justness of the conclusion to which it aims. To be sure, the rays of the sun and the labor of men are both necessary to secure the harvest. And if man did not work, the harvest would not come to him. The harvest, therefore, is not so free a gift as that it will come forcibly upon us, whether we will or no. But it is a lame comparison, after all. Does not God, in the bestowment *of this gift*, influence the will of the hus-

bandman to coöperate with his own? To be sure he does. For, in the very promise that seedtime and harvest should not fail, God must have determined to put in operation the causes which would infallibly secure it. One of these causes is the consenting will of man. God does not make man a *passive* recipient of a temporary harvest, neither will he make him a passive recipient of eternal salvation. His will will coöperate with the will of man, and man become a willing subject of Messiah's kingdom.

But the system we oppose does not admit this fact with reference to those who fail of God's salvation. No; God *leaves* them to pursue their way to ruin. God did not leave the husbandman to neglect a preparation for the harvest. He stimulated his will, plied him with proper motives and inducements, and, by the want of daily bread, influenced him to labor for it. If you say that the man acted of his own accord, and might *not* have so acted, we reply, he did act freely and of his own accord, but he had no control over the motives which induced him. Again, make the very worst of this case; suppose that some, in the matter of a temporary harvest, through idleness and sloth, fail of it; yet none can fail of that eternal harvest; for here, according to the very doctrine in question, *God's* will is universal, and it is "God who worketh in *us* both to will and to do of his *good pleasure*." (Phil. ii. 13.)

Thus, the sun will not only shine, the Sun of righteousness, upon the heart of man, but God will apply his motives, — motives which will prove effectual in inducing us to embrace the offered good. Thus will his grace be free, and first in importance; the powers of man will be called into action; and salvation will be universal, according to the will of God.

But the doctrine we oppose attaches more importance to the works of men; for, while it admits, in words, the sovereign efficacy of the Almighty's grace, it denies that this grace will prove effectual in "creating us in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them." (Eph. ii. 10.) In other words, it assumes the position that good works, or a regenerated character, is necessary to salvation; or, rather, that regeneration is itself salvation, when perfected; and, at the same time, it denies that the grace of God will prove efficient to "create" those good works, or to produce that regeneration. For countless thousands never will experience it. While, then, good works are necessary, of absolute importance, and must be performed, it denies that the grace of God will induce the creature to perform them. According to our proposition, it attaches more importance to the works of men than to the grace of God.

VI. *The doctrine of endless punishment is one that charity never can rejoice in.* This may ap-

pear rather unconvincing of its falsity, if we do not consider in connection with it a declaration of the apostle: "Charity," says he, "rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth." (1 Cor. xiii. 6.) Can, then, endless misery be any part of the truth? Where is the charity that would rejoice in the prospective damnation of millions of God's rational offspring? Indeed, it is when we reflect upon the fact that the charity of no man could wish it true, together with the fact that the joys of heaven must be diminished, if its blest inhabitants are knowing to the truth that millions of their race are suffering and writhing in torments inexpressible,—it is, I say, when we reflect upon these facts, that we are convinced of the absurdity of the doctrine in question. No mortal, except of the stamp of a Nero — who, it is said, could dance at the music of the cries of those whom he doomed to a burning at the stake — can look upon human suffering in this world without sympathizing with the sufferer, and sharing his woes. Are the inhabitants of heaven to view unmoved, or to know of unmoved, the endless damnation of millions of their race, without any tenderness or sympathy, and without being deprived of a portion of their happiness? Yea, are they to *rejoice* at this spectacle, with hallelujahs on their tongues, and shouts of *amen* to the damnation of their nearest relatives, as is sometimes affirmed! Then charity, the greatest of the Christian virtues — greater than

faith or hope—will not exist in the city of our God; but a hard-heartedness, and an unfeeling selfishness, and a cold, exclusive, inhuman, savage spirit, will pervade the celestial mansions, and, to a charitable heart, cast an air of repulsion over all its joys. We rest, then, in the conclusion that the doctrine of endless punishment is what charity never can rejoice in,—therefore, is not a truth; for "charity rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth."

VII. *This doctrine, with its connections, if true, is true for all mankind.* It maintains that holiness is requisite in this life to escape it,—that there is no change after death; and now let us see where this will carry us. We have here nothing to say about a change of heart in this life, the work of sanctification being begun here, &c. &c. in order to show, with a semblance of propriety, that such may more likely be fitted for heaven than others in whom the work is not yet begun. Our simple remark is on the idea held out by this theory, that there is *no change after death.* Select the very best individual you can find on earth, and ask him if he would be willing to carry his character with him for a whole eternity, among the holy and the perfect in the paradise above. No man, it is presumed, is perfect here below; none but what need some change, some mighty change, to fit them for the society of the blest above. And if there is *no* change, *either at* death or after, and all who are

not, on this earth, fitted for a perfect heaven, must be doomed to a wretched hell, then there is no alternative; all mankind must go and wail away an eternity of damnation. It cannot be got over, that if, on this ground, the doctrine of endless punishment is true, it is true for all mankind.

VIII. *The doctrine in question is of no good moral influence.* Here let us not be misunderstood. I do not mean to say that those who believe this doctrine exhibit the *fruits* of no moral influence. We know that there are good, and there are bad, and there are indifferent, among all denominations. But what we mean to affirm is, that while a thousand other religious considerations—the goodness of God, the love of Christ, the hope of heaven, the duty of man, the fear of temporal calamities and punishments, &c. &c.—while these and other considerations may exert a good moral influence over the hearts of those who believe the popular doctrine, the consideration of an endless hell is comparatively of no good moral influence at all. All the good moral tendency, we apprehend, is from other considerations, such as we have named; while the doctrine of endless punishment is among the least of the causes of moral improvement among men.

It is, however, a common remark, that, if endless punishment cannot prevent a man from sinning, nothing can. Surely, the idea is awful *enough*, — most assuredly it is; and there lies the

difficulty: it is *too* awful. From its very severity it loses its power of alarm; for it is altogether too much for human credulity. The more tremendous you make this punishment appear, the more it exceeds human belief. Take any reasonable, reflecting man, who is not so warped and blinded by a creed that the light *cannot* shine into his mind, and the more he reflects upon this subject, the more skeptical will he become. Indeed, there is already a skepticism on this subject, which but few comparatively are aware of. Hundreds and thousands of souls there are who inwardly reject this doctrine; yet, through fear of "the Pharisees, they dare not confess it, lest they should be put out of the synagogue; for they love the praise of men more than the praise of God." This is, indeed, plain, but it is the language of plain truth. As we were saying, take any reasonable, unprejudiced man, and press this subject upon his mind; urge it untiringly upon him; go, talk to him about torment upon torment, and pang upon pang, waxing fiercer and fiercer as the ages of eternity roll round; and, ten chances to one, he will tell you to go talk to the winds. But convince him of a reasonable punishment,—one proportioned to the crime, and which would come with infallible certainty upon him,—and this would prove a rational and wholesome restraint upon his evil passions and propensities. This would excite a fear, whereas,

the other, from its very terror, loses its power of alarm.

Again, it should be remembered that it is the certainty, and not the severity, of punishment, which most effectually restrains from sin. Those who are familiar with our civil code will tell you that it is this certainty of which we speak, and not the magnitude of a penal evil, which holds out the most terror to the criminal. A penalty altogether monstrous, and disproportioned to the crime, will not be believed; or, if it is, it is generally accompanied with a pretty comfortable hope of escape. It is so, in countless instances, with the imaginary penalty of endless misery. To be sure, there is a dim, vague, distant idea; but there is not a lively, well-settled, undoubting, realizing faith. And it is well there is not; for humanity could not bear it. And it is a melancholy fact, that, in those few cases where the horrid idea is brought home in living power to the mind — where the poor victims to its influence have been amazed and confounded with its terrors, and driven to the thought that there was no mercy for them, that they were the objects of God's wrath, and the devoted victims of his hot displeasure — they have generally been whelmed in the maniac's gloom, and terminated their wretched lives by laying violent hands upon themselves. For the actors and instruments in these *wretched* tragedies, — "Father, forgive them, for *they know not* what they do."

But we must press again our subject. We have said, the idea of endless suffering is too awful. It exceeds human belief. Or, if there is a stupid, thoughtless, unrealizing faith in it, it is, at best, a faith which causes no comparative concern. One would think that a real, hearty, unwavering belief in the endless damnation of any of the species would be enough to make the believer "put on sackcloth and ashes, and go mourning about the streets." Christians, friends, what are we thinking about? This whole congregation, this town's population, the inhabitants of this whole earth, exposed to a hell all fathomless and boundless; where no reprieve is granted, where torture upon torture is inflicted, and measured out, and measured out, to rack the body and torment the soul; and after the mighty roll of innumerable ages has passed away, the wretched sufferers are not one moment nearer their end than when they first commenced their horrid destiny: it is all to be gone over with again, and then again; and there is no mitigation, and no end; heavens! if I believed this doctrine, the churches would tremble, or God would not allow me strength. Yea, let the believers, and especially the preachers, of this doctrine, clothe themselves in sackcloth, and, as the false prophet ran through the streets of Jerusalem, crying wo, wo, wo, to the inhabitants of the great city; so let them lift up their voices, and tire not, crying wo, wo, wo, to the inhabitants of earth, whose eternal

destiny, for bliss or for torment, hangs upon a hair, which, cut away, they fall, and fall — forever.

My candid friends, please keep your minds upon the subject. Is this doctrine believed? Is it reflected on? Admit that it is. Admit, also, that, many times, the fear of hell may be of a restraining influence; that, by the fear of it, many acts of wickedness are prevented; still we are inclined to press the question, what is such obedience good for? For "he that feareth is not made perfect in love." A slave's obedience, and nothing more, is that which proceedeth from a fear of hell.

We have said that a hundred other religious considerations, such as the goodness of God, the love of Christ, the hope of heaven, the suggestions of duty, and the fear of temporal punishments, the loss of reputation, the law of the land, and the penitentiary, operate upon the minds of men to keep them in the way of virtue, while the doctrine of *endless* punishment, even though believed, is comparatively of no good influence at all. Now it is the latter consideration, — the fear of temporal punishments, the loss of reputation, the law of the land, &c. — which, after all, is felt to be the most effectual in restraining the evil passions and propensities of men. Believers in endless punishment may not be willing to admit this. But their actions admit it. For what are all the exertions to discourage sin and promote virtue in the earth? Is *it all because* of endless punishment in a future

world? Take a particular case. For what is all this stir in the moral world about temperance? And why are societies formed, and measures taken, to prevent the spread of intemperance in the land? Suppose there are two reasons for this. And let us suppose all that weight of reason derived from the prospect of endless ruin for the drunkard placed in one scale, and all that derived from the wretchedness and misery which drunkenness produces in the earth placed in another: do you not think that the scale filled with earthly reasons would weigh down with a tremendous force? Is it not plain that the shame, and disgrace, and misery, which drunkenness pours upon the earth operate more powerfully to stimulate men to action in this great moral enterprise than any consideration of the miseries of another world?

Perhaps it will be said that the reason derived from the exposure of *one* soul to *endless* misery is greater than all earthly reasons put together. True; but mind you, I spoke of those reasons which *prompted men to action* in this great enterprise. And I say that the creed of endless ruin is *forgotten* in a great measure; and when men look abroad upon the ruins, the wretchedness, and the woes, that drunkenness produces in the earth, it is more the prostration of intellect, the misery and poverty of families, the worse than widowed wives, and the cries of the orphan and the outcast, which prompt *to immediate* action, than any consideration

of the miseries of eternity. *Endless* misery is forgotten, cast in the shade where it should be, before the glowing hells that drunkenness lights up around our very dwellings, and over the face of the whole earth. Here, then, we see, that however unwilling men may be to admit it, it is nevertheless a truth, that temporal punishments and miseries, the law of the land, and the penitentiary, exert a more powerful influence than the feaf of future torments, in placing a restraint upon the evil propensities of men. The reason is, that the *certainty* and *nearness* of punishment, rather than the *severity* of a *distant* evil, is what men want to feel, to act as a wholesome influence on their fears. And when we take into view the fact that endless punishment is so little believed, and when it is, that the obedience it produces from a slavish fear is not worthy of the name of obedience, we consider our eighth proposition abundantly established, that the doctrine in question is of no good moral influence. But this will more plainly appear in the course of our subject in a future lecture.

IX. *The doctrine of endless punishment is expressly contradicted by the Holy Scriptures.* With reference to this, we must consider the acknowledged difficulty of proving a negative. The Scriptures rather tell us what *is* true, than labor to explode what is *not* true. And we shall see, when we come to the affirmative side, or to the question, *What saith the* Scripture? that partialism will be

swallowed up in universal truth. Nevertheless, there is one caution on the negative side of this subject which is worthy of particular attention. The Pharisees, it is well known, believed in the endless punishment of human souls. Their doctrine was, that the souls of the wicked, at death, passed immediately into a state of never-ending torment. Yet our Saviour (Matt. xvi. 12) said to his disciples, without any reservation, "Beware of the doctrine of the Pharisees!" — a very singular circumstance, if that one doctrine, which is magnified as the very pillar of morality in our day, was the truth of the Almighty. Why should Jesus caution against the doctrine of the Pharisees, so sweepingly and so unreservedly, if they held at least one of the most important, soul-saving truths? They did, unquestionably, teach the doctrine of endless punishment, and yet our Saviour said, Beware! And so say we. Beware of the doctrine of the Pharisees!

For further proof on the negative side of this subject, we ask you to consider the following passages; and, as the Scriptures cannot be a contradiction, let us beware, lest we through ignorance make them so, and dishonor the God who is above. In Psalm ciii. we read, "The Lord is merciful and gracious, slow to anger, and plenteous in mercy. He will not alway chide; neither will he keep his anger forever." Whatever this passage originally referred to, what is it but a plain refuta-

tion of the endless enmity of God? Again, in Psalm lxxvii. "Will the Lord cast off forever? and will he be favorable no more? Is his mercy clean gone forever? doth his promise fail forevermore? Hath God forgotten to be gracious? Hath he in anger shut up his tender mercies? And I said, This is my infirmity." This last sentence ought to be engraven on the heart. When I am told that the Creator *will* cast off forever, (says a benevolent writer,) that he *will* be favorable no more, that his mercy will be no longer exercised, but that his anger will flame with relentless fury throughout eternity, I will say to the person who addresses me, this is your infirmity. The mercy of God is repeatedly said to endure forever, but as for his anger, that "endureth but for a moment." These repeated declarations of the mercy and clemency of Jehovah cannot be true, if, throughout eternity, he refuses to be reconciled to his suffering creatures. But once more, and this shall suffice for the present, while it is remembered that the *spirit* of the passage is what chiefly arrests our attention. Read it, ye who talk of the ceaseless wrath of your Creator, and may it have a practical influence upon you. We quote it, without comment, from the 57th chapter of Isaiah. The merciful Creator says to you, "I will not contend forever, neither will I be always wroth; *for the spirit should fail before me, and the souls which I have made.*"

We bring this subject to a close. Partialism is not the doctrine of the Bible. With perfect charity for those who entertain this theory, we have no hesitation in saying that the doctrine of endless punishment is, in the first place, averse to the whole nature of God. It is opposed to the wisdom, power, justice, knowledge, mercy, love, and truth of the Divine Being; it is not found in connection with the law of God; it is opposed to the very nature of the law; it denies, with its connections, the unchangeableness of God; it declares the inefficacy of the labors, suffering, and death, and the everlasting disappointment and dissatisfaction, of Jesus Christ; it attaches more importance to the works of men than to the grace of God; it is what charity never can rejoice in; if true, with its connections, it must be true for all mankind; it is of no good moral influence; and it is expressly contradicted by the Holy Scriptures. We might bring a hundred other arguments, but this is enough. "Thou art weighed in the balances, and art found wanting,"—*wanting* the approval of our reason, *wanting* the testimony of sacred writ, *wanting* every thing to make it consistent, and nothing to make it more inconsistent, absurd, and monstrous than it now stands out, stripped of its disguise, conceived in sin, and shapen in iniquity. Let it "go down to the vile dust from whence it sprung;" and let all the people say, Amen.

LECTURE III.

ARGUMENT FOR THE DOCTRINE OF UNIVERSAL SALVATION.

Produce your cause, saith the Lord; bring forth your strong reasons, saith the King of Jacob. *Isaiah* xli. 21.

We come now to the opposite theory,—to *Universalism* in distinction from *Partialism*, as the characteristic ultimatum of the divine government.

In a former lecture we penned a few remarks on the subject of human reason. These were rather in justification of its use, in the science of theology, than on the manner of its application. We do not say that reason may be safely trusted with regard to every matter of divine revelation. We do not say there is *no* subject beyond the cognizance of human faculties, in the ways of that almighty Being with whom we have to do. Far be it. We admit that there are some things which, in our present and imperfect state, and perhaps in our future state of exaltation and perfection, we can never fully comprehend. We wish to treat this subject candidly. There is the mode or manner of the Deity's existence; there is the idea of a *cause uncaused*; there is an incomprehensible

eternity; there is the origin of evil; there is divine sovereignty with human accountability; there may be other things which, to finite, mortal man, never can be fully comprehended, — must be matters of faith rather than of understanding. But this does not terrify us. Give us but the truth; make it manifest to our understandings — as it can be — that there must have been, and must be, a God, and we trouble not ourselves about the manner of his existence. Far less do we trouble ourselves because we cannot comprehend him. This would be as unwise as to doubt our own mental being because we cannot comprehend the properties of mind. Indeed, man *knows positively* but wondrous little. He cannot comprehend himself, nor the properties of the smallest molecule of matter. It is almost literally true,

> "We nothing know, but what is marvellous;
> Yet what is marvellous we can't believe,
> So weak our reason, and so great our God."

But, concerning the mysteries of Providence, or revelation, there is this distinction between things that we can and things that we cannot reason on conclusively. We shall point out this distinction as it relates to the economy of divine government only, as this is the subject with which we are now alone concerned. There is, then, a distinction between the means employed, and the ultimate end, in the *dispensations* of the Deity. To make

this plain, it is frequently said that we are incompetent to reason on the justness or the wisdom of the endless misery of a portion of our race, because many things of an afflictive nature do occur, in the providence of God, which we find and *own* ourselves unable to account for. But we object to this reasoning, because it confounds two things which ever ought to be kept separate, — *means* and *ends*. A thousand events daily occur, in the providence of God, which we cannot comprehend the wisdom or the goodness of, just because they are the means only for the attainment of some end which we are wholly unacquainted with. Afflictions are sent upon us; death enters our dwellings, and tears from us relatives and friends; what we call accidents assail us. But what *are* all these dispensations? Are they only to afflict us, to cause us misery as an end? or are they not rather a means to some end yet in the future, and of which we know not? Undoubtedly the latter; for we are assured by the plain reading of the word, that we are chastened "for our profit." We cannot reason, then, on these dispensations, in themselves considered, and come to any correct conclusion; because they are to be considered as means to some end yet in the future. But suppose they were not so. Suppose, when you looked upon that sick man, pale and emaciated, stretched upon his couch, and exercised with pain, you should *contemplate* the suffering before you as an *end*, or

rather as an endless continuance of misery. Suppose you took him by the hand, and smoothed his marble brow, and looked upon his sunken eye, and tried to mitigate his pain, but could not say, "My friend, be of good cheer; thy sufferings will soon be ended; thou shalt either be restored to health, or these, thine earthly sufferings, will work out for thee a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory." No, nothing like this. There you must behold him, but not to comfort or assuage. There you must contemplate his sufferings, but not his restoration or deliverance. No, his is a protracted illness. Month after month, and year after year, must wear away, and you must look upon that misery as an end, and not a means; as a production of suffering for its own sake, and not as an affliction to be overruled for good. I ask you, suppose this was the case, could we not reason on it? *Might* we not? Consider *all* these dispensations as ends in the divine economy. Might we not reason on them? Most assuredly, with all the safety in the world. We might then come to the conclusion that they were unjust, opposed to goodness, and of no possible benefit whatever.

Now just apply this reasoning to the subject of our lectures. Endless punishment, or rather endless misery, (for endless punishment might be considered a contradiction in terms, punishment signifying correction, which it cannot be, if it is endless; endless misery, then, more properly is

not a means, but an end, — a final resting-place in the government of the Deity, or is so represented. Now we may safely reason on final ends, when we cannot reason upon the means employed to bring about those ends. In the one case, there is a long concatenation of causes and effects, the connection of which to the final end we are wholly ignorant of; and in the other case, which is ours at present, we have nothing to do with causes of which we know nothing relating to their dependent effects; but we have to do with final effects only, and upon which, as concerning their justice or goodness, human reason is abundantly competent to decide. We will, then, give in the admission that there are a thousand daily occurrences of Providence, the character of which we cannot reason on; but the reason is, because their character is determined by the final events to which they lead. But in the idea of final ends, there is nothing, either before or after, to affect their character in the least; and they are proper subjects of human reason.

Now it avails nothing to call this doctrine of endless misery a mystery. There are, we admit, some mysteries of Providence; but these are in the *progressive measures* of the divine government, not in the ends of it. How unsatisfying, then, is the course pursued by many, who, when being questioned on this point of faith, affirm presumptuously *that we cannot* reason on it! *Why* not reason on

it? We can see precisely its character. There is nothing before it or after it to affect its character in the least. We have not got to wait to see whether it will *result* in good or not. There is the thing itself, drawn out from every thing else, its character, as good or evil, impressed upon it, and all we have got to do is to read it. I trust this subject is now plain enough.

Listen, then, to the follies of those who would decline any discussion on the question of endless punishment, to borrow that phrase, when viewed as a final end in the government of the Almighty. They complain of inquisitiveness. They talk about carnal reason. They hush us up with the cry of mystery — mystery! They intimate a blasphemous familiarity with the ways of the Deity! They remind us of our duty of submission. Heavens! and all about what? Why, about a thing involved in nothing to perplex us — of a most decided character in itself — plain, palpable, standing out in bold relief from every thing else — not a means to any end — nothing before or after it to affect its character — of a simple, uncompounded nature, — an existence, in fact, in itself and alone, either one thing or the other; and we are not competent, with our eyes wide open, to say what! If this is not a bold, unprincipled presumption upon the powers of human intellect, then we know not what is. O, it is the weakness of the cause — away with all *this folly* and pretension — it is THE

WEAKNESS OF THE CAUSE — the utterly indefensible nature of this doctrine of the church, which extorts this pretended modesty, and reserve, and child-like submission on this subject. Do you suppose, Christians, that if there *were* sufficient reasons, strong and sturdy, for the support of this sentiment, that its advocates would resort to such subterfuge to defend it? Alas, no. They would be brought forth with all the hardihood and confidence of one deeply initiated into the ways of the Most High. They would be extolled and lauded to the skies as "reasons strong" and proofs defiatory. But now it is manifest, and it is useless to deny it, that, for the want of a sufficiency in the shape of *argument* to defend this dogma, resort must be had to the cry of mystery — carnal reason — inquisitive blasphemy. And a passage of scripture is always at hand for such an emergency — "Great is the mystery of godliness" — which is a sufficient and ever ready reply to all our questionings and to all our arguments. This may do for some, but it will not do for us. And to us there is nothing more evident than that a cause which needs such subterfuge to support it must be unreasonable and false. *We* are not of this make. *We* must call yet aloud, — "Produce your cause; bring forth your strong reasons." And if the advocates of this doctrine cannot support *their* cause by reason and argument, we will *engage to* support ours, — to "give an answer unto

every one that asketh a *reason for the hope that is within us.*"

While on this subject, however, let us remember that a reverse of all the argument we have advanced on the opposite side of this subject, will furnish argument for the theory of universal and efficient grace. The reader may have done this work himself. So that our present theme can be but a collection of some remaining reasons for the embrace of an opposite and more glorious theory.

I. *We begin with the proposition that the doctrine of universal and eternal salvation is the only one under heaven but what insults our reason at the very first consideration of it.* There are only three opinions, relative to a future final state, which have ever been received. These are, the annihilation of the wicked, and the eternal salvation and glory of the righteous; the endless punishment of the wicked, and the contrary; and the universal holiness and happiness of Adam's widespread race. There are, I know, refinements and modifications of the system of endless punishments; but these are the three distinctive opinions, and, in fact, the only opinions which can be received with reference to a final state. And this latter, we affirm, is the only doctrine presented to us but what insults our reason at the very first consideration of it.

Nothing can be more puerile than the idea of annihilation. In the first place, it is open to all

the objections which have been before advanced in these lectures, founded on the design and foreknowledge of the Deity. It is admitted on all hands, (except by the Calvinists, whose blasphemous theory we determined to pass into oblivion after a respectful notice in our first lecture,) that the design of the Deity was to impart immortal happiness to all his moral offspring. Now, neither free agency nor any thing else can be involved to oppose this design. Free agency did not exist before the creature who possesses it. *Nothing* existed on the part of man, and nothing but the arbitrary will of Deity on his part. And, with a design to bestow immortal blessedness upon all his creatures, he brings them into existence, KNOWING —if it is possible to design against knowledge— that his design will be frustrated, and he must be forever disappointed.

In the next place, it is little short of blasphemy, viewed in the common apprehension of it. "The doctrine of annihilation," says a just and feeling writer, "supposes that by far the greater part of mankind were created by a benevolent and holy Being, whose prescience foresaw how they would act, — to be vicious and die, to be raised from the dead, re-organized or re-created, to be *miserable*, and then to undergo a public execution, by which they would be forever blotted out of this creation. My brethren, if the fact be so, fix your minds upon *it.* You have often regarded with admiration that

curious effect of the divine power, the human body, — the delicate structure of the eye and the ear, the nerves and brain, the veins and arteries, and the various organs of sensation, respiration, and motion; you have contemplated with devout wonder the faculties of the human mind; you have acknowledged with grateful satisfaction that God is love, — that every organ, that every power, both of body and mind, is an inlet to enjoyment, and that man was formed in the image of God, that he might be the object of his favor forever. Contemplate the scene which is now to take place; (that is, at the resurrection of the wicked.) What a process is going on through nature! Myriads of those beings are to be raised from the dead — that is, re-organized, re-formed, or re-created — to be miserable in a greater or less degree, according to their degrees of guilt, and at length to be finally destroyed!" *

And this is a work to be ascribed to the Deity! With the idea of this doctrine in the mind, the words of Young have a pertinency and significancy of meaning which can be felt in no other association:

"Why burst the barriers of my peaceful grave?
Ah, cruel death, that would no longer save!
But grudged me e'en that narrow, dark abode,
And cast me out into the wrath of God."

* Estlin, quoted by Smith on "Divine Government," pp. 248, 249.

But even this dishonorable sentiment is preferable to the doctrine of never-ceasing misery. This sentiment must take the lead of all absurdities and abominations. It is an unparalleled and monstrous conception; even atheism itself, in theoretical absurdity, falling far below it. We must say, so far as theory is concerned, better deny the being of God, than admit his existence, and ascribe to him such an ungodly character. The impiety would not be so great. These are plain sentiments; but they are penned in "soberness and truth." We have said that reason is insulted on the very first consideration of it. For what does it behold? The creeds, and opinions, and vague theories of the human mind have cast an obscurity over this subject; and the clear mind is bewildered thus, or else it would take one thought, and spurn the doctrine forever away from it. Volumes have been written on the subjects of free agency, human depravity, rejection of the *offer* of salvation, &c.; and hence the mind is clogged among the contemplation of these things, and seldom gets so far back as to argue the character of the Deity, independent of the consideration of every one of them. But this step must be taken, if we would probe the subject to the very bottom. We must send our minds back before free agency existed, before man's wickedness was known, before he rejected *the offer* of salvation,—yea, before all things pertaining to this world, when God alone existed in

his own self-sufficiency, wanting nothing to augment his happiness, and there imagine him revolving in his mind a plan for introducing millions on millions of intellectual, moral beings into an existence which he KNOWS will prove an everlasting curse to them. Horrid thought! Yet it will come. It will rise up from the workings of our better nature, to utter its secret thunder against a system so utterly appalling. And, I say, let it come. Silence not these forcible remonstrances of reason against what it cannot, no, never can, approve. As we stated in a former lecture, "no sin can be taken into the account; for man had not existed. *Nothing* existed, and *out of nothing* the Deity produced an *endless curse.*" This is reason's first inference, in contemplation of the doctrine in question. The thought is simple, the process brief, and the argument irresistible, against the idea of unceasing misery. And as the same is true, in kind, with regard to annihilation, it is, then, true, that the doctrine of universal, final holiness and happiness is the only one under heaven which does not insult our reason at the very first consideration of it. It alone can supply the "feast of reason," and, I may add, "the flow of soul."

II. *The doctrine of the Universalist acknowledges no absolute evil, and declares that the universe shall ultimately embrace nothing but good.* This truth, indeed, appears self-evident, if we admit the infinite *goodness of the* Deity. For, with this admis-

sion, what has the Deity to do with evil as an end in the divine economy? The idea is as absurd as to say that infinite goodness was limited, or that pure goodness consisted partly of evil. Some writer said, when writing on this subject, that he who doubted the existence of evil ought to have the jumping tooth-ache, or some painful disease. This, however, is mere pertness, and not argument. The tooth-ache and the disease itself may result in good, although we cannot give the *how*. At least, no one, in our present state of ignorance, can say positively that it does not. We confess it is a subject involved in much obscurity; but there is much that we do know upon it. That natural evil results in good is demonstrable by every-day occurrence. Who has not seen afflictions overruled for the benefit, and the very great benefit, of the sufferer? Every house of suffering is a school of virtue. Besides, good is generally known by its opposite evil. But, while on this subject, I choose to give the opinions of others, rather than any of my own. And, of all the accounts I have ever seen on this subject, I have never met with one that embodied so much sound sense, and so many irrefragible positions, so much pithiness of remark, and so much eloquence withal, and all condensed in so brief a space, as that given by that most excellent writer, Soame Jenyns, in an old work on the Origin of Evil. A Universalist he was too. *Read it*, brother, and lay it to heart. "Most of

the grievances attendant upon human nature," he thinks, "may be comprehended under the following heads: poverty, labor, inquietudes of mind, pains of body, and death; from none of which, we may venture to affirm, man could ever have been exempted so long as he continued to be man. God, indeed, might have made us quite other creatures, and placed us in a world quite otherwise constituted; but then we had been no longer men; and, whatever beings had occupied our stations in the universal system, they must have been liable to the same inconveniences.

"Poverty, for example, is what all could not possibly have been exempted from, not only by reason of the fluctuating nature of human possessions, but because the world could not subsist without it; for, had all been rich, none could have submitted to the commands of another, or the drudgeries of life; thence all governments must have been dissolved, arts neglected, and lands uncultivated, and so an universal penury have overwhelmed all, instead of now and then pinching a few. Hence, by the by, appears the great excellence of charity, by which men are enabled, by a particular distribution of the blessings and enjoyments of life, on proper occasions, to prevent that poverty which, by a general one, Omnipotence itself could never have prevented; so that, by enforcing this duty, God, as it were, demands our assistance *to promote* universal happiness, and to

shut out misery at every door where it strives to intrude itself.

"Labor, indeed, God might easily have excused us from, since at his command the earth would readily have poured forth all her treasures, without our inconsiderable assistance; but, if the severest labor cannot sufficiently subdue the malignity of human nature, what plots and machinations, what wars, rapine, and devastation, what profligacy and licentiousness, must have been the consequences of universal idleness! So that labor ought only to be looked upon as a task kindly imposed upon us by our indulgent Creator, necessary to preserve our health, our safety, and our innocence.

"Inquietudes of mind cannot be prevented without first eradicating all our inclinations and passions, — the winds and tides that preserve the great ocean of human life from perpetual stagnation. So long as men have pursuits, they must have disappointments; and whilst they have disappointments, they must be disquieted; whilst they are injured, they must be inflamed with anger; and whilst they see cruelties, they must be melted with pity; whilst they perceive danger, they must be sensible to fear; and whilst they behold beauty, they must be enslaved by love: nor can they be exempted from the various anxieties attendant on these various and turbulent passions. Yet, without them, we should be undoubtedly less happy and *less safe*; for without anger we should not defend

ourselves; and without pity we should not assist others; without fear we should not preserve our lives; and without love they would not be worth preserving.

"Pains of body are, perhaps, but the necessary consequences of the union of material and spiritual essences; for matter being by nature divisible, when endued with sensibility, must probably be affected by pains and pleasures, by its different modifications; wherefore, to have been freed from our sufferings, we must have been deprived of all our sensual enjoyments,—a composition by which few, surely, would be gainers. Besides, the pains of our bodies are necessary, to make us continually mindful of their preservation; for what numberless lives would be lost in every trifling pursuit, or flung away in ill-humor, was the piercing of a sword no more painful than the tickling of a feather!

"Death, the last and most dreadful of all evils, is so far from being one, that it is the infallible cure of all others.

> 'To die is landing on some silent shore,
> Where billows never beat, nor tempests roar:
> Ere well we feel the friendly stroke, 't is o'er,'

For, abstracted from the sickness and suffering usually attending it, it is no more than the expiration of that term of life God was pleased to bestow upon us, without any claim or merit on our part. But, was it an evil ever so great, it could be *remedied* but by one much greater,

which is by living forever; by which means our wickedness, unrestrained by the prospect of a future state, would grow so insupportable, our sufferings so intolerable by perseverance, and our pleasures so tiresome by repetition, that no being in the universe could be so completely miserable as a species of immortal men. We have no reason, therefore, to look upon death as an evil, or to fear it as a punishment, even without any supposition of a future life; but, if we consider it as a passage to a more perfect state, or a remove only in an eternal succession of still improving states—for which we have the strongest reasons—it will then appear a new favor from the divine munificence; and a man must be as absurd to repine at dying, as a traveller would be, who proposed to himself a delightful tour through various unknown countries, to lament that he cannot take up his residence at the first dirty inn which he baits at on the road. The instability of human life, or the hasty changes of its successive periods, of which we so frequently complain, are no more than the necessary progress of it to this necessary conclusion; and at last death opens to us a new prospect, from which we shall probably look back upon the diversions and occupations of this world with the same contempt we do now upon our tops and hobby-horses, and with the same surprise that they could ever so much entertain or engage us."*

* *Origin of* Evil, by Soame Jenyns, pp. 64—71.

We ask not the reader to adopt *every* idea in this extract, but we do ask him to consider it well, for it is worthy of it.

These remarks, however, have a general reference to *natural* evil. Speaking of *moral* evil, the same writer says: "And, to render these punishments consistent with goodness, they must not only be proportioned to their crimes, but also some may be necessary to universal good; for no creatures can be called out of their primitive nothing by an all-wise and benevolent Creator, to be losers by their existence, *or to be made miserable for no beneficial end, even by their own misbehavior: so that all future misery, as well as all present, must be subservient to happiness; or otherwise infinite power, joined with infinite goodness, would have prevented both vice and punishment.*" *

That moral evil, and *all* moral evil, does result in good, and is not therefore properly evil, is admitted, and even contended for, strange as it may seem, by believers in endless and terrible damnation. Jonathan Edwards thus writes upon the subject: "God does not will sin as sin, or for the sake of any thing evil," but "for the sake of the great good that by his disposal shall be the consequence." † Again, "What is aimed at [that is, in the permission of moral evil] is good, and good

* Origin of Evil, by Soame Jenyns, p. 85.
† Edwards *on the* Will, p. 343.

is the actual issue, in the final result of things." * Again, he quotes with approbation from Turnbull: "If the Author and Governor of all things be infinitely *perfect*, then whatever is, is *right*; of all possible systems he has chosen the *best*; and consequently there is *no absolute evil* in the universe." † And yet there is, according to this author, a boundless, bottomless, endless pit of evil!

How moral evil results in good, is a question which we, in the present place, have not the time to answer, except that it *tends to correct itself*, by the pains which it inflicts. Admitting that moral evil was necessary in order to the more perceptible existence of moral virtue, and it may not only be seen to result in good, but that goodness itself depends upon it for its existence. How many times have folly and imprudence proved the foundation of future wisdom and prudence! How many a notable act of wickedness has so wrought upon the mind, as to give rise to the successful resolution of future rectitude! Every observer of the world must have noticed instances where base and profligate youth have, from the very evils of their depravity, determined on a future reformation, and become men of transcendental excellence and worth, far outstripping those who, from their youth, have pursued the even tenor of their way in a mediocrity of virtue.

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* *Edwards* on the Will, p. 347. † *Ibid.* p. 342.

We hope we shall never be accused of plagiarism, even if we do not give the quotation marks for the idea contained in the last sentence. We *believe* it belongs to Dr. Chalmers. We have looked for it an hour, and cannot find it; and now, for the life of us, we cannot tell whether it belongs to the doctor, or whether it is any body's but our own. It got into our mind somehow, and we give it to the reader for what it is worth.

But to compensate the doctor, if that should happen to be his, here is one which is his, and for which we refer to the volume and the page. Be it remembered, that we have said that moral evil results in good by an inherent tendency to correct and destroy itself. Be it also remembered, that Dr. Thomas Chalmers was an eminent defender of the endless perpetuity of sin. Yet, if we mistake not, we have caught him in glorious *doubts* of a God-dishonoring faith. Speaking of this tendency in vice to destroy itself, he says, "At all events, whatever reason there may be to *fear* that, in the future arrangements of nature and providence, both virtue and vice will be capable of immortality, we might gather from what passes under our eyes, in this rudimental and incipient stage of existence, that even with our present constitution, virtue alone is capable of a blissful immortality. For malice and falsehood carry with them the seeds of their own wretchedness, if not of *their own destruction.* [Why *that if there?*] Only grant the soul to be

imperishable; and, if the character of the governor is to be gathered from the final issues of the government over which he presides, it says much for the moral character of him who framed us; that, unless there be an utter reversal of the nature which himself hath given, then, in respect to the power of conferring enjoyment, or of maintaining the soul in its healthiest and happiest mood, it is righteousness alone which endureth forever, and charity alone which never faileth." * We confess, there is a little evasive ambiguity in this. The author talks about virtue alone being capable of a *blissful* immortality; as though vice might be capable of a miserable one. He also says, unless there be an utter reversal of our whole nature, then, *in respect to maintaining the soul in its healthiest and happiest mood*, it is righteousness alone which endureth forever; as though, in respect to keeping the soul in an *unhealthy* and *unhappy* state, vice too might endure forever. But then he is careful to state, "Whatever reason there may be to FEAR that both virtue and vice may be capable of immortality," as though it was fear alone, and not an undoubted belief. But why fear such a thing, when, in reference to the present state, he begs hard for the acknowledgement that vice carries in it the "seeds of its own *destruction*," and that, "while benevolence, that great

* *Chalmers'* Natural Theology, vol. i. pp. 378, 379.

conservative principle of being, has in it a principle conservative of itself, as well as its objects, *the outbreakings of evil are but partial and* TEMPORARY?"* Now, if this is the case, then, as the doctor himself says, in the future state also, "Unless there be an utter reversal of the principles of nature which God himself hath given," it must be, absolutely and *exclusively*, "righteousness alone which endureth forever, and charity alone which never faileth!" And *is* there such an utter reversal? Does the doctor himself contend for it? He may, but that will not undo what he has here intimated. He has told us, in the first place, that he only *fears* it, while the present constitution of human nature is against it; and, in the next place, on page 404 of the same volume, he supposes that "the EXISTING CONSTITUTION of man, and his existing habits, *shall be borne with him to the land of eternity!*" Well done, doctor. Now if thou hast not given us pretty good proof of the *undoubted* character of thy faith in the endless perpetuity of sin, and pretty good proof how undemolishable it is, according to thine own showing, then we cannot hope that thy departed spirit will ever make a more successful attempt. We leave thee here. "Great men are not always wise," and boys sometimes can see it.

We must bring this subject to a conclusion. If

* *Natural* Theology, vol. i. p. 378.

we see, in the present life, how many evils, both natural and moral, may and do result in good, and are not, therefore, absolute evils, then, with reference to a future state, the same may, and, by the perfections of God, must, hold true, to his glory, and the good of a glorious and entire universe. What a foul blot would it be upon that universe, — *a final state of absolute and unmixed evil!* What in vice and irreligion more shocking and abhorrent! On the contrary, what in religion more beautiful than the whole amplitude of the moral universe regenerated into purity and bliss! Amen, my soul, adore that God, who, to adopt the philosophic language of the poet,

> * * "Beholding, in the sacred light
> Of his essential reason, all the shapes
> Of swift contingence, all successive ties
> Of action, propagated through the sum
> Of possible existence — he at once,
> Down the long series of eventful time,
> So fixed the dates of being — so disposed,
> To every living soul of every kind,
> The field of motion, and the hour of rest,
> That all conspired to his supreme design, —
> To UNIVERSAL GOOD!"

III. *The doctrine of universal and eternal holiness and happiness harmonizes all the attributes of God.* We shall not here enter into a lengthy argument. It was shown, in our first lecture, that *the opposite* doctrine was opposed to all the divine

attributes; and in that argument we received the opposite impression that the doctrine we now advocate *harmonized* them all. It allows to the Deity goodness to suggest, wisdom to devise, knowledge to know or see, and power to execute, the complete success of a plan for the salvation and redemption of all created intelligences. And, of course, truth, mercy, and love, must coincide with it.

But what we now allude to more particularly, by harmonizing the divine attributes, is the *justice* and *mercy* of the Deity, which, by popular theology, are so strangely and discordantly at variance. Those who advocate the final undoing of the wicked have no hesitation in admitting that the mercy of God would, in itself considered, extend salvation to the entire race of man; and it is only justice that must forever prevent an accomplishment so infinitely desirable. We have, now, an idea to present here which we never saw suggested before, but which weighs very much in our mind, against the conclusion which the rejectors of our doctrine would draw, even admitting their premises true, viz. that justice, against mercy, demands the endless condemnation of the sinner. Consider, then, that mercy wants to save, justice wants to damn. These are both essential and infinite attributes of Deity. Now what is to be done? These Christians say, let justice be executed. *But why so?* Why so, any more than to

only the good, of all the subjects of its administration. "We know of no God who is just to the sacrifice of his mercy, or merciful to the sacrifice of his justice. The God we worship is at once 'a just God and a Saviour.'" Goodness and justice are the same in purpose. Goodness requires as much punishment for sin as justice. They do indeed differ in their manifestations, and so pass by a different name. But if that is justice which punishes for the good of a moral being, so also is it goodness. And the punishment which justice inflicts is the greatest blessing which, under existing circumstances, could possibly be bestowed. "Justice, then, is so far from being incompatible with goodness, that it is the highest goodness, directed by the most perfect wisdom." We repeat the proposition, that this doctrine harmonizes all the attributes of God.

IV. *This theory also renders all the commands of God consistent.* The sum of all the divine commands is embraced in this: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart; and thy neighbor as thyself." These commands are imperative on all mankind. But commands, to be imperative, must be consistent. They must be in accordance with our moral nature, and what we can rationally obey. But the doctrine of endless punishment, founded on the endless enmity of God, *renders* them utterly inconsistent, and what we *cannot* rationally obey. God is represented to be

filled with hatred to the habitual violaters of his law; yet, notwithstanding, a command is obligatory on these transgressors to love the Lord their God with all their hearts. We would not cavil upon unimportant points, but here is a point of the utmost importance to be noticed. What in reality is it but an absurd and inconsistent command to *love hatred?* There could not be a more direct contradiction. I know it is said that all have sufficient reason to love the Creator, for his daily blessings are scattered with a rich profusion on the vilest of the vile. But that is not the point in the argument. It is not these blessings which we are commanded to love, but God who gives them. And if, notwithstanding these blessings, he glows with unbounded hatred towards even the boldest transgressors, how can that portion of mankind be consistently called upon to love him? They could not, manifestly, love such a being, unless they could *love hatred.* And this is a direct contradiction both in ideas and terms.

Indeed, it is not pretended that any *now* love a being who is filled with hatred to them, for that very circumstance of *their* love is considered proof enough that God loves them. But how, in the name of reason, could they *first* love him while yet he was filled with hatred? It was not God who changed first, according to this doctrine. He remained in hatred (he might have had the love of benevolence, *but still* it was such a love as would

damn them through eternity; and no man could love that; — he remained in hatred, then,) until they loved him. Consequently they had to love him while in hatred; that is, had to *love hatred* in order to get him to love them! We are sickened with the absurdities of this doctrine. It is plain to reason itself that the command is thus as inconsistent as it can be.

But, again, with reference to the second command — love to our neighbor, and even to our enemies — what shocking inconsistency is here! Why love our enemies, if God does not love his? The command is, "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you," &c.; and the reason is given, "That ye may be the children of your Father in heaven," whose goodness is alike impartially extended to "the evil and the good, the just and the unjust." Now this is reasonable. We may consistently be called upon to love our enemies if God loves his, and is "kind even to the evil and unthankful." But look at the opposite doctrine. By this we are required to love our enemies while God hates them. How, then, can we imitate God? Indeed, I am disposed to press the conclusion that, if God hates his enemies, we ought also to hate ours. For "shall mortal man be more just than God?" But, with a God of love instead of hatred, the commands are all consistent. We can love our neighbors, and even our *enemies*, if God has this affection for them;

whereas the opposite doctrine is crowded with practical no less than with theoretical absurdities.

V. *The doctrine of universal salvation recognizes the parental relationship of God to all his moral offspring.* This truth is indeed recognized by another sect in Christendom, whose members strongly insist upon it, but we must tell them — many of them — that they do, nevertheless, deny the necessary consequences which result from such a truth, by representing the principles upon which the Creator governs as utterly inconsistent with a father's character. The character of a father is too well known to be ascribed to a being who inflicts an endless evil upon any of his children. The principle would dishonor an earthly father, and it is infinitely dishonorable to God.

In maintaining our sentiments, however, on the moral government of God, we have frequently been accused of laboring under a great error; that of bringing down the character of the incomprehensible God to a comparison with an earthly father, — a frail, weak worm of the dust. And what presumption is this! says one; for, are not God's ways higher than our ways, and his thoughts than our thoughts? "As the heavens are higher than the earth, so are his ways higher than our ways, and his thoughts than our thoughts."

All this we readily admit. But this is a very unfortunate allusion for the objector. Did not Christ institute the same comparison? "If a son

ask bread of any of you that is a father, will he give him a stone? or, if he ask a fish, will he, for a fish, give him a serpent? or, if he shall ask an egg, will he, for an egg, offer him a scorpion? If ye, then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask him?" Here the same comparison is instituted, and the imperfection, too, of the earthly father expressly alluded to: "If ye, then, BEING EVIL," &c.; which circumstance, instead of destroying the propriety of the comparison, the Saviour makes use of to strengthen it, by arguing, that, if an earthly father, a frail, weak worm of the dust, as the objector says, is ever willing to give good gifts unto his children, MUCH MORE shall a God of infinite perfection govern his children upon the pure principles of parental love.

After such an example by Christ himself, why should we be objected to for instituting the same comparison, on the untenable ground that God's ways are higher than our ways? For this very circumstance is a *reason why* we should expect him to be governed by the same principles of paternal kindness as those which actuate an earthly father; being *infinitely* above in goodness, according to the testimony of Christ himself. And from the quotation we have made we learn this instructive lesson, — that, until the heart of an earthly *parent* can become so steeled to the impress

of humanity as to offer a stone to his children when they ask for bread, we may expect God, the great Parent of the universe, to conduct himself in a manner which best comports with a Father's love. We *know* his ways are higher than our ways; but, let us ask, are they so much worse? Are they not infinitely better?

But, says one, does God *sustain* the relationship of Father to all mankind? Are we not plainly told that some are the children of the devil, and the lusts of their father they will do? Yes; but is there a man or a woman, who is not a proper subject of derision, who supposes that any human being is really a child of an evil spirit, related to him by a tie of consanguinity? But if this is not the meaning of the passage, what is? Plainly, that some men are *characteristically* the children of Satan, or the adversary. The reason is assigned *why* they were the children of the devil, because they were subservient to his evil desires. While, then, some men are characteristically the children of the adversary, all men are the children of God by creation, and it is this act of *giving being* to a creature that creates the relationship of Father. "Have we not all one Father?" says the prophet. "Hath not one God created us?" Again, he is styled the "Father of the spirits of all flesh;" and the apostle says there is "one God and Father of all;" and, in that ever memorable prayer of

our Lord, all men are taught to address their Cre ator by the endearing name of Father.

But it is contended that sin destroys the relation ship. This is a sound position indeed! Sin de stroy the relationship! Let us ask, does virtue *constitute* the relationship? No, nothing but the act of creation. The child is related to the father before either obedience or disobedience exists As, then, obedience does not constitute the relation ship, it is absurd to say that disobedience can destroy it.

Be it now remembered that they were wicked Jews to whom the language was addressed, "Ye are of your father, the devil." Now, to wicked Jews, also, is the language, "Turn, O backsliding *children*, for I am married unto you." And, again, "Hear, O heavens, and give ear, O earth, for the Lord hath spoken: I have nourished and brough up *children*, and they have rebelled against me." Thus the Creator addresses the backsliding and rebellious objects of his care by the endearing name of children. Sin, then, does not destroy the relationship.

But it is still insisted that those are called chil dren in a special manner who have imbibed the spirit of the gospel. "As many as are led by the Spirit of God, *they* are the sons of God." We have no objection to this, nor do we see how it can form any rational objection against the conclusion we *aim to* establish. For, if God is the Father of

mankind by creation, and has declared his government as conducted on the principles of that paternity, this is the strongest sense in which he can be our Father, and the very government which must disprove the doctrine we oppose. We may be the children of God in a special manner, by imbibing his spirit, and "following after him *as* dear children;" but, still, God is our Father before that, and it is with reference to this relationship that he will be honored by our conduct towards him, and by his dealings with us. We rejoice, then, in the liberty of our faith to recognize in God the great Father and Protector of the whole human family. Amen and Amen.

This truth we deem established. Now, there is a question put concerning this truth, which we will make use of with reference to our present subject. Saith the Lord, by the prophet Malachi, "If, then, I be a Father, where is mine honor?" And indeed this question may be brought triumphantly against any doctrine which does not limit the chastisements of God, and cause them to result in good. David has well described the principle of parental government: "If his children forsake my law, and walk not in my judgments; if they break my statutes, and keep not my commandments; then will I visit their transgressions with a rod, and their iniquity with stripes. *Nevertheless, my loving-kindness will I* NOT UTTERLY *take from him, nor suffer my faithfulness to fail.*" (Psalm lxxxix.

30—33.) Consider this declaration of the principle of divine punishment, this principle of every good earthly father, of punishing for profit and correction, to bring good ultimately out of it, with what is ascribed to God, the Father of the human family. According to this theory, the sentiment of David is utterly reversed. According to popular theology, God says, "If my children transgress my laws, and walk not in my judgments; if they break my statutes, and keep not my commandments; then will I not only visit their transgressions with a rod, and their iniquity with stripes, but my loving-kindness will I utterly take from them, and inflict upon them unprofitable and unimaginable torment, so long as I exist!" This is a candid exposition of our prevailing theology. Might not the Creator well exclaim, "If, then, I be a Father, where is mine honor?" And where is it? Not in Calvinism; for that is most tyrannical and exclusive. Not in Arminianism; for that is most cruel and unjust. Where, then, shall we find it, but in that UNIVERSAL system of grace and goodwill which declares the parental relationship to all God's moral offspring, — that the most severe chastisements of Jehovah are but the sterner expressions of his love, and that, upon this benevolent principle, every rebel in the universe will be dealt with for all his transgressions of the law? We do affirm that there is a beauty and a justness *in this* view of the divine government, which no

other system has, and that this alone, the excellent and efficient paternity of the Almighty, recommends the system in question to the hearts and consciences of all men.

VI. *The doctrine of universal salvation is congenial with all holy desires.* There may be more in this than most people are apt to imagine. Did you ever reflect upon the fact, that the doctrine we approve approves itself to all? The hope of a final reign of universal purity and blessedness seems to be a plant of almost natural growth in the breast of every human being. We say, in *every* human being, because, whenever and wherever a human mind is found free from the shackles of barbarism, ignorance, infidelity, and atheism,—which can dare to send forth an inquiry, and lift the curtain that veils the mysteries of another world,—there *will* arise the conjecture, whether some benignant Providence hath not secured the final blessedness of the congregated universe. And more than this: even where the influence of early instilled and carefully cultivated principles has checked the manifestation of this truth in the creeds and confessions of mankind,—where the omnipotence of education has an irresistible force in fashioning the mind, and keeping it from entertaining such a thought,—even here, and among a people who not only reject, but bitterly oppose it, is the "word nigh unto them, even in their hearts and in their *mouths*; and that is the word of faith

which *we preach*." It is exhibited in the wishes, the desires, the hopes of all Christians, of whatever faith, and is uttered in the prayers of every philanthropist, poured forth warm and fervently, against creeds, against faith, for the salvation of universal humanity. Surely, the God of all truth would never have implanted aspirations so universal in the minds of men, did they not leap from the heart to the recognition of the same truth which gave them birth. And, whatever may be made, said, or inferred, from this fact, we deem it an important testimony to the truth as it stands out from the pages of God's revelation. It is not the *law* written in the heart, but it is the *testimony*, and responded to by every evidence in nature, and by every utterance of the God of nature. Our hearts suggest, nature promises, and the word of God declares, that "Of him, and through him, and to him, are all things; to whom be glory forever."

But we have mentioned the prayers of individuals. And it is a singular and touching fact, that the earnest invocations which ascend to the throne of thrones, imploring the Deity to accomplish the salvation of the world, should rise from faithless hearts, so warm, so fervently. Whatever may be meant by that affirmation of the apostle on another subject—"Whatsoever is not of faith is sin"—however much may be embodied here, we can but view these faithless prayers as the offerings of *hearts* most strangely at variance with the very *petition*. We do not mean to say that, with

enlightened view of the system of our faith, they would not *wish* it true; but we have reference to that undoubting disbelief of the granting of what is asked for, insomuch that, if you tell the petitioner it *will* be granted, he will enter into a spirited argument against it! Can these be the prayers of faith? We would not question the sincerity or the piety of our Christian brethren; but we think they "greatly err." Does it not look like a species of mockery, to put forth to the Deity a fervent prayer, which we as heartily believe will never be answered — that it cannot consistently be answered — and that a faith which is congenial *with* the answer is radically and scripturally wrong? Upon this very subject, the apostle hath instructed us, that we offer prayers for the salvation of "all men, without doubting." (1 Tim. ii. 1—8.) Upon which Dr. Clarke says—"*reasonings*" are referred to—"Such as are often felt by distressed penitents and timid believers; faith, hope, and unbelief appearing to hold a disputation and controversy in their own bosoms; in the issue of which *unbelief* ordinarily triumphs."* The doctor could not, if he had tried, represented more aptly the case of such Christians, or the apparent impiety of such prayers. It is granted by all that we should pray in submission to the will of God, nothing doubting but his purpose will be accomplished, and the objects of such prayers be granted. Now the

* *Clarke* on this passage.

apostle hath signified to us the will of God, which, even though it be admitted to be the will of desire merely, is the salvation of all men. And he has exhorted us to pray for it "without doubting." But, if there exist "reasonings, faith, hope, and unbelief," entering into a sort of "controversy" and "disputation" in the bosom of the petitioner, where even "*unbelief* ordinarily triumphs," what character shall we ascribe to such prayers, or what to the faith in such direct hostility against them? They are certainly not the prayers of "faith, nothing wavering," even if, not being "of faith," they are not "sin." And, when we look at the subject in the strongest light, — when we look out upon assembled multitudes who congregate to mingle the incense of their prayers for the salvation of Adam's wide-spread race, and those, too, who, if you tell them afterwards that there is every reason in the world to believe their prayers will be answered, they will then turn about and resent it, or get into a passion with you, — we cannot think that such prayers are acceptable offerings to the Most High; or, if they are, the faith that contradicts them must be singularly false.

We, thank God! can perform a consistent duty, in praying for the human race; nothing doubting that God will bestow a favor so consistent with his will, and so in accordance with all holy desires. Our proposition, then, has an importance with it *which* gives it the character of strong evidence for *the* truth of a theory which can alone support it.

The doctrine we advocate is congenial with all holy desires. We can preach Universalism, and pray Universalism, and say amen in faith; whereas, the theory of Partialism must strangely contradict the prayers of faithless hearts, and exist in jarring dissonance with the holiest aspirations of the soul.

We rest, then, thus far, in the following conclusions: that the doctrine of universal and eternal holiness and happiness is the only one which does not insult our reason on the very first consideration of it; that it excludes all absolute evil, and maintains that the universe shall ultimately embrace nothing but good; that it harmonizes all the attributes of God; that it renders all the commands of God consistent; that it recognizes the parental relationship of God to all his moral offspring; and that it is congenial with all holy desires. These are some of the "strong reasons" which we "bring forth" in support of our "cause," and which *cannot* be brought forth by any other system of divinity. For these reasons, we prize and honor it, and count it worthy of our reverence and faith. It will stand upon a *rational* basis, and does not ask us to renounce our reason, or to shrink from an investigation of its claims. It had, we trust, its origin in Eternal Reason itself, and its consummation unto all will be "the feast of reason, and the flow of soul."

LECTURE IV.

ARGUMENT FOR THE DOCTRINE OF UNIVERSAL SALVATION, CONTINUED.

What saith the Scripture? *Romans* iv. 3.

In considering the merits of the doctrine of universal salvation, it has frequently been declared that, notwithstanding the appearance of reason in many of the arguments put forth in defence of it, it is, nevertheless, felt to be repugnant to the line of Scripture testimony in reference to this momentous question. Hence, the reasons which are urged in its behalf are pronounced unworthy of trust, and the controversy is then put upon scriptural ground, where, it is said, Universalism meets no response but that of a continued line of condemnation. In accounting, however, for a large share of this felt repugnancy, we shall ascribe it at once to the force of tradition, and the hold of education on the mind. Men have been instructed from their infancy, and their instructers from *their* infancy, back through many generations; and a religious opinion, thus nourished and supported, *has struck* its roots to the very depths of the human

heart, and become, in fact, a part of that heart itself. Is it any wonder that such sentiments retain their hold as they do? The wonder and the praise should be, that the force of truth is so omnipotent to dislodge these opinions from the soul.

The final undoing and endless punishment of the wicked has so long been received implicitly as the truth of God's declaration, that many who peruse the matter of their Bibles take this point as a key of interpretation, to unlock the meaning of those Scriptures, which, without this aid, would remain to them in a shadow of obscurity. And these passages, many of them, are of the plainest and most simple character. So great is the hold of fireside opinions. No one, I presume, will dispute the fact, that almost every threatening of a general character, on the pages of the Scriptures, is carried, by many, far from its context and connection, away into a future world, for application and improvement. Even those of a most unquestionable temporal and earthly nature, where the context and all the circumstances show that they must be confined to a state of flesh and blood, are, on the wing of swift imagination, transported to the world of spirits. Nothing could exceed the wildness of such a course. While the whole Old Testament is, by some of the most eminent defenders of the eternity of punishment, given up as affording no proof at all of it, how many less-informed Christians are there who find no difficulty

in selecting from these Scriptures hundreds of texts in support of this most questionable sentiment!

But enough: there are, evidently, two sides to the subject of the present controversy. Be it ours to present the scriptural ground-work of a doctrine so glorious and infinitely desirable as that of the universal and complete salvation of the human species. And if we succeed in establishing this side of the question, of course, the opposite doctrine falls, as a necessary consequence, from its supposed foundation in the Bible. Nevertheless, we shall, in the sequel, offer some general remarks upon the numerous passages brought forth in defence of the opposing theory.

I. We begin with a notice of the first gospel promise mentioned in the Bible. It relates to the Saviour's conquest over sin: "I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed: it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel." (Gen. iii. 15.) This is the language of the Lord to the serpent. The sense of the passage is this: enmity shall exist between the serpent, or sin, and the seed of the woman, which is Christ. Christ shall bruise the serpent's head. Here is an allusion to the ancient custom of killing serpents. The blow was given upon the head. To bruise a serpent's head is to destroy it. Christ, therefore, shall destroy sin. This agrees with another passage, where we find *the same* fact recorded: "Forasmuch, then, as the

ldren are partakers of flesh and blood, he also
iself took part of the same; that through death
might destroy him that had the power of death,
t is, the devil." (Heb. ii. 14.) Again, the
rks of the devil are to be destroyed. "For this
pose the Son of God was manifested, that he
ght destroy the works of the devil." (1 John
8.) This testimony is conclusive. The ser-
it's head shall be bruised, the works of the devil
troyed, and the devil himself annihilated. This
the testimony of Moses, John, and Paul. The
quest over sin shall be universal and complete.
I. We pass to a brief notice of the promises to
ancient patriarchs. These are, indeed, familiar;
our object is to convince, rather than confirm.
e sum of the promises is this: a declaration of
Lord to Abraham, renewed unto Isaac, and
ifirmed unto Jacob, that in their seed "*all the
ions and families of the earth* should be
ssed." (Gen. xii. 3; xxvi. 4; xxviii. 14.)
ese promises are also spoken of by Peter on
wise: "And in thy seed shall all the *kindreds*
the earth be blessed." (Acts iii. 25.) That
language conveys the idea of universality can-
be successfully disputed, insomuch as no indi-
ual can be found who belongs not to some
on, family, or kindred. And, indeed, partial-
themselves are constrained to admit the univer-
ty of this language. On Genesis xxviii. 14,
rke remarks, "Not only all thy race, but all

the other *families* or *tribes* of mankind, which have not proceeded from the Abrahamic family, *shall be blessed*; for *Jesus Christ by the grace of God tasted death* FOR EVERY MAN." And on Genesis xii. 3, he remarks, "In the *Messiah* shall all the families of the earth be blessed; for he shall taste death for every man; his gospel shall be preached throughout the world; and *innumerable blessings be derived on* ALL MANKIND, through his *death* and *intercession*." What kind of blessings, doctor?

These promises, then, are universal. But there are now two considerations which are urged against the use which we would make of them; one is, that they are not gospel promises, but only promises of temporal blessings; another is, that although they may be gospel promises, yet they are conditional, and may not be realized in a universal fulfilment.

With regard to the first of these objections, it is sufficient to remark, that the apostle calls them *gospel* promises. Alluding to them, he says, "And the Scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the heathen through faith, preached before *the gospel* unto Abraham, saying, In thee shall all nations be blessed." (Gal. iii. 8.) This is sufficient. Paul calls them gospel promises, and also promises of justification through faith. There is, then, nothing temporal in them.

But it is again affirmed that, admitting them to *be gospel* promises, nevertheless, they are condi-

tional, depending on our faith, and may not have a fulfilment that is universal.

Our answer is, first, there is nothing in the promises *themselves* that is conditional. The language is positive and absolute. The Lord says, "I WILL, and thou SHALT."

In the next place, we observe, these promises are either unconditional, or else God's veracity is impeached. To say that *faith* is any part of the condition is the veriest absurdity. For the *promise* is the very thing to be believed. As such, it must be absolutely true before we believe it, else we are required to believe a falsehood, or something which is not true till we believe it!

God himself has declared to us the impiety of imputing to him such conduct. "He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in himself: he that believeth not God hath made him a liar; because he believeth not the record that God gave of his Son. And this is the record, that God hath given to us eternal life; and this life is in his Son." (1 John v. 10, 11.) In this passage, believers and unbelievers are called upon to believe the record that God gave of his Son. What is the record? "*This is the record*, that God hath given to us eternal life." And "he that believeth not" this record, "hath made God a liar." But how so, if the unbeliever hath not this life made sure for him before he believes? The very fact that unbelievers are required to believe that they have eter-

nal life proves that they have it infallibly in store for them, whether they believe it or not; because, if they thus have it, they make God a liar by disbelieving it; but, if they do not have it, I do not see how they could make him a liar if they *did* disbelieve it, for they would disbelieve no truth.

It is precisely so with the promises. We are called upon to believe them. They must, therefore, be true before we believe, and faith cannot be the condition. I am willing to grant that, without faith, we cannot *enjoy* the promises; but this does not prove that they are false, or not true till we believe them. They ARE true, and our disbelief cannot affect their verity. And they which believe "are blessed with faithful Abraham." But "What if some did not believe? Shall their unbelief make the faith [or faithfulness] of God without effect? God forbid: yea, let God be true, but every man a liar." (Rom. iii. 3, 4.)

But, again, the apostle hath distinctly declared, in so many words, that the divine promises are not conditional. "But as God is true, our word toward you was not yea and nay. For the Son of God, Jesus Christ, who was preached among you by us, even by me, and Sylvanus, and Timotheus, was not yea and nay, but in him was yea. For *all the promises of God in him* are yea, and in him, amen, unto the glory of God by us." (2 Cor. i. 18—20.) That is, they are absolute, infallibly *certain*. But the doctrine we are examining is in

evident hostility to this emphatic testimony. It affirms that the divine promises, *if believed*, will be yea; and if *disbelieved*, will be nay. And, therefore, instead of the apostle's doctrine, that they are all yea and amen, it contends that they are *both yea and nay*, according to the belief or unbelief of men. And, in fact, the system goes still further. It approaches the *deistical* ground, that God's promises are neither one thing nor the other, neither yea nor nay, *until* they are believed or disbelieved by man!!

So much, then, for the affirmed conditionality of the promises. Indeed, we are willing to acknowledge that man is not a *passive* instrument in the hands of God; that God's promises will not be fulfilled upon his head, with man in a posture of unwillingness or ignorance; that a certain condition of the mind is requisite for the experiencing of God's salvation; — but if *this* be called a conditional salvation, it is a condition which is sure of a true performance; for God, after all, is the ultimate and directing cause, and in this sense it may be said that "we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them."

III. In defence of universal salvation may now be presented other passages of various and special import. We do not, indeed, agree in the application of many passages which have been made use of in proof of the universality of the salvation of

the gospel; for we are of opinion that there are sufficient Scriptures, and those sufficiently explicit and direct, to justify, and even to encourage, a departure from many doubtful texts which have usually been resorted to in this great controversy. *One* text of a direct and unequivocal bearing is better than a hundred which, from some little circumstance in its phraseology or context, an opponent may make an uningenuous use of, to slur and weaken the whole character of evidence employed upon the subject.

In the exposition of this subject, we may not follow the order of the Scriptures with so much advantage as the order of theology. In other words, we may not, with so much success, follow the arrangement of the books and chapters of the Bible, as the arrangement of divine Providence in accomplishing the salvation of the world. We may not be enabled to do this, so far as Scripture testimony is concerned, but in a very brief manner; but this, at any rate, should be done first, as far as may be, before we adduce promiscuous Scriptures in attestation of the truth.

God, then, in the first place, *willed* the salvation of the world. "God will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth." (1 Tim. ii. 4.) Is this a will of desire or of purpose? I answer, it makes no difference which it may be, as it regards the accomplishment thereof. We have been sickened long enough with the

crude idea that, with reference to the ends of the divine government, God's will of desire and will of purpose may be different, and even hostile to each other. It does not comport with sound sense or sound theology, to say that what God desires, as an end in the divine economy, he does not purpose to effect. Can we say, then, that he purposes what he does not desire? With as much propriety as we can the former. We may rest assured, my brethren, that what God desires, as the result of his government, he will verily see that it is accomplished.

But we contend that it is not a will of desire merely, but a will of purpose, and is so expressed by the apostle: "*God* WILL HAVE *all men to be saved.*" Besides, the testimony of the same apostle is, "Having made known unto us the mystery of his *will*, according to his good pleasure, which he *hath* PURPOSED *in himself*, that in the dispensation of the fulness of times, he might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are on earth, even in him." (Eph. i. 9, 10.) It is, then, the *desire* and the *purpose* of Jehovah to gather together in one *all things in Christ.* It is also further stated, "In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, BEING PREDESTINATED according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will." (Eph. i. 11.) Nothing could be stronger

evidence of the will and purpose of God to effect the salvation of the world.

Now, in the next place, what God willed and purposed, he sent his Son to accomplish. The beloved apostle says, "We have seen and do testify, that the Father sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world." (1 John iv. 14.)

In the next place, what God willed and purposed, and sent his Son to accomplish, Jesus, in accordance with the mission he received, faithfully undertook. He "gave himself a ransom for all," "tasted death for every man," and is "the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world." (1 John ii. 2.)

In the next place, what God willed and purposed, and sent his Son to accomplish, and Jesus in accordance therewith undertook, shall be fully consummated. The great apostle speaks of the consummation in terms of perspicuity and force: "Then cometh the END, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father; when he shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power. For he must reign till he hath put all enemies under his feet. The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death. * * * And when all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall the Son also himself be subject unto him that put all things under him, that *God may be all in all.*" (1 Cor. xv. 24—28.) Observe, here,

that all enemies are not to be subdued by being imprisoned for eternity, or by placing the rebellious spirits where no further harm can result to the interests of Christ's kingdom. No, this is not the subjection of Christ. A slave or rebel may be thus subdued; chains may hang upon his body, while still the mind may burn with vengeance, and he be only outwardly subdued. This is not the subjection of Christ. And if you will look at the passage last quoted, you will find that the text warrants the conclusion that all enemies are to be subdued by having their *enmity destroyed*, and becoming *willing* subjects of the King of saints. Nay, the passage presents us with the fact, that these enemies are to become subject unto Christ *in the same way* that he is subject unto God. Observe, "He must reign till he hath put all enemies under his feet; and when all things shall be subdued unto him, *then shall the* SON ALSO HIMSELF *be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be* ALL IN ALL." God can never be all in all, in a spiritual sense, until all are subjected unto Christ as he is to God, which, in fact, the Spirit testifies.

Another testimony with regard to the consummation of God's will and purpose, for which Christ was sent, and for which he labored, may be found in Paul's Epistle to the Romans. At the conclusion of the eleventh chapter, after tracing the successive *stages of God's* providence in the system of

lection, he makes it issue in the salvation of all the Jews, and all the Gentile world, and concludes the universal theme with the following universal language: "For God hath concluded them all in unbelief, [both Jews and Gentiles,] that he might have mercy upon all. O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out! For who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counsellor? Or who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed to him again? *For of him, and through him, and* TO HIM ARE ALL THINGS; *to whom be glory forever. Amen.*"

From the whole, there could not be a more connected and conclusive argument for the salvation of the world presented to the human mind. It is infallibly established, that God, in the plenitude of his goodness, first *willed* the salvation of the world; that this will is a will of determinate purpose; that he then sent his Son to execute this purpose; that Jesus accordingly undertook the work; and that, finally, the will, and purpose, and work, shall be consummated, in the subjugation of all mankind to the Messiah's spiritual reign, as he is to be subjected to the Father, who shall then be *all in all* to whom be glory forever.

IV. We may now leave the order of theology and introduce other promiscuous Scriptures, confirmatory of the same great truth. And, in the first

place, the Saviour himself hath declared the universality of the accomplishment of man's salvation. "And I," says he, "if I be lifted up from the earth, *will draw all men unto me.*" (John xii. 32.) And, insomuch as the only condition was fulfilled on which the accomplishment of this truth depended, — as the Saviour *was* lifted, like the serpent in the wilderness, so must he draw, influence, or attract all men unto him. And this agrees with another testimony which is written, "The Father loveth the Son, and hath given *all* things into his hand. * * * All that the Father giveth me shall *come to me;* and him that cometh to me, *I will in no wise cast out.*" (John iii. 35; vi. 37.)

The next passage we shall introduce is in the fifth of Romans. "Therefore, as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life." It is evidently the apostle's idea here, that the free gift unto justification is as extensive as was the judgment to condemnation. And how extensive are they? Both are *universal.* As *all men* are condemned by the offence of one, "EVEN SO" are the same *all men* justified by the other. If it is said that the free gift was only *offered* by these means, but that many will not accept the offer, we reply, that such is not the doubtful character of the apostle's language. Besides, we have before proved that *all must* become willing subjects to

Christ, even as he is to be subjected to the Father. But the apostle's language is emphatic: "THE FREE GIFT CAME UPON ALL MEN," not, *was offered to*. Look also at the next verse: "For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners; so by the obedience of one SHALL many be made righteous." How extensive is the signification of the term *many* here? How many were made sinners? *All*. "So by the obedience of one," then, "SHALL ALL," or the same number, "be made righteous." And this agrees with the former verse. To be made righteous is the same as to obtain justification unto life. And the free gift came upon *all men* for this justification. And the apostle continues, — "Moreover, the law entered, that the offence might abound; but where sin abounded, grace did much more abound." This is a very singular expression, if, in millions of instances, *sin* is to abound *over grace*, and the triumph of sin be perpetual where grace can never operate. The doctrine of unpardonable sin, and the idea of "sinning away the day of grace," are both repulsed by this gracious testimony; for grace must abound over sin, or this testimony is effectually repudiated But the next verse confirms and establishes the whole. "That as sin hath reigned unto death [that is, *universally*,] EVEN so might grace reign [universally,] through righteousness unto eternal life, by Jesus Christ our Lord." There is nothing *in this* last verse which an objector can cavil

except it be the term *might*. He may say that it is decidedly *potential*, and implies *possibility*, *power*, *will*, and this is all. We direct him, then, to the 19th verse of this chapter, which has already been considered, where the *indicative* SHALL declares the veritable fact that all shall find righteousness by Christ. Besides, we ask him to consider this whole subject, to take in all the connection, and say whether terms so absolutely universal, and so variously diversified, upon so glorious a subject, can possibly be reconciled with the *limitation* of God's blessings through Christ, upon the lapsed of Adam's race. We are satisfied that they cannot.

In confirmation of the views here expressed, I cannot refrain from introducing an extract from Clarke's works, showing that not only Universalists, but Partialists, have felt the force of the apostle's language here, and have fairly stumbled on the truth unconsciously, (at least, so it *appears*,) in utter contradiction to their creeds. We give it, at any rate, as an ample comment on the text. "As extensively, as deeply, as universally as *sin*, whether implying the *act of transgression*, or the *impure principle* from which the act proceeds, or *both*, *hath reigned; even so*, as extensively, deeply, and universally *might grace reign*, [here is the potential,] filling the whole earth, and pervading, purifying, and refining the whole soul, *through righteousness*, through this doctrine of free salvation, *unto* eternal life, *by* Jesus Christ our

Lord. Thus we find that the salvation from sin here is [here is the indicative] as extensive and complete as the *guilt* and *contamination* of sin: death is conquered, hell disappointed, the devil confounded, and SIN TOTALLY DESTROYED. Here is glorying, to him that loved us, and washed us from our sins in his own blood, and has made us kings and priests to God and his Father, be glory and dominion, forever and ever, amen! Hallelujah! The Lord God omnipotent reigneth! Amen, and amen." Here is the force of truth; and the glory of truth. Who could think that such an exposition of this Scripture, and such an exclamation, would proceed from a partialist believer in the endless perpetuity of sin and misery? Yet so it is, that truth, which is powerful, will sometimes apparently make men forget their creeds, and exult in the salvation of the world.

Passing over the remnant of this Epistle, we come to the Epistle to the Corinthians. Part of the testimony we have already noticed; but there is still another passage which, with its connection, asserts the universality of final blessedness: "As in Adam *all die*, even so in Christ shall *all be made alive*." (1 Cor. xv. 22.) If the word in the first instance conveys the idea of universality, so also must it in the second. To be made alive in Christ is to be raised to a state of immortality, in opposition to the mortality of those who die in Adam. *But is* this all? Is it only to be raised to immo-

tality? We say, that it is to be raised to immortality *and glory.* For the apostle goes on to state the *order* of the resurrection, (order of time,) and in the three orders which he mentions — Christ the first fruits, afterward they that are Christ's at his coming, then the end, when *all* enemies shall be subdued unto him, that God may be all in all — in these three orders or successions, all mankind are not only included in the resurrection of immortality, but in the resurrection of glory; for, as before shown, they are to be subjected unto Christ as he is to the Father! And, further, no man has ever yet shown, or ever can show, that in this account of the resurrection of immortality, there is any limitation in number, even to the 42d verse, where we are instructed that, "*So* also is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in dishonor; it is *raised in glory.*" And, further yet, (to the 49th verse,) "As we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly." And so on till verse 51: "We shall all be changed," and "Death," (verse 54,) to every son and daughter of Adam, "is swallowed up in victory," and the apostle renders thanks for all, through Jesus Christ our Lord.

I say, no man has ever yet shown, or can show, that there is any limitation in numbers, from the all that die in Adam, to the number who shall be raised in glory and bear the image of the heavenly. No, the chapter *is* a glorious one — the best one in

Andover Seminary, says, "What can be meant by things in heaven, that is, beings in heaven, bowing the knee to Jesus, if *spiritual worship* be not meant?" And we may echo back the question, what can be meant, if this be not?

The apostle, in his letter to the Colossians, assures us, however, that this must be the meaning, for he uses the same periphrastic phrase for the universe, viz. things in earth and things in heaven, and uses it with reference to their reconciliation. "For it pleased the Father that in him should all fulness dwell; and, having made peace through the blood of his cross, by him to *reconcile* [not, then, to force and compel] all things unto himself; by him, I say, whether they be things in earth, or things in heaven." (Col. i. 19, 20.) This was the good pleasure of the Father, to be accomplished through "faith grounded and settled" in Jesus Christ his Son; and God himself hath declared to us, "My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure." (Isa. xlvi. 10.)

There is yet another passage, which is the last that we shall notice, recorded in Paul's letter to Timothy. There it is expressly recorded that God is the Saviour of all men. The apostle declares, "For therefore we both labor and suffer reproach, because we trust in the living God, who is the Saviour of all men, especially of those that believe." (1 Tim. iv. 10.) This passage is direct and conclusive. It might not be, were it not for the latter

clause of it; but, as it is, the very thing which is generally supposed to weaken it for our purpose, just strengthens the argument for the salvation of the world.

In the first place, however, let us remark upon the construction which is put upon this text by the limitarian disciple. He would declare that the text in question only expresses a *willingness* with God to be the universal Saviour, but that those only can be absolutely saved who exercise the faith required. I charge you to observe and remember that the text has not this idea in it. It does not read, "God, who is *willing* to be the Saviour of all men, especially of those that believe." No, this is far from the style of the apostle's language. His language is positive and absolute. "GOD IS THE SAVIOUR OF ALL MEN." The present tense of the verb may require of us to substitute the future, as God who *will be* the Saviour of all men; but it does not authorize us to destroy the absoluteness of the language, and, with a change of tense, to effect a change of mood, as, God *would* be the Saviour of all men. By no means can we take this liberty. God *is* the Saviour of all men in the same sense that Christ was declared to *be* the Saviour of the world, even before many who now are, had become the subjects of his kingdom. Although, then, the subject requires a change of tense, I repeat, it does not re-

quire, but rather forbids, a change of mood which would destroy the absoluteness of the declaration.

But it is objected, again, that God is declared to be *especially* the Saviour of those that believe. But this destroys not the strength of the passage as applied to our purpose. Because the apostle stated first that God was the Saviour of all men, and then afterwards added, especially of those that believe, must we make him contradict the unequivocal statement which he made at first? The whole text must evidently harmonize.

But the worst of the limitarian interpretation is yet to be exposed. Instead of the inspired reading of the text, "God is the Saviour of *all* men, *especially* of those that believe," the partialist interpreter would have it, "God is the Saviour of *no* man *except* those that believe!" Should we not tremble for such utter perversions of the sacred text? Is not this a desperate effort to bend the Scriptures to sustain a groundless theory?

But what will be done, says the objector, with the special nature of the text's latter clause? Does it not weaken the argument therefrom for the universality of God's salvation. We answer, instead of weakening the argument, it just strengthens it. Observe, if God was not the *actual* Saviour of *all*, he could not be the *special* Saviour of *any!* How could he? Would it not be the veriest nonsense to talk of a *special* salvation if there were no *com-*

mon one? Suppose I should say, I will preach to all the congregation, but especially to the church. Would you be justified in reporting abroad that I was going to preach *only* to the church? Or suppose I should exhort you to the practice of all the Christian virtues, but *especially* charity. Would you understand me to say *omit* all *but* charity? You see, then, that the qualifying adverb *especially*, in connection with the universal *all*, instead of weakening, only strengthens the supposition that absolutely all is meant. For, were it not so, there would be no propriety at all in the use of the qualifying adverb *especially*.

But we prefer, after all, to have the apostle the interpreter of his own language. It is manifestly a just rule of interpretation to allow, in a connection of similar character, the same meaning to a person's language in one place, as is evidently signified by the same language in another. Now this same apostle thus writes to the Galatians: "As we have, therefore, opportunity, let us do good unto *all* men, *especially* unto them who are of the household of faith." (Gal. vi. 10.) But, according to the law of many interpreters with reference to the passage in Timothy, we are here to understand the apostle as exhorting his Christian brethren to do good to *no* man, *except* the household of faith! Again, this same apostle writes to Timothy, "The cloak that I left at Troas with Carpus, when thou comest, bring with thee, and the books,

but *especially* the parchments." (2 Tim. iv. 13.) Now this apostle would have hardly conceived his direction obeyed, had Timothy brought *only* the parchments, and *left* the cloak and the books. In like manner, we contend that his meaning is abused, when we make him say, with similar language, that God is the Saviour of *no* man, *except* those that believe. He must be, evidently, the *actual* Saviour of *all*, or else he cannot be the *special* Saviour of *any*. Any other interpretation would make the apostle to utter unmeaning, unintelligible words. Our argument, therefore, from this passage, is strengthened by the very phraseology which is usually supposed to weaken it. God is, absolutely and truly, the "Saviour of all men;" and let all the people say, Amen.

But what is this special salvation to believers? We answer, it is the *rest*, and *peace*, and holy *joy*, which, even in this life, is consequent upon faith in Jesus Christ our Lord. "We which have *believed*, *do* enter into *rest*." (Heb. iv. 3.) "Now the God of hope fill you with all *peace* and *joy* in *believing*." (Rom. xv. 13.) "*Believing*, ye *rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory*." (1 Peter i. 8.) This is the special blessing and salvation of believers. "We are *saved* by *hope*," also. (Rom. viii. 24.) We are saved from tormenting doubts and fears. We are saved from despair, and the otherwise almost insupportable *load of* the troubles and adversities of life. While,

to the poor unbeliever and rejector of the gospel, these comforts never come; and he must pass through life a hopeless wanderer, shrouded in the gloom of dark and cheerless infidelity. Such persons are not saved; have not the special salvation, but are condemned. "For," says the Saviour, "he that believeth not is *condemned already*." (John iii. 18.) And, again, "He that believeth not the Son, shall not see life; but the wrath of God *abideth* on him" in the present time, and so long as he continues in his unbelief." (John iii. 36.)

This may suffice for an exposition of the last quoted text, in proof of a full and complete salvation. And no other view of God's salvation, permit me to remark, can possibly be reconciled with that emphatic language. We rejoice in the simplicity of the truth (and may it be ours to practise according to it, and secure its special benefits!) that God is the Saviour of all men, but especially of those that believe. We will "trust in the living God," who thus manifests himself to us, even though, as did the apostle, "we therefore both labor and *suffer reproach*."

We thus conclude the affirmative testimony on the question of the "world's salvation." We have given, perhaps, but a small part of what might be given; but we have aimed to present a few undoubted passages, and to trust the argument from them. We are quite willing to rest the subject upon what we have called the theology of the

question, in distinction from any further scriptural array. *That* is a pillar immovable; and that alone is a pillar of everlasting truth. Nay, we could do with the very PURPOSE of the Almighty; but when we see that purpose put in execution — when we see Jesus sent of the Father, and coming to accomplish his unalterable will — and when we see the END described, the grand consummation of the divine government emphatically declared to embrace the *whole* in a resurrection of immortality and glory, — we are more than doubly assured that this is Christianity — this is truth.

V. But now, says the reader, are there not other Scriptures, of equal strength, belonging to the opposite side of this great controversy? Our reply is, first, that the Scriptures cannot be a contradiction. (We are not reasoning with infidels.) If that is truth which we have quoted in such abundance, it must at once be manifest that no other passage, however strong or highly figurative, can be consistently interpreted to contradict that which is established. There are, indeed, other Scriptures which are *brought forth* to establish the opposite theory, and we have now a few general remarks to offer upon them. It cannot be expected that our remarks should be more than general, for there are upwards of one hundred and thirty passages made use of to establish the appalling doctrine of endless and unutterable torment. For an *examination* of the *whole* of them, I refer the read-

er to a work recently published, entitled the "UNIVERSALIST'S GUIDE, by *Thomas Whittemore*." Our remarks must be general.

It is a source of satisfaction, then, to know that Universalists are not the only persons who have given these passages an application to temporary punishments. On the contrary, limitarians themselves, and even eminent commentators and critics in their ranks, have given almost all these Scriptures the application which Universalists also are constrained to adopt. The passages which are usually considered proof-texts of the doctrine of endless misery, are generally such as contain the terms *hell*, *judgment*, *damnation*, *perdition*, &c. and the phrases *everlasting punishment*, *second death*, *unquenchable fire*, *everlasting destruction*, *day of judgment*, &c. Now, *every one* of these terms and phrases, and almost every other passage, both in the Old and New Testaments, which is made use of in our day to establish the revolting doctrine of endless torment, have been, by the most respectable Orthodox authority, applied to scenes of the present life. For confirmation of this fact, and a faithful transcript from these writers on these passages, see "Paige's Selections from eminent Commentators, who have believed in Punishment after Death; wherein they have agreed with Universalists in their Interpretation of Scriptures relating to Punishment;" a work, by the way, of invaluable worth. The fact we have

stated shows the unwarrantable confidence which is placed in these terms and phrases, as proof of endless punishment. Or, at least, it shows that there is nothing *novel* in the Universalist's view of these passages, and that we were not guided by prejudice alone, or an overweening anxiety to twist and bend these Scriptures for the support of a favorite system. No; the most respectable Orthodox commentators, with all their prejudices and creed against it, have done this work for us.

You will all understand what I have affirmed. I do not say that any *one*, or *two*, or *three* commentators, have thus interpreted the passages referred to, but *among them all* they have done the business; they have shown that almost every text which is usually quoted to prove this doctrine, does not prove it, but relates to temporal calamities altogether. This shows that Universalists are not the only persons who have thus interpreted these "terrible" passages. It shows that truth is felt, even with the opposite and powerful influence of human creeds and human prejudice; and that the doctrine of endless punishment, instead of having, as is generally supposed, "hundreds" of unequivocal texts to support it, has only a few, a *precious* few, which *all* its advocates can agree on as teaching it to man! This is a fact which but few, very few of its believers are aware of. They frequently accuse Universalists of disagreement among *themselves*, but little thinking that, in the ranks of

their own commentators, so little agreement exists with regard to the proof-texts of their distinguished doctrine, scarcely imagining that among them all they have rejected almost every text which is usually supposed to reveal this blighting, withering doctrine to the world. Universalists are far more agreed than this, and are ready, at any time, to present an array of scriptural evidence, unitedly and firm, and, to them, invincible to all attack.

But this one fact, relative to the almost universal destruction of proof by the public defenders of the eternity of hell torments, on scriptural ground, too, goes an amazing way towards countenancing, as eternal truth, the doctrine of the universal redemption and sanctification of the world. It ought to be looked upon with seriousness, with reverence, and holy joy. True, they were *men* who have thus testified. But what, in reality, do we see in it? Men, eminent for learning and biblical research, strong in the faith of the endless condemnation of the wicked, sitting down, with care and prayer, to comment on the book of God's revelation, for the benefit of honest inquirers after the way, the truth, and the life; and holding forth *such* truth upon almost every passage which relates to punishment, against creeds, against faith, against prejudice, at the risk even of considered eternal interests, where conscience alone, and honest conviction of the truth, could prompt them so to understand God's word! We hail it *as a signal* testimony to the truth of our

illustrious servant of God met from this perverse and faithless generation, and from the Gentiles also; suffice it to say, in his own significant language, he "both labored and suffered reproach, for trusting in the living God, who was the Saviour of all men."

An opposition and a spirit of a similar character have lived and reigned in every age, from the time of the gospel's promulgation in the earth. Persecution, abuse, and misrepresentation, instead of Christian expostulation, respectful treatment, and candid exposition, have been resorted to as refuges of power when sound reasoning and Scriptural testimony fail. It is employed at the present day, in a most signal manner, by those who have not the ability or the honesty to come to a manly discussion of the question, upon the decision of which rests the destinies of the world. But we do not complain of opposition; we would rather court it. What we complain of is, the *character* of that opposition, and the perversity of that spirit which would stifle all manly investigation, and employ uncharitable abuse, low satire, personal invective and ridicule, on a subject so serious as that involving infinite and eternal interests. Our cause is *advanced* by *manly* opposition, by free investigation, by a fair and candid discussion of its claims. And those who have generally taken *part* on the opposite side of this controversy appear to know this; and hence there have been no

means, however dishonorable and deceptive, which have not been resorted to, and turned into a carnal and offensive weapon. We would by no means include *all* who have warred against the sentiment in question, in this dishonorable charge; for we speak of the *general* character of that warfare which has been waged against the theology of a free redemption and sanctification of the world. A few have quitted themselves in a manly and a Christian manner; but the majority, and nearly all, have brought disgrace upon themselves and their profession. In the first place, there is a mortifying ignorance of the system they attempt to overthrow; in the second place, an unchristian bitterness of spirit against every thing that comes not within their views of theoretical Christianity.

These remarks have been called forth as suited to the subject and the occasion. The general character of the objections brought forward against the doctrine of a free and complete salvation, evinces not only an ignorance of the system against which the objections are directed, but a severity and acrimony of temper altogether unsuited to a mind deeply imbued with the spirit of the gospel. Not that we would require that fastidiousness which revolts at a full and hearty expression; but only that candor, and fairness, and decency, which would better become men who claim all the piety and all the religion in the world, and who *may* be as frail and *fallible* as — even ourselves.

But it is time to notice the objections which are urged against the system in question. And here be it remarked, that we need not expect any thing so *very* formidable as one might be supposed to imagine, when we are told of the *utter* and *palpable* absurdity of all our views and principles. There is an impression that that thing, Universalism, is a creature of such entire deformity, that "to be hated, needs but to be seen;" that it is so *utterly* destitute of consistency and truth, that time and labor are lost in the consideration of its claims. What we designed to say was, that, if it really *is* such a moral monster, it would be a very easy thing to bring it, *as such*, forth to the public gaze; that, if it be, in reality, such a compound of error and absurdity, the arguments which are urged against it might be supposed to be singularly formidable; and that our answers thereto might be imagined to be specimens of the severest metaphysics; where all the sophistry and all the ingenuity that could possibly be mastered would be brought forth to give the argument a character of deep perplexity. But I put the congregation on the expectancy beforehand, that no such knotty reasonings need be lookod for; for the reason that the objections to be noticed we do not consider so absolutely terrifying; and, formidable as they may be, and undoubtedly are deemed, yet, to our minds, they are not of this discouraging *character*; and therefore your minds will not be

taxed with any such deep and intellectual abstraction. Indeed, the objections, many of them, are of a character so crude and lax, that one can sometimes hardly come to a patient consideration of them; or at least, without submitting first to a slackening of all his mental energies, can he sit down patiently to the work of refutation.

We will not promise to bring forth *every* objection from high and low, which has ever been urged against the theory of universal deliverance from sin and sorrow; for that would be to scan an endless field of folly and perversity, and, by a tedious line of illustration, to concentrate an argument of great *comparative* strength, for that entire depravity for which our Christian brethren contend. Be it ours, at the present time, to notice, with all due respect, the strongest and most popular objections which are urged against the doctrine in question.

These objections, considered worthy of notice at the present time, are, in number, *ten:*

I. The theory in question is denounced as the doctrine of the devil; as having been the invention of Satan, who, it is said, first preached it to the woman in the garden of Eden, when he said in his deception, "Ye shall *not* surely die."

II. It is denounced as a species of infidelity; a denial of some of the fundamental parts of the Christian revelation.

III. It is objected to as being a new doctrine;

an innovation upon the established doctrines of the church.

IV. It is affirmed to be the production of a *one-sided* view of the Bible; as an hypothesis built upon the *promises* of God, to the neglect of his most awful *threatenings*.

V. It is said to involve an absolute denial of the *justice* of Jehovah.

VI. It is declared to be the result of an unprincipled *perversion* of the Scriptures.

VII. It is a doctrine said to be particularly pleasing to the *carnal mind*.

VIII. It is also affirmed to be "*too good to be true*."

IX. It is said to be built upon a denial of the free agency of man.

X. It is, finally, said to be a doctrine which will do very well to live by, but will not do to die by.

Add to this, that it is also denounced as a device most ruinous to the souls of men, being of a terrible, demoralizing influence; which objection, from its importance and prominency, we have reserved for a separate discourse; and we have here, I think, a very candid statement of the principal objections brought against us by "those of the contrary part."

The *honest*, *dignified*, and *intellectual* opponent may find it hard to suppress a smile, despite of the *seriousness* of the subject. And if he can patiently

to us while we come down to answer these

charges, we will endeavor, in the spirit of Paul before Agrippa, to count ourselves happy, because we shall answer for ourselves, at this time, touching all the things whereof we are accused of the multitude.

I. The doctrine, then, in the first place, is denounced as the invention of Satan, who preached it, originally, to Eve in the garden of Eden. This is, indeed, a charge of some magnitude; and it would be singularly mortifying, as well as singularly absurd, could we truly trace the doctrine of a world's salvation back to the enemy of all righteousness as its source and origin in the earth. But, before we notice the absurdity which such a supposition involves, it were well to ascertain the truth of this accusation, by looking at the sermon which the devil preached on this occasion. God, it seems, had been warning Adam of the fearful consequences of transgression in partaking of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and solemnly declared that of this he should not eat; "For in the day thou eatest thereof, *thou shalt surely die.*" This, be it recollected, was the truth of God. It was inevitable, and not to be despised. Death, certain and unavoidable, should take place upon Adam, on the very day of transgression. Now this is precisely what Universalists preach. They hold forth death to the transgressor, from which there can be no escape. And this punishment, as *in the case of Adam*, in the first transgression, is,

to a great degree, immediate in its operations: it is true now as it was when Adam sinned,—"*In the day thou eatest thereof*, thou shalt surely die." Be it remembered, that this was not natural or physical death; neither was it eternal death, which phrase does not occur in the Bible. It was not *natural* death which took place on that day; for Adam lived many hundred years after that, and begat many sons and daughters. And of course, if it was not natural, it could not be *eternal* death; for that, if true, cannot take place till after the body has yielded to the fell destroyer. It must, then, have been *moral* or *spiritual* death; for this, in fact, is the only death that could take place, according to the other history of Adam, upon the day of his transgression. He died on that day, according to the plain and unescapable threatening of the Lord. He died to innocence, to virtue, and to so much of happiness as was the consequence of the violated law. And this agrees precisely with the representations of moral death given by the Old Testament writers, by Christ, and his apostles. *Wisdom* is styled life. "She is a *tree of life*," says the wise man, "to them that lay hold upon her; and happy is every one that retaineth her." (Prov. iii. 18.) Again, "Whoso findeth me, findeth *life*." (Prov. viii. 35.) Again, "In the way of righteousness is *life*, and [on the other hand] in *the* pathway thereof there is *no death*." (Prov. *xii. 28.*) Jesus also himself says, "If a man keep

my saying, he shall *never see death.*" (John viii. 51.) This, evidently, cannot mean natural death; and it is altogether gratuitous to say that it means eternal death. But it signifies that spiritual death, which, if a man believe and obey the gospel, will never be his portion in the world. Jesus is styled "the *bread of life.*" And, again, "The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life;" that is, they quicken and invigorate all the inner man. The apostle also assures us that "To be *carnally minded* is *death.*" (Rom viii. 6.) Death is not said here to succeed carnal-mindedness as a punishment, though this may be a truth asserted in other places; but the very state of carnal-mindedness *is itself* a state of death, of moral torpor and misery. John says, "He that loveth not his brother *abideth in death*" (1 John iii. 14) in the present time. In precise accordance with this, the same apostle says, "We know that we *have passed* [already passed] from death unto life, because we love the brethren." (1 John iii. 14.)

This testimony is sufficient, from the Old Testament and the New, to show that *death*, as the term frequently occurs in the Bible, is a depraved moral condition in the present life; a death, as the apostle significantly expresses it, a "death in trespasses and sins."

Now this is the death which Adam was threatened with, and of which he died, on the day he tasted of the forbidden fruit. The history of his

after life shows that it could be no other; and the Scriptures, as we have seen, are in full accordance with this exposition of the subject.

This is the death God preached to Adam, and this is the death in which Universalists believe. But the devil contradicted God. "The serpent said unto the woman, Ye shall *not* surely die." Now this is not our doctrine. We believe no such thing. Do we not invariably contend for a death, — a punishment in the day of transgression? Why, then, charge us with preaching the devil's doctrine, who so plainly contradicted this threatening of the Lord, and this prominent and distinguishing tenet in the Universalist's faith? God said, "*In the day thou eatest thereof*, thou shalt surely die." This is what we believe. This is the faith of Universalists. The devil said, "Ye *shall not* SURELY die." We reject his testimony as false and dangerous to men.

But, seeing this doctrine is not ours, it were worth a while to inquire whose doctrine it is. Who has espoused this sentiment of Satan, and who is guilty of the charge? My brethren, did you ever hear sentiments like these: that sin was a pleasant thing in life; that many fascinations and many delights abound in the paths of wickedness; that it is even true, that punishments are not inflicted upon many transgressors who revel in iniquity, and they riot in an intoxication of bliss, *in the direst* depravity, while judgment is delayed,

and they are permitted to enjoy their sinful pleasures, and do not *surely* and inevitably suffer? Did you ever hear a *worse* form of doctrine? Did you ever hear it contended for earnestly, that sin might be reveled in, and its votaries go triumphing on, from day to day, and from year to year, escaping the penalties of justice, with a high hand and an outstretched arm, and, by a timely repentance, even escape the retributions of eternity, and sit down among the company of the celestial, thus clearing *all*, or nearly all, the judgments of the Lawgiver, and going *forever* unwhipped of justice? In short, did you ever hear it virtually and substantially declared that the sinner does not *surely* die in life, to the full extent and meaning of the law, and does not *surely* die in eternity, but may even escape that threatening evil? If you have, then you need not be at a loss to discover the practical adoption of the devil's doctrine, and — please lay the charge at the door of the guilty.

We would not, certainly, thus shift the charge upon our accusers, did it not furnish an instance of most righteous retort, and signal mistaking of the innocent for the guilty. It is *they* who preach the devil's doctrine, — they who "put far away the evil day," and steadfastly maintain that *in the day thou sinnest*, thou *shalt not* surely die!

But, again — for we wish to place this subject in a clear light, and do it ample justice — it may now be seen *that there is* an evident *absurdity* in styling

Universalism the devil's doctrine. This doctrine teaches the *destruction* of the devil and all his works! Is it supposable, that, if the devil should set out to invent a doctrine to suit him, he would frame one that taught his own destruction? that he would prophesy his own downfall and his own conquest? Would he not rather frame a system of divinity, or of diabolism, which would perpetuate his own reign, and assert his own triumph? If we may suppose the devil possessed of that cunning and device which is usually ascribed to him, he would undoubtedly, were he to invent a system, maintain the empire of his own dominion, and never be guilty of introducing any conqueror who should overrule and destroy him and his works. I leave it again, therefore, to the audience, to say which would prove most likely to be the doctrine of the devil; that which involves his own destruction, and asserts that one mightier than he shall "finish sin, make an end of transgression, and bring in everlasting righteousness," or that which erects his kingdom which is to endure forever, and peoples it with many millions of souls, the fruit of his successful enterprise. I speak as unto wise men: judge ye what I say. The devil is declared to be "the enemy of all righteousness." We may rest assured, then, that if he be possessed of the least particle of cunning or malignity, he never would have framed such a righteous system as the *former*; but unholiness, blasphemy, and misery,

would be his delight, and the characteristics of his kingdom. Again, it should be recollected, "Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation; and every city or house divided against itself shall not stand. And if Satan cast out Satan, [which is the case if our doctrine be his,] he is divided against himself; how shall then his kingdom stand?" You will at once perceive that the charge of advocating the devil's doctrine can be brought against any denomination of Christians under heaven with vastly more propriety than it can against Universalists. For how could Satan, unless he has become vastly changed in character, made more holy and less powerful, consistently advocate a doctrine which asserts his own destruction, divides him against himself, and makes it out that he, who is the enemy of all righteousness, has planned a system of universal holiness and happiness! O, consistency, thou art a jewel.

Once more, and we will have done with the subject. In order to *guess*, (for this is the best we can do, seeing there will be a difference of opinion on it,) in order to guess, then, which or what would be the devil's theory, were he to invent a system and palm it off as truth, let us take to imagining what sort of sentiment he would delight in. Those who profess to be best acquainted with him might, perhaps — all partiality for him aside — do the work better than we can; but *we* will *try*, and this *for the elucidation* of the truth. Here,

devil, possessed of wisdom, power, and to a terrible degree; and now let us at sort of system he would invent, if he ording to the character usually ascribed arry on as much deception and work il as he could. His first object would nt obedience to God's great commands, n love and loyalty to him, and love to iversally. For this purpose, he would levise the most malignant falsehoods to d reproach his character; he would iim as cruel, partial, and vindictive; creatures to love him, when, in fact, he reated and determined them for endless or else pretended to be kind by *offering* when, in fact, he *knew* they never n it. He would also represent the requires as exceedingly irksome and performance, causing great surrenders it; and the path of obedience would be as clogged with tribulation, and over- gloom. And, at the same time, if they lk therein, they would be threatened es unimaginable and of endless dura- , on the other hand, would be repre- sant and agreeable; while, at the same ould be forbidden on pain of the penal- id. To complete the shocking cari- God's character, the devil would tell ey were by nature utterly incapable of



thinking one good thought, or performing one good action, and constituted with an irresistible propensity to evil, and that continually; that they could do nothing of themselves to better their condition; and yet, that *God* would do nothing, until they sought out the good work themselves! Thus might the devil teach and preach, and, very likely, he would succeed in discouraging many, and driving others to despair and suicide, and frightening the rest into a profession of his doctrine, as a very acceptable, though perfectly unintelligible, refuge for the salvation of their souls.

Having accomplished so much, the next thing to be done would be to prevent obedience to the great social command, — love to universal humanity. In order to accomplish his devilish design here, he would begin by slandering, at wholesale, human nature. He would very probably assert broadly, the utter corruption and malignity of the human character; thus representing them not only *unworthy* of love, but in a light in which it would be *impossible* to exercise a particle of true affection for them. This done, he would then probably tell them — make them believe it if he could — that God *himself* was their enemy; that he cherished an infinite and unreconcilable hate for them, or a greater part of them; and then leave them to guess at the reasonableness of God's command.

Then, if the devil could succeed in destroying love for God *and* man, he would next naturally

begin to assert his own supremacy, though in a way in which his subjects should not suspect his enmity to them. But *in his system* would be included his triumphant reign in the regions of guilt, and darkness, and despair; his eternal and tyrannical dominion over a great proportion, all he could get away from the kingdom of the Redeemer. Thus would he maintain the consistency of not predicting his own destruction, and his diabolical system would he complete, except in the case of offering rewards and punishments: the rewards he would probably place far off in the distance, so that they might lose all good effect; and the punishments, the evil day, would also be put far away, in order thereby more effectually to carry on his deception, and flood the world with immorality and crime.

This would be the *devil's* doctrine, at least as well as I could fancy it, and I would not claim the merit of *entire* fancy; and I now give up for some one better skilled in diabolical devices.

We have spent much more time upon this objection than its weight and soundness really deserve, for the reason that this is the *first*, the uppermost with many minds, that is urged against the system of universal and efficient grace. It pretends to trace the system back to its origin, — to the father of lies; and if we have done any thing to repel it, may it result to the honor and advancement of the *truth.* I beg the hearer to remember that the

devil's teaching was, In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt *not* surely die, which is exactly the reverse of our system of punishment; that the popular system is in precise accordance with the devil's promise of delay; that, moreover, the charge to us of teaching Satan's theory involves the absurdity of his making it a fundamental part in his system to insist upon his own destruction, with all that appertains to him; also, of dividing him against himself, and making it out that he who is the enemy of all righteousness has shown himself mightily in favor with a pure and spotless system of universal holiness and joy!! Remember these, with the other particulars with regard to what probably would be the devil's theory, were he to invent one and palm it off as truth; and then we will conclude this portion of our subject with the caution, that "those who live in glass houses should not throw stones!"

II. Another objection against the system of truth we advocate is, that it is a species of infidelity, — a denial of some of the fundamental parts of the Christian revelation. This objection is of such a nature that we need spend but little time upon its claims. It is usually given forth in a style of bitter and uncharitable, not to say dishonest, perversity of heart, for this *reason*, candid hearer: those who make use of it as a weapon against us, *know* that we have no sympathy for infidelity; that we *cordially reject its* cold and faithless spirit; and

that there is no principle we more studiously adhere to, in the support of our doctrines, than, What saith the Scriptures? We may be in error in our interpretation of the Scriptures, and so may our accusers; but that we *reject* the Scriptures, that we secretly or openly countenance the principle of unbelief in any of the matter of their testimony,—this is a charge which comes with an ill grace from those with whom it is as far from their house to ours as it is from ours to theirs. And it is upon this principle that we may with as much propriety bring the charge of infidelity against them, for not believing as we honestly do, as they bring it against us. But we have no disposition so to do. Both may be mistaken in their views of Christianity; but, be it remembered, both honestly receive the Bible as the rule and directory of faith. And what aggravates the charge when brought against us is, that those who bring it *know* that we are not atheists, nor deists, nor skeptics, in any of what we conceive to be the essentials or minutiæ of the Christian revelation. They *know* it; and hence they must settle the matter with their own consciences, when they bring the heavy charge of infidelity against us. We acknowledge that we may be mistaken; that we are not infallible; and we ask and expect, in modesty, the same acknowledgment from them. But that we disbelieve or explain *away* any one point which we think the Bible *teaches, is* a charge as unjust and uncharitable as

it is false. We shall not allow them to point out and dictate *to* us what the Bible *does* teach, any more than they would allow us to point out and dictate to them. In fact, this charge of infidelity from one Christian sect to another resolves itself, finally, into the assumed infallibility of the principles and doctrines of either sect which first brings the charge; so that every individual member thereof may at once assume the prerogative and dignity of the pope of Rome, and haughtily issue forth his bulls and edicts, and charges of heresy, infidelity, or apostasy, against every other individual who may, as honestly as he, hold to a different form of doctrine from his own. We heartily abominate the practice, prevailing as it does between the different sects in Christendom; and can but look upon it as a weak and unreasonable attempt to cast reproach upon an honest body of Christians who verily "believe, and do testify, that the Father sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world;" moreover, who believe in the *complete success* of this mission, staggering not at the promises through unbelief.

This leads us, in the second place, to remark, that it is not generally against the matter of *universal salvation* that the charge of infidel sentiments is brought, but against Universalism as a system involving other points of doctrine. The remarks already offered, however, apply to every article *of our faith*, and render the charge unjust

and false. We remark, now, that, so far as the matter of *salvation* is concerned, instead of being infidels, we believe too much, rather than not enough, for our brethren of the "contrary part." We believe *too much;* this is the difficulty; this is the occasion of their reproach. *Their* faith is narrow and contracted; *ours*, broad and universal. Infidelity lurks not in this portion of the Universalist's faith. We feel it full and strong, rising and expanding, like Peter's vision of the sheet, knit at the four corners of the universe and let down to earth. "Blessed are the people who know the joyful sound: they walk in the light of thy countenance, O Lord." The Saviour to us is the Saviour of the world. Salvation to us is deliverance from *universal* sin, and ignorance, and imperfection. With the eye of faith we see "death conquered, hell disappointed, the devil confounded, and sin totally destroyed." God save us from any doubt or skepticism here. Let the shield of faith be perfect and entire, protecting us against every insidious attack. Let the helmet of salvation shield our heads from the blow of the battle-axe that cannot cleave. Let faith be universal, and hope be full, till faith and hope are realized on high, and

> "The anthem long and loud shall swell,
> Our Saviour hath done all things well."

We remark, in the third place, that so far is Universalism from infidelity, that it has saved num-

bers from the black and turbid waters of unbelief, and given them a faith to go on their way rejoicing. Friends, brethren, consider this truth. Many are the minds that can testify to this, that, had it not been for a system of benevolence and rationality, they would have wandered in the way of darkness unto death. Unsatisfied with the doctrines of the church, which to them appeared unreasonable and unworthy of belief, and still believing the Bible to countenance these doctrines, they have closed up their Bibles, and become infidels outright. Infidelity, to them, appeared more reasonable than the appalling and unintelligible doctrines of the church. The doctrine of the Trinity they could not assent to; total depravity they felt to contradict and dishonor the noblest and most obvious principles of human nature; vicarious atonement they felt to be unjust and appalling; imputed righteousness or guilt, they felt to be impossible; and endless torments they rejected as an unparalleled abomination. They thought these doctrines sanctioned by the Bible; they turned from their Bibles to the fairer works of nature, and rejoiced and triumphed in their unbelief. But the Spirit of God again moved upon the waters; they resolved to be free from the bias of human creeds; they again turned the eye of earnestness upon the pages of the Bible, and there, from the fountain-head of inspiration, they drank, and lived again. They became convinced that the Bible favored not

these time-venerated doctrines; that it spoke a different language; and God put a new song into their mouth, the song of praise unto our God, of redemption and salvation to the ends of the earth.

This is no ideal picture; but the truth, as thousands could attest, who have experienced the workings of error and truth upon their minds. And no wonder that many have been driven to infidelity by the utterly irrational and appalling doctrines of the church. Convince me that the Bible favors *one* of these doctrines, and you destroy the harmony between faith and reason, and cast the shadow of deformity upon all its pages. Not that my faith is grounded upon reason and not upon the Bible; but that heretofore, the Bible, has appeared to me a reasonable book; but that then, it would be utterly repulsive and shocking to behold. I rejoice in a *reasonable* faith. I would not adopt, to the full extent, the couplet of the poet:

> "Bow down, sense and reason:
> Faith *only* reigns here."

And, strange as it may appear, it is the opinion of many enlightened and sagacious observers, that the doctrines of the Trinity, total depravity, vicarious atonement, imputed guilt and righteousness, and endless torments, have made more infidels than all the infidel writers the world ever produced. I, for one, believe this truth. And I not *only* believe, but I *know*, that the doctrine of uni-

versal salvation from sin and suffering *has* saved thousands of infidels, who, without this light, would have gone down to their graves in hideous darkness. These thousands are now rejoicing believers in a nobler system of divine truth; the grave to them has lost its power; light immortal has beamed out from beyond it; they have become convinced, by careful study, that the Bible is a different book; and they can now sing, "Glory to God in the highest; on earth, peace and good-will to men." God grant that converts may be multiplied, till the objection that Universalism is a species of infidelity may stand refuted by the testimony of thousands more, who shall rise up and bless the day when a system so rational and glorious poured a flood of heavenly daylight in upon their understandings, and struck off from their minds the degrading shackles of infidelity and sin.

III. It is again objected, that Universalism is a *new* doctrine, an innovation upon the established doctrines of the church. In the first place, the objector himself shall answer this objection. He has just told us that it is, at least, about six thousand years since the devil preached it in the garden of Eden! How, then, can he now turn right about and call it a *new* doctrine? He should be careful, else one falsehood will destroy another as fast as ingenuity invents. It is paying a better compliment to Universalism than can be paid to Ortho-

doxy — if, indeed, it may to either be considered a compliment — to say that it is six thousand years old. But we do not crave the compliment of such antiquity as this. We go for the proposition that it is as *old as Christianity*, and we put our brother of the opposite faith upon the task of proving that his system is even *thus* venerable. We speak now of the teachings of Christ and his apostles.

To be sober about it, this is not the first time the cry of innovation has been raised. When a certain itinerant preacher arrived in the city of Athens, there was great concern lest the established religion should be overthrown. "And some said, What will this babbler say? other some, He seemeth to be a setter forth of strange gods; because he preached unto them Jesus and the resurrection. And they took him, and brought him unto Areopagus, saying, May we know what this *new doctrine* whereof thou speakest is?" (Acts xvii. 18, 19.) And after the preacher had declared to them the God they ignorantly worshipped, who was Lord of all, and Father of all, &c. some mocked, as at the present day, at a doctrine which they did not understand; while a few only of the multitude clave unto him and believed.

When Martin Luther thundered against the errors and corruptions of the Catholic Church, the popes undoubtedly cried innovation. Luther held forth his "*new doctrine*," and brandished it most successfully against them.

So, when John Murray published abroad in this country the doctrine of a world's salvation, the multitude cried, innovation! heresy! Unquestionably it *was* new to them, who were born in darkness, brought up in darkness, and instructed in darkness. The *light* appears *very* new to a blind man who has just received his sight. Old things, we are assured, will one day pass away, and *all things* become new. This shall be at the time when there shall be no more death, neither sorrow nor crying; neither shall there be any more pain; for the former things shall have passed away.

To come more directly to the subject, to the charge of preaching a *new* doctrine, let us observe how utterly without foundation this accusation is. We know that the doctrine of a partial salvation has prevailed most extensively for many centuries in the Christian era; but this furnishes no argument for its truth; besides, it cannot be shown, by an appeal to history, that the doctrine of universal salvation did not prevail with it in every age of Christianity; or that the doctrine of endless torments was published at all, as a Christian doctrine, in the first and early ages of the church. On the contrary, it *can* be shown, by a concurrent line of history, that Universalism has prevailed in every age from the time of the apostles; and that the doctrine of endless torments was not known, as a Christian doctrine — mark the expression — *was not known, so far as* we have any account, until the

commencement of the *third* century of the Christian church. It was then taught by *Tertullian* of the Latin church; and, from all you can find in the history of past antiquity, he is the first Christian writer who ever asserted that the torments of the damned would be *equal*, in duration, with the happiness of the blest. Believer in endless misery, reflect upon this truth. Ye who denounce Universalists as innovators, as the publishers of a *new* doctrine, come and learn wisdom and humility. Two hundred years had passed from the establishment of Christianity, and *till* that time, if the voice of history may be credited, no Christian writer ever taught your doctrine of endless sin and wo.

More than this, what is called the Epistle of Barnabas, an allegorical and mystical work, written about the year 131, is the *first Christian writing extant*, after the sacred Scriptures, in which we find the word *everlasting* or *eternal*, applied to human suffering. "But whether he thought it *endless*, cannot be determined; as the word *everlasting* or *eternal* was used by the ancients to denote indefinite rather than interminable duration." *

Tertullian, then, for aught that appears to the contrary, must claim the honor, or rather the dishonor, of first teaching as a Christian truth the appalling and tremendous error of endless torments

* Ancient History of Universalism, p. 37.

for God's rational offspring. This was about the year 200. Verily, it had no part or lot in the matter of the gospel; that good old doctrine proclaimed two hundred years before, by the angel from heaven to the shepherds on the plain! Compare the spirit of Tertullian with the spirit of Jesus Christ. The latter *wept* over the prospective calamities of Jerusalem, horrible, yet temporal and ending. "He beheld the city and *wept* over it," evil and iniquitous as it was. Tertullian exclaimed, in the true spirit of his doctrine, "How shall I admire, how *laugh*, how rejoice, how exult, when I behold so many kings, worshipped as gods in heaven, together with Jove himself, groaning in the lowest abyss of darkness! So many magistrates who persecuted the name of the Lord, liquefying in fiercer flames than ever kindled against Christians; so many sage philosophers blushing in raging fire, with their scholars whom they persuaded to despise God, and to disbelieve the resurrection; and so many poets shuddering before the tribunal, not of Radamanthus, not of Minos, but of the disbelieved Christ! Then shall we hear the tragedians more tuneful under their own sufferings; then shall we see the players far more sprightly amidst the flames; the charioteer all red-hot in his burning car; and the wrestlers hurled, not upon the accustomed list, but on a plain of fire." *

* *Ancient History* of Universalism, p. 81.

Compare the spirit of Tertullian with the spirit of Jesus Christ! The latter *wept*, the former *laughed*, at the spectacle of human misery! Surely, among all the early fathers, there was none whose spirit better *accorded* than Tertullian's with this cruel and antichristian doctrine of endless torment. He dwelt upon it with a relish that savored of the imaginary hell he taught. To him might well be awarded the distinction of introducing this doctrine to the Christian church!

With regard, now, to the doctrine of universal salvation, so far from being a *new* doctrine, it can be distinctly traced, from century to century, back to the first and second centuries of the Christian era, and proved to be the faith of many of the Christian fathers, among whom were Clemens Alexandrinus in the second, and Origen in the third century; and, in fact, prevailed extensively in the third and fourth centuries, and, for aught that appears to the contrary, was accounted the true Christian faith. It was not an object of persecution: though other doctrines, and even opposite ones, prevailed at the same time, yet no unhappy contests or dissensions were created in consequence thereof. One fact should be specially noted and remembered. This doctrine was *never* publicly condemned till by the fifth general council, in the year 553. It revived at the period of the Reformation, and, since that time, has been advocated by *many* able and fearless minds, and believed by

many more timid and fearful, who have dreaded the sacrifice of popular esteem which an open avowal of their faith would at once demand of them to make. In Switzerland, in Germany, in Scotland, and in England, it has found its advocates, among whom we might mention Lavater, Everhard, Stilling, Douglass, T. Southwood Smith, Bishop Newton, Hartley, Priestly, Belsham, and many others. At the present time, it finds its most extensive reception in England, Germany, and the United States; the numbers in our own country amounting to upwards of seven hundred thousand; and this, it must be observed, is the growth of about seventy years. It *was* a "new doctrine,"—it might have been considered such to the people of this country one hundred years ago, or even seventy; but, from its rapid increase, it bids fair to arrive at a good old age; and God grant that the light may roll onward, till the whole earth is flooded with his glory! It is *not* a new doctrine; it is old as Christianity. Yea, it claims a higher antiquity: it *was* published in the garden of Eden; not by Satan, but by him who said the seed of the woman should "bruise the serpent's head." There was the great conquest over sin predicted. Yet the patriarchs caught clearer glimpses of it. It was contained in the promise to Abraham to bless all the nations of the earth in Christ. Christ taught it when he said, "And I, if I *be lifted up* from the earth, will draw all men

unto me." The apostle taught it when he said God would "have all men to be saved, and come unto the knowledge of the truth." It has lived through every century of the Christian church; it triumphs at the present day; and it will be consummated only in eternity, when all of every nation, kindred, and tongue, shall strike the chords that sweep o'er angel lyres,—"Unto him who loved us, and washed us from our sins in his own blood, to him be glory and dominion forever."

IV. Another objection is, that Universalism is the production of a *one-sided* view of the Bible,—an hypothesis built upon the *promises* of God, to the neglect of his most awful threatenings. To this let us answer, that we profess to believe the *whole* Scriptures, and that those Scriptures present to us a connected and harmonious system of divine grace. The nature of the charge, therefore, seems to carry with it a large measure of its refutation. We are not possessed of such narrow discernment as to believe — phrenologically speaking — with one side of our marvellousness, that the Bible teaches truth when it says, "God will have all men to be saved;" and with the other side of that organ, that he has threatened endless banishment from him. The promises and the threatenings, to our minds, come from the same Jehovah; and that Jehovah "is not a man, that he should lie; nor the son of man, that he should repent. Hath he said, *and* shall he not do it? or hath he spoken, and

shall he not make it good?" Evidently, if we build upon the promises, to the neglect of the threatenings, we are guilty of this inconsistency, — of believing that God may keep his word in one case, and not in the other! And is *this* the charge against us? For the honor of our common sagacity, we beseech our brethren not to bring it again. Do not think us quite so far gone! We are not so blind to our own interests as this. If God has threatened, verily, we believe he will execute it to the uttermost. And why should we wish to believe otherwise, and run the risk of the fulfilment of his word, perhaps tremendously, upon our presumptuous heads? Besides, if God may not be expected to execute his threatenings, what better security have we that he will fulfil his promises? We beseech you, in all earnestness, never to impute this weakness to us again.

But it is said that we *neglect* the threatenings, — neglect the study of them; that we love to dwell upon the promises, but cannot bear to contemplate the threatenings. In reply, the objection must mean either one thing or the other, — either that we *disbelieve* what appears to us the plain threatenings of endless wrath, or that we *believe* them, but hate to dwell upon them. The first would constitute us infidels, which we have shown we are not; the second would constitute us fools. Now, we *do* profess to have good common sense. And if so, why do we wish to run the tremendous

risk of hoping God may not prove true to his word?

In reply to the charge that we neglect to *study* the threatenings of God's word, we hope we may be excused if we indulge in a little egotism. We suppose that it is from this ground that the charge comes, of a *one-sided* view of the subject. Now we do believe that there is no sect in Christendom who has made the study of God's threatenings so distinct and thorough a work as these same Universalists. Start not, hearer, for it is a truth. We have been *compelled* to this, from the very opposition we have had to encounter from scriptural as well as anti-scriptural opponents. We have been assailed with passages of Scripture, times without number, which has only had the effect to turn our attention, in a special manner, to the careful and labored consideration of them; and we think that, in this matter, we stand equipped and ready to wield the sword of the Spirit in a contest. We abhor boasting; but the objection calls for a candid statement of facts. So careful have we been in the consideration of those passages which speak of punishment, and especially those usually applied to a future state of existence, that a complaint is frequently entered against us in a scornful way, that we are always harping upon this character of texts. Nay, it is said of our preaching, in taunting simplicity, that we have "too much Scripture!" *Thank* God that it is so! that he has put into our

hands a faithful record of his truth, and it is ours to read it understandingly, and rejoice in the things which it opens to us. May we *always* have a "*Thus saith the Lord*" for every point of doctrine we advance, and we'll give up the creeds and catechisms, and count them blind leaders of the blind. If men had *always* confined themselves to holy writ, — if they had not taken doctrine upon authority of tradition, and naked, unsupported assertion of ministers and others, — the world would have been better off, wiser and sounder in the faith, and more united in the things pertaining to their peace. We glory in the charge of being "too scriptural." A Christian, especially in this age of error and delusion, cannot be too scriptural. He ought to have line upon line, and precept upon precept, — here a little, and there a little, of God's word; and, in the language of the learned Bishop Horsley, "he will not be liable to be misled, either by the refined arguments or the false assertions of those who would engraft their own opinions on the oracles of God." Then, "the whole compass of abstruse philosophy and recondite history shall furnish *no* argument with which the perverse will of man shall be able to shake this LEARNED Christian's faith."

We repeat, we have been compelled to a careful study of the threatenings, from the very opposition which, from this quarter, we have been called to encounter. We have given them our particular

and candid attention. We have had no wish to be deceived ourselves, nor to be the instruments of deception unto others. We have not taken a *one-sided*, but a *broad-sided* view of the matter; and we think that from this charge we may very honestly and very fairly plead *not guilty*. We do, indeed, dwell upon the *promises;* these, to us, are the sheet anchors of our faith. We cannot give them up; they are exceeding great and precious promises; and it is a happy consideration that the law is not against them. God stand by us with his promises, and God enable us to know his threatenings; and we 'll yet trust the issue with him, and rejoice in full, broad, glorious, gospel Universalism!

V. This doctrine is also objected to as involving an absolute denial of the *justice* of Jehovah. In noticing this objection here, we shall endeavor to be brief, because the same subject, in previous lectures, has been called up and discussed. In the first place, Universalism teaches that "every transgression shall receive a *just* recompense of reward." But, as the views of divine justice are different, it is proper to ask, in the next place, what there is in cleansing a fellow-being from his sins that is unjust. Now this individual example will illustrate the whole spirit of Universalism; for it teaches that every sinner in the universe shall, after receiving an adequate punishment for his transgressions, be cleansed from all iniquity, and

be made holy by the blood of the Lamb. We press the question, What is there in destroying sin, in turning men from guilt to innocence, from corruption to purity, that is unjust? Would it not be rather unjust to *continue* them in guilt and pollution when they might be cleansed and purified, and advanced in excellence and glory? It appears to us that, if there is injustice any where, it is in putting a moral being into a state where he is compelled to sin, and which makes obedience and reformation impossible. Doubtless God will consult his *glory*, which, I suppose, must harmonize with his justice, in the final issues of his government. Now it is written, in the third chapter of Romans, "All have sinned, and come short of the glory of God." The question we have to ask is, if men in this world come so far short of the glory of God by sinning against him, can they ever ☞ *come up to it* by being placed in a state where they will be compelled to sin, and blaspheme him forever? Answer this, ye who talk of damning moral beings to the glory of God. Now, if the justice of God is consistent with his glory, the question is settled: universal salvation from sin and suffering does not deny, but is essential to, the justice of the almighty Being.

But it is said that justice *demands* the endless condemnation of the sinner. I reply, this objection comes too late. It has already been proved that justice demands no punishment which is incon-

sistent with the highest good and glory of the universe.

Again, is there any *mercy* in the infliction of endless punishment? All must answer, no. Now it is written, in the sixty-second Psalm, "Also unto thee, O Lord, belongeth mercy; *for* thou renderest to every man according to his work." Here it is assigned as a *reason why* God is merciful, because he executeth justice, or rendereth to every man according to his work. Now, inasmuch as it is no *reason why* God is merciful, because he executeth unmerciful, endless torment, the execution of such a punishment can furnish no *reason why* he is just, but a contrary one. The doctrine of universal salvation, then, does not involve a denial, but is one of the strongest *affirmatives, of* the justice of the Almighty.

Again, it was clearly proved in our first lecture that sin is a *finite* evil. To that lecture I again refer. Consequently, it is not universal salvation, but endless punishment, (one of the infinities,) which denies the justice of God.

Again, justice and mercy are not opposed to each other. They both harmonize, else we rob God of his perfection. Consequently, if mercy desires the reformation of an offender, so does justice, else it is outraged and converted to revenge. It is not our doctrine, therefore, but the contrary one, which denies the justice of God.

Once more: if it be possible, in all the annals of

history, and tyrants wading through seas of blood, to find a case of injustice, *that* is injustice which demands endless and unutterable torment for the sins of seventy years. It is not only injustice, but injustice beyond all conception, measure, and bound. To the other arguments in these lectures I refer, for a further examination and conclusion of the subject.

VI. Another objection against this doctrine is, that it is the result of an unprincipled perversion of the Scriptures. A word to the wise is sufficient. In the first place, I refer to my *fourth* lecture on this subject. In the next place, I ask if, in this accusation, it be meant to include the charge of *manufacturing* Scripture. We confess we have no disposition to be irksome; but we ask the congregation if they will turn to their Bibles, to the chapters and verses of the following passages: "No *self-murderer* shall have eternal life. If ye die in your sins, where God and Christ are, ye can *never* come. As the tree falls, so it lieth; as death leaves us, so judgment will find us. God, *out of Christ*, is a consuming fire. The wages of sin is *eternal* death. As it is appointed unto *all* men once to die, and after this the judgment." To these passages we might add the phrases, "Endless wo, endless misery," &c. If the hearer will turn to his Bible, and to the chapters and verses of these respective Scriptures, we shall then feel in a livelier *mood to talk* to him about perversion, &c.

We declare we had rather have the charge of a *perverter* than a *manufacturer* of Scripture. We repeat the caution, that those who live in glass houses should not throw stones. Among all the charges that have ever been brought against us, we do not recollect of ever having to encounter the heavy one alluded to. Other people have done this work for us. We have had Universalist Bibles, and sermons, and prayers, and other matters furnished for us, wherein Scripture has been put in a form supposed more suitable for us, but we do not know that we have ever been accused of doing these things ourselves. We have always deemed the Bible in a right shape now; at least, we have always made use of it as it is; and the fruits of our conquest prove abundantly that it need not be subtracted from, or added to, to give us, more effectually than we now have it, the vantage ground against our enemies.

To notice seriously the charge of unprincipled perversion would, as in a former case, be to notice a charge like the following: that we have framed a system in our minds to suit our own fancy, or our conceptions of the divine government; and have then, despite of the plain reading of the word, run the tremendous risk of infinite consequences. We repeat, we are not so blind to our own interests as this. Men do not generally place themselves and all that appertains to them in *such* amazing jeopardy.

But it may be said we do it ignorantly. Then the congregation must decide. I refer to my fourth lecture, wherein the Scriptures were largely and liberally appealed to; and we urge the more attentive examination of our views of Scripture, respecting which, among our accusers, there exists such an unpardonable ignorance. *It is true*, the majority of our adversaries *know not what we do* with certain important portions of the Bible. They are ignorant of but one side of a view which has been taken of these passages, and, *in* that ignorance, they express the greatest astonishment that any one could think differently from what to them appears the only true teaching of the word. These things we know from long experience; and we have no hesitancy in speaking. They are, for the most part, utterly ignorant of what they *call* perversion! We advise them to examine our views of these matters. Be more noble than those in Thessalonica, and search the Scriptures daily whether these things are so. *Prove all things;* hold fast that which seemeth to thee good. Look upon ministers as fallible men. Consider how the popes erred, who claimed infallibility. Consider the changes in your own ranks; how reputed orthodoxy now is amazingly different from what it was a few years since; how, if preached now as it was then, it would meet with extermination and repulse. Add to all this the consideration that, long ago, men of *learning* and eminence, of the Orthodox

party, have given almost every passage in the Bible which speaks of punishment an application to the present life. These men were not prejudiced against the doctrine we oppose. Their prejudices were all in favor of a popular and common interpretation, and their own doctrine would have been sustained and interested by it; but conscience and honesty, united with their learning, compelled them to explain these Scriptures as Universalists ever have explained them. Will you bring the charge of wilful or ignorant perversion against them? Undoubtedly some would contend for the latter; but every man must be his own judge; and, if honestly in error, no doubt God will approve the sincerity of his heart. I leave this charge of perversion, to notice the next in order, which is,

VII. That Universalism is particularly pleasing to the carnal mind. In reply to this frequently put and scornful objection, let us first ask if those who bring it really know what they assert. We are confident they do not, for it would involve them in many mortifying inconsistencies; and we have more charity for them, therefore, than to believe they really know what this objection conveys. For the objection is in reality an assertion from a Christian's mouth, that the desires of God, of Christ, of holy angels, of the saints in glory and the saints on earth, AND the desires of the carnal mind, are *in perfect* unison with one another!—a proposition

too shocking, almost, to contemplate. For is it not true, is it not the candid and ready confession of the majority of believers in endless punishment, that God desires, and wills, and it would be his pleasure to effect, the salvation of the world? Certainly, this is contended for. To this end we frequently hear ministers of the gospel warn their impenitent hearers of the dangers of transgression, at the same time reminding them, for their encouragement, that God is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance. And, to strengthen their arguments, they will frequently quote from Ezekiel, "Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should die? saith the Lord God; and not that he should return from his ways and live? I have *no* pleasure in the death of him that dieth; wherefore turn yourselves, and live ye." That it is indeed the *pleasure* of God that all might be saved, might be established from the Scriptures; but it is frankly admitted by our opponents, and we are therefore saved the trouble. And, of course, if it is the pleasure of God, it is also of Christ, if these two are one in desire. Now, that it is the pleasure of the holy angels, may be established from the following: — When the birth of the Saviour was announced to the shepherds of Bethlehem, in the language, "Fear not, for, behold, I bring you good tidings of great joy, which shall be *unto all people*," suddenly there was with the angel "*a multitude of* the heavenly host praising God,"

and adding the response, "Glory to God in the highest," &c. It was, then, emphatically the pleasure of the holy angels that this Saviour might prove successful. So, also, is it the pleasure of the *saints* in heaven. For we read, "There is more *joy* in heaven over one sinner that repenteth, than over ninety and nine just persons that need no repentance." So, also, is it the pleasure of the saints on earth. For they are all laboring, and praying fervently, for the salvation of the world. Now, then, the conclusion is — if the objection under consideration is a just one — that the desires and pleasure of God, of Christ, of the holy angels, of the saints in heaven, and the saints on earth, are all in perfect unison and agreement with the desires and pleasures of the carnal mind! The carnal mind, then, is something very different from what we have always conceived it to be; or else all heaven must bear the impression of carnality. Is there a Christian who ought not to be *ashamed* to say that what is pleasing to the carnal mind is also pleasing to God and heaven?

The difficulty lies here. Many people know not what they oppose. When they think of Universalism, they think of something inexpressibly odious. They have but one confused and mortifying idea of it; that is, that we "preach all men into heaven, good and bad together." Thus endeth *all* their knowledge of the system. A carnal mind, *to be sure*, might dwell on such a prospect, with all

the rapture of an unregenerate soul. It would be *worthy* of the contemplation of an aspirant for the debauched heaven of Mohammed. But this is not our doctrine. And can you tell me if there is any thing pleasing to the carnal mind, or agreeable with it, in the prospect of unspotted holiness and spiritual joy? Is there any thing pleasing to carnality in the contemplation of carnality destroyed? of a universal washing of the regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost? If there is, then it is a worthy pleasure; and carnality itself is not *total* in the man.

Again, in order to answer the objection effectually, let us seek a knowledge of the *tendency* of carnal mind. "The carnal mind," then, the Scriptures assure us, "is enmity against God." Enmity against God, then, against his government, his will, his law, is the characteristic of the carnal mind; "For it is not subject to the *law* of God, neither indeed can be." It must be destroyed. Now it seems perfectly reasonable to suppose that whatever is in *accordance* with his government, his will and law, the carnal mind must be particularly opposed to. For here it would manifest its enmity, in unrighteous opposition to his will and pleasure. Is it, then, the system of Universalism, with which the carnal mind is particularly pleased? This system teaches that the law of God, which is all comprehended in love to God and man universal, *shall eventually* be all fulfilled; that all disobe-

dience shall be done away, and love to God be universal. But the carnal mind is *enmity* to the law of God! Evidently, then, it cannot be particularly pleased with the system of Universalism, which is not in opposition with the law, but depends, for its very existence, upon the law's wide and universal fulfilment. No; the carnal mind is opposed, is at enmity with this; and we may rest assured, that a system so in entire accordance with the government, will, pleasure, and law of God, would never be pleasing to the carnal mind, which is at utter enmity with the whole of it.

But what *would* the carnal mind be pleased with? If we may indulge in a little further reflection, guided by the declared characteristic of the carnal mind, that it is enmity against God, we may say that it would be pleased with any thing that was in opposition with the will and law of God. Now, to be brief, *endless damnation* is acknowledged by its own advocates to be contrary to the will and pleasure of God. Consequently, *endless damnation* is a doctrine of the carnal mind! a doctrine pleasing to devils and fiends incarnate; but not pleasing to God, angels, or holy men. *Endless damnation* is contrary to the *law* of God. For the law of God requires love, and love universal, for its obedience. But the doctrine in question perpetuates eternal hatred and rebellion, and makes obedience to the law impossible. Consequently, *endless damnation* is at enmity with the

law, is enmity against God, and is therefore a production of the carnal mind! These things are plain; but they are matters of plain truth. Those who live in glass houses should not throw stones.

But perhaps it will be said that what is meant by Universalism being pleasing to the carnal mind is, that the prospect of a final and universal deliverance from *punishment* is a thing thus pleasing to carnality. But this is only a part of our doctrine. Our system teaches not only a universal deliverance from punishment, after every sin is blotted out, and all justice executed, but also teaches an advancement unto unspotted holiness and purity. The whole system must be taken in connection, if we would fairly raise an objection against it. And if *this* prospect of purity is pleasing to the carnal mind, I say, it is a *worthy* and *honorable* kind of pleasure, and proves that carnality itself is not absolutely *total* in the man!

VIII. We pass to a consideration of the next objection. It is the paltry idea that this doctrine is "too good to be true." Truth, then, depends upon badness, or upon a low state of goodness. And if this is the case, then we know of no doctrine that would hit nearer to the truth than that of endless torments. It would be difficult to conceive of one *worse* than this. We believe that, if there *is* a devil, and if he has a doctrine, this must be the one. We defy any man to invent one more *worthy* of the devil. The only way to make it perfect,

and every way worthy of the devil, is to make damnation universal.

But do, I beseech you, look this objection in the face. Can any thing be *too good* to emanate from the fountain of infinite and everlasting goodness? Can any thing be *too good* for the Father of all mercies? Ah! this objection is the exclamation of those who "trust" not "in the mercy of God forever." It is the evidence of a mind filled with despair and tormenting doubts, which has been shrouded in the gloom of a false theology. How many are there who have long contemplated their Creator as one terrible in power, and awful in the infliction of evil; who have lost the confidence of children, or, what is worse, perhaps never had it, but, from their youth, have looked upward to the throne of an august Monarch, or a ruling Sovereign, but have never perceived the kind and ever-faithful Father! Such Christians, such creatures, I pity from my heart. I know something of their bitterness, for I have drank at the same fountain, and been instructed in the same ways. *Saurin* did most truly exclaim, "I find in the thought a mortal poison, diffusing itself into every period of my life, making society tiresome, nourishment insipid, pleasure disgustful, and life itself a cruel bitter. I cease to wonder that the fear of hell hath made some melancholy, and others mad."

Too good to be true! And have ye lost the

relish for goodness? have ye fallen in love with evil? have ye forsaken God, the fountain of living waters, and hewed out to yourselves cisterns, broken cisterns, that can hold no water? Have ye gone after other gods? Have ye bowed down the knee to the image of Baal? I protest against the degrading fear that can tremble to ascribe goodness unto God. There is good in the universe. There is good, infinite good, in the plan of redemption and salvation. There is good out of evil, order out of confusion. God is light, and in him is no darkness at all. God is love, and he hateth not any creature he has made. God is good, and his goodness endureth continually. "Let us abundantly utter the memory of his great goodness, and sing of his righteousness. All thy works shall praise thee, O Lord, and thy saints shall bless thee. The Lord is good to all, and his mercy endureth forever." If our doctrine is too *good* to be true, we rejoice, not in the absurdity of the accusation, but in the character of a grand theology which called it forth. It is too good *not* to be true. Your doctrine, friend, let me tell thee, is *too bad* to be true, too bad to be ascribed to God; and may he, in mercy, put thee in a better way.

IX. This system is said to be built upon a denial of the free agency of man. This objection may be answered very briefly. We took special care, in the outset of this series of lectures, to anticipate all objections founded on, or growing out of, the

free agency of man. We showed, clearly, that we were freed from the mazes of this intricate question; that free agency and endless punishment were not necessarily connected; that one might be true without the other; and that we, therefore, passed along in our argument, leaving the dear sentiment of free moral agency in an undisturbed repose. It must be manifest to all, that, because man is a free agent, he is not, of necessity, exposed to an endless curse. The penalty of the law may, in perfect consistency therewith, be annihilation, or limited punishment terminated by a restoration to holiness and happiness, or any imaginary evil which God may be pleased to inflict. All we contend for in the present argument is, that free agency and endless punishment are no more *necessarily* connected than Calvin's theology with the north pole. This must be apparent to every one. Now, if free agency and endless punishment are not, of necessity, connected, how does universal salvation involve of necessity, a *denial* of this agency? It does not; and, if they *were* connected, it even then would not. To be plain, it is not only contended by many theologians that God, in the great plan of his economy and government, determined unchangeably that man should be a free, moral agent, but it is also contended that he must set before him infinite joy and endless wo. Now we may, for the argument, admit the truth of these *propositions*. And how far will the argument

carry us? May not free agents universally be saved? *Can* they not be saved? Is there no period of time, in the whole outstretchings of eternity, when a free agent might not turn and live? The argument, you see, is resolved into a mere *supposition* that they may not be saved. And now, against that, we will set the supposition that they may!

But we prefer to *rest* the argument on scriptural ground. In Psalm cx. 3 it is written, "Thy people shall be willing in the day of thy power." Here is a reference to the gospel day. The day of God's power is the day of Christ's power. And it is declared that the people shall be willing,—shall come with a willing mind and heart, with a readiness to receive the blessing, however perverse and opposed they may have been. And if one may, all may; and the will of man may be in harmony with his salvation. Nothing is more trifling, therefore, than to say that universal salvation is built upon a denial of the free agency of man. If he is free, it is not *impossible* that he may be saved; whereas it would be if he was not.

X. The tenth and last objection we shall notice is, that this doctrine will do very well to live by, but will not do to die by. This is frequently the last exclamation, given with a sigh, when argument fails and controversy ends. It will do to live by, but will not do to die by. This is an objection of some *weight; for* if the doctrine will not support

us in the dying hour, it cannot be the all-sustaining truth of God. In answer to it, we would thank the objector, in the first place, for the acknowledgment that it does so well to live by. It *is* a comforting, salutary, holy doctrine. It is all-sufficient to live by.

"But it will not do to die by." In order, now, to ascertain its virtue here, and its comparative worth in reference to its opposite, we must imagine ourselves stretched upon the dying couch. Having gone through a life, perhaps, of much turmoil and trouble, we have approached the closing scene. Our friends, our family — if we have any — are around us. We bid them *good-by* with a faith all holy in the universal victory of Christ, or else all trembling with horrid apprehensions of ever-accumulating misery. Look on this picture, and on that. Here is a faithful believer in a world's salvation rejoicing with his family and friends in the hour of dissolving nature, in the prospect of death vanquished, sin finished, and God all in all; and his eye kindles while the spirit flutters from its shattered tenement, and death has no power over him. He leaves them for a little while, when they shall meet again in realms of universal blessedness, when there shall be no more death, neither sorrow nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain; for the former things will have passed away. He commits his family to the care of the universal Father, says *farewell*, and life's feverish dream is o'er.

Here is another,—a believer in another doctrine. He sees a heaven, but he may not attain to it; it is but a *partial* heaven; and even if he should, he sees a hell, glowing and yawning, may be, for some of that precious group around him. O, that double death! that poison of death's peace! that trembling apprehension for the fate of some one dearer than life! *Farewell!* I *may* meet thee in heaven; thou mayest perish from me forever! —I forbear. This is no imaginary picture. If there is any doctrine fitted to die by, it is that which whispers, peace, be still.

But it is said this doctrine will not *abide* by us in the hour of death. It is now too late to bring this assertion. Thousands of death-beds have testified its falsity. Many have been the triumphs, and glorious the victories, over death, which we have witnessed, which our eyes have seen, and our ears have heard. Scarcely a week passes but brings us some new tidings of the victories of this faith, this hope. It is the only faith that can satisfy, that can give fulness of joy, in death's approaching hour. No doubt, many die happy in the contrary faith; but, if they have hearts, if they have sympathies, there must be, when looking out even upon the little world of their own interests, an aching void which nothing else can fill. God grant that, when my head is pillowed on the bed of death, I may have this faith, this joy, this triumph!

But it is said that many *renounce* it on their death-beds. This charge is unsupported. Attempts are frequently *made*, by designing individuals, to shake the faith in that affecting hour; but they have generally been repulsed, and compelled to be the spectators of a triumphant exit. We think we may be safe in stating that *no intelligent* believer in the great salvation, who has been left to the full exercise of his reasoning faculties, whose mind has not been strangely prostrate with his body, has renounced his faith — worth worlds to him — in death's approaching hour.

Shall we state a contrary truth? It is, then, prominently true, that many, who, in health and prosperity, have expected to gain heaven by their works, their piety and faith, have, when brought to the last closing scene, expressed their only hope in the mercy of God. They have then been made to feel the frailty of all things else, and they have rejoiced alone in the goodness of the Creator. Yea, more than this: instances are on record, where those who have, in activity and health, assented to the doctrine of endless and unutterable torments, have, *on their death-beds*, when tottering, as it were, *on the verge of the grave*, exchanged a system so gloomy, and revolting, and dishonorable to God, for a strong, and rejoicing, and triumphant faith in the final blessedness of the congregated universe. I am happy to state the occurrence of a *case of* this kind, which happened but a few weeks

since. It showed the power of a wide and universal faith to sustain the spirit when sinking under death. It was another and a glorious refutation of the charge that the system we advocate will not stand by us in the last sad scene. It has not only stood by, but, blessed be God, it has *come* to sustain the soul in death, when, through a whole life, the subjects have been left to grope in the darkness of an inglorious faith. "Thanks be to God, which giveth us the victory, through our Lord Jesus Christ."

And now, my brethren, I bring this subject to a close. I think myself happy, because I have answered for myself this night, before thee, touching many of the things whereof we are accused. But one other charge remains; that is, the heavy charge of licentiousness, which flies upon the wings of the wind. From its importance and prominency, and the zeal with which it is hurled as an offensive weapon against the faith in God's unbounded love, we have reserved it for the last and closing lecture of the series. From the labors of the present one, we hesitate not to say that the charges are false which are alleged against us; and, in the language of an apostle on a like occasion, "neither can they *prove* the things whereof they now accuse us."

LECTURE VI.

COMPARATIVE ILLUSTRATION OF THE MORAL TENDENCY OF THE SYSTEM OF UNIVERSAL GRACE.

If the truth of God hath more abounded through my lie unto his glory, why yet am I also judged as a sinner? And not rather, (as we be slanderously reported, and as some affirm that we say,) Let us do evil, that good may come? *Romans* iii. 7, 8.

It is the object of this discourse to refute the slanderous accusation of *licentiousness*, which was omitted in the consideration of the charges brought forward in our last lecture, and reserved for a particular and separate discussion. We shall not only act the part of the *defensive*, but, by a comparison of the two opposite theories, illustrate the *preference* of one over the other.

This charge, we have said, flies upon the wings of the wind. It is the first and the last, the alpha and omega, with the generality of those who would oppose and destroy what it has been the object of these lectures to establish. It will frequently survive the serious charge, with the consideration of which we closed our former lecture; and, while many triumphant deaths have extorted

the acknowledgment of the frailty and falsity of that, the many well-ordered *lives* will not command a like honorable acknowledgment for this: but the virtue of the *heart*, instead of being placed to the homage of the faith that nourished it, will be very circumspectly looked upon as a most fortunate preservation from the errors of the *head;* while, at the same time, it is very generously and complimentally handed over to the imperceptible influence of other sentiments, among which, it is said, the man had been so lucky as to breathe and live! But our motto is, "Honor to whom honor is due. A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit; neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. Either make the tree good, and his fruit good, or else make the tree corrupt, and his fruit corrupt; for the tree is known by its fruit." We must beg to be excused from adopting a judgment so *very* impartial; for this is not our method of appropriating either honors or virtue.

To approach the subject, let us briefly descant upon the meaning of the text. In the chapter immediately preceding the one from which our text is selected, the apostle sets forth in a strong light the presumed self-sufficiency and wickedness of the Jewish people. Then, in the next chapter, notwithstanding all their wickedness and unbelief, the apostle supposes a Jew to ask — for the subject is treated in the form of dialogue — "What if some *did not believe?* Shall their unbelief make the

faith [or faithfulness] of God without effect?" That is, — as Dr. Clarke very judiciously remarks, — "If some of the Jewish nation have abused their privileges, and acted contrary to their obligations, shall their wickedness *annul* the PROMISE which God made to Abraham, that he would, by an *everlasting* (or age lasting) covenant, be a God to him and to his seed after him? Shall God, therefore, by stripping the Jews of their peculiar honor, as you intimate he will, falsify his promise to the *nation*, because some of the Jews are bad men?" To all which the apostle replies, "God forbid: yea, let God be true, and every man a liar."

Now, in contemplation of this striking fact, that no unbelief or unrighteousness in man could in the least degree annul or render of none effect the faithful promise of God, the Jew very honestly rejoins, "But if our unrighteousness commend the righteousness of God, what shall we say? Is God unrighteous who taketh vengeance?" He supposed that if no possible wickedness could at all weaken the promise of God to them, their unrighteousness might serve to *commend* or *illustrate* his great mercy in keeping and fulfilling that promise which he made to their fathers, — that "the more wicked they became, the more God's faithfulness to his ancient promise is to be admired." And in this he was indeed correct; but the conclusion he came to from this fact was entirely erroneous. *For*, continued he, this being the case, is not God

unjust in taking vengeance? Why should we be punished for what serves so to enhance God's faithfulness and glory? Admitting this, is not God unjust in punishing? But what saith the apostle? "God forbid; for then how shall God judge the world?" Although the wickedness and unbelief of men *may* thus ultimately redound to the glory of God, by making his faithfulness and mercy more manifest, yet, if he should not punish or take vengeance on the sinner, how could God judge the world? All distinction between right and wrong would be at once confounded.

We are now in a fairer way to understand the text. The apostle there, after his plain manner of speaking, calls the unbelief and unrighteousness of the Jews a *lie*. "If the truth of God hath more abounded through my lie unto his glory, why yet am I also judged as a sinner? And not rather, (as we be slanderously reported, and as some affirm that we say,) Let us do evil that good may come?" This was the conclusion he came to. If the truth of God, or the faithfulness of God, in keeping his promise to our fathers is, through our lie, or unfaithfulness, made far more glorious than it otherwise would have been, why, then, should we be judged as sinners? Why should we be blamed and punished as sinners for that which would redound so much to the glory of God? And not rather, (as we be slanderously reported,

and as some affirm that we say,) Let us do evil that good may come? "Seeing this ground is assumed, why not in all cases do wickedly, since God, by freely pardoning, can so glorify his own grace?"

Here, then, we have the precise idea of the text. But this was a most impious sentiment, and had been unjustly laid to the charge of the apostles, who taught the doctrine of a free salvation without the merit of good works. The doctrine of the apostle was, "Where sin abounded, grace did much more abound," or would be much more manifest. This doctrine of free grace abounding over all sin and destroying it, is what gave rise to the slander and calumny mentioned in the text, which appears, at that time, to have gained a considerable ground. An opinion had prevailed, that, as the free, unmerited grace of God through Christ was, in the estimation of a few, sure to abound over all manner of sin, then all manner of sin might not only be committed with impunity, but that the more evil a person did, the more the grace of God would abound to him in the redemption of that evil, and they could not see the propriety of abstaining from it! They went even further than this. They even said, "Let us *do* evil, *that good may come.*" But this was so manifest a perversion of the truth, and withal so slanderous to the characters of the teachers of that doctrine, that a

just punishment was pronounced upon the propagators of the slander,—"Whose damnation was just."*

To come down from the apostle's time, could there be a more similar, more apt, more well-chosen case, to represent the state of feeling and character of opposition to the doctrine of a free and full redemption at the present day? Is there not precisely the same calumny heaped upon the doctrine now, and upon its honest advocates? As we stated at the commencement, it is one of the first, with many the first and the last objection, that the theory of a world's salvation by the grace of God prostrates every barrier to the commission of evil, and permits the perpetration of the blackest crimes with impunity. The system represents the infinite goodness of God, infinite in duration and embrace; declares that no evil, no absolute and unmixed evil, can find a lodging in the universe; and even maintains that sin itself shall ultimately merge in good, for it shall be drowned in abounding, glorifying grace. Then it is exclaimed, in the spirit and blindness of the ignorant Jew, Why, then, am I judged a sinner? What should restrain me from evil? It is also slanderously reported, and some affirm that we say, Let us do evil; for what should restrain us from rushing on from iniquity to iniquity? Go, blind stranger, unto what

*See Clarke on the whole of this subject.

thou canst not see, but may yet know; go, learn wisdom from the first principles of Christ. He will instruct thee in a better motive, and tell thee of a better and more honorable service.

The subject now opened to the hearer may be treated of in the order best fitted to accomplish the object of our labors. I wish the hearer to remember that the subject of the text illustrates the nature of the system whose moral influence we would represent and feel. It represents the abounding goodness of God over all the wickedness of man, which is but commended or illustrated by it. It recognizes, in principle, the great and important truth that Universalists ever have insisted on, — that God is good, and in his government there is no evil. *Moral* evil shall result in good. *Punishment* is a means for the attainment of good. In short, good, good alone, is the happy ultimatum to which all things tend. In view of a system so inexpressibly glorious and grand, it is frequently queried, in the spirit of the unsanctified and blinded Jew, Why not do evil, then, that good may come? or where is the restraining influence to prevent the commission of sin? It is our object to *answer* this question.

And, in the first place, be it observed, that to do evil that good may come is impossible. The very phraseology contains a contradiction in itself. The *design* of the actor gives the moral color to the act. *To do* evil that good may come must proceed

from a good design. The moment that it is done for good, it is not evil. To do evil that good may come is, therefore, to do good. The phrase contradicts itself.

If it be objected to this reasoning, that although it may be good in the actor, seeing that he had good intentions, yet it may, through his ignorance of causes, be evil in its more immediate effects, we acknowlege the justness of this view of the subject; and hence the unlawfulness of doing evil that good may come. It may, and is, in this respect, a commission of evil on our part.

But I need not dwell upon the abstrusities of the subject. May not a person *sin*, says one, — may he not do *wickedly*, and this with great impunity, if he has the deluded conviction of all-abounding, universal grace and good? This he *may* do. This is coming to the subject. And our whole question is — which is the foundation of this discourse — *why not?* Why not, my Christian brethren, as it is slanderously reported of us, do all manner of evil, seeing the grace of God is sure to abound over it?

I. We answer this question, in the first place, by an illustration from comparison. Here is a man subjected to some natural infirmities of the flesh. Yet his case is not absolutely fatal, and nothing but what may be cured effectually, by proper treatment and prescription. And he takes encouragement from this fact, — from a knowledge of this truth. Now, will he continue in this sickness,

for a length of time, and refuse to take the medicine, because he knows he shall one day recover; — that the physician will restore him?

Take yet another case. Here is a well man. Now will he *make himself sick* because he knows, or thinks he knows, that he can and shall recover? Will he rush into danger, will he undergo the pains of disease, for the purpose of testing the efficacy of the medicine?

Now take yet another. Here is a *sin-sick* soul. Will he continue in his sickness, in his spiritual infirmities, or will he foolishly rush into sin, because he knows he shall one day be restored? Will he endure the pangs of transgression, because he knows transgression will be finished, and everlasting righteousness brought in? Will he take encouragement from a knowledge or a faith in this truth, to continue in moral pollution, because the great Physician shall one day make him whole? Fie, fie, on the cobweb reasonings of the doctors of divinity against what they know not and understand not. Sin is a moral disease; and it racks the soul with many moral torments. It is so represented in the Scriptures. Tell me, then, ye who love simplicity, if ye will endure the pains for the sake of submitting to the remedy; if ye will destroy your moral health for the sake of reinstating it again; if ye will make yourselves miserable, and poor, and wretched, for the all-mortifying reason that ye will one day be rich, and comforta-

ble, and perfect. No, my fellow-sinner, you will *now* guard against iniquity as a pest and poison to your soul. You will *now* submit to the remedy, and delay not till the disease has reached a fearful and more threatening crisis. You will *now* learn wisdom and instruction, for *now* is the accepted time, and *now* the day of your salvation. Do not evil, then, because of abounding good. Sin not because of abounding grace. God forbid; but grant that you may be dead to sin, but alive unto God, through Jesus Christ our Lord.

Perhaps it will be said that this, after all, is a sophistical view of the subject; that, without the fear of endless punishment, men *will* sin, in spite of all the pains annexed to the disease. We reply, first, that the sinner is actuated by the motive of obtaining *happiness* when he ventures to transgress. Now, until any one will undertake, and that successfully, to show that, even in this world, sin yields more *happiness* than virtue, — till then, I say, our representation will remain, not a sophistical, but a true one; and the system we advocate has the advantage, even on the score of wholesome and restraining fear. For the fear of *any* evil which would overbalance the good of a contemplated act, no matter how much, is a sufficient preventive of that act; for no man will go counter to his own interest. And as the evil we hold out is near at hand, and not rendered ineffectual from

its uncertainty and distance, and possibility of escape after all, I say our system has the advantage, even on the score of terror. But this will more plainly appear as we proceed.

In the next place, we reply, that, if the fear of endless punishment *alone* secures the man's obedience, his obedience is "good for nothing;" for he is only deterred from sin by a hatred of its consequences, which is consistent with as great a love for *sin* as before!

II. We now pass to the second division of our subject. *Why not* do evil in assurance of abounding grace? We answer, the grace of God does not prevent his justice. "Shall we sin," says the apostle, "because we are not under the law, but under grace? God forbid. He that doeth wrong shall receive for the wrong that he hath done; and there is no respect of persons." It ought always to be remembered that Universalists do not discard the principle of fear which, like faith, worketh by love, — a filial fear of God our Father, who punishes for good. These chastisements we own and fear. It ought always to be remembered that Universalists can avail themselves of the "terrors of the law," and they are the only sect of Christians who provide no possible way of escape. They know nothing of averting the penalty by the substitution of another sufferer instead; or by the convenient work of popular repentance. They

are free to declare, by them alone "the violated law speaks out its thunders;" and by them alone "the *gospel* whispers peace."

And must we point again to the terrors of the evil way? Must we resume the task, and tell the sinner of his dangers? Look through, sinner, look through that external covering, into that seat of unholy passions. Behold the tumult and the uproar of those inferior faculties, while conscience sits as the outraged sovereign of the inner man. Look at her! She may have been despised and trampled on, but still she announces the supremacy of her inviolable claims. Conscience, though deprived of her rights, still continues to assert them. "She may have fallen from her dominion, yet still she wears the badges of a fallen sovereign, having the acknowledged *right* of authority, though the power of enforcement has been wrested away from her. She may be outraged in all her prerogatives by the lawless appetites of our nature; but not without the accompanying sense within of an outrage and a wrong having been inflicted, and a reclaiming voice from thence which causes itself to be heard, and which remonstrates against it."* And it is this loud remonstrance that speaks the daggers to the guilty soul. No matter what the crime may be, it must kindle up with it the damning consciousness of guilt. And the fires of a

* Chalmers' Natural Theology, vol. i. p. 315.

guilty conscience, once kindled, will burn while memory lasts, and justice fan the flame. All vivid will it live in the bosom of the sinner; or, if it sleeps betimes, it is only to arouse with a new and increased energy, to inflict the contrast of a heavier pang.

Take any of the numerous sons of vice, and follow him up in the workings of his busy mind, and you will find this lesson fulfilled upon him. Take the thief. He "fears each bush an officer," and trembles at the flitting spectres of a frighted fancy. Conscious that others will not trust him, he scarcely trusts himself, and, worthless thing, quivers in perpetual fear. Take the liar. He may not pass with the open reputation of a liar, but he will be a poor, miserable reflector upon his own littleness. The nobleness of stern integrity can never be about him; and, in the moments of his busy memory, he will recoil, in shame, from the moral likeness of himself which will come up before him. Or turn to the slanderer. If he does not bear the indignation of community, he must reflect how vile he is; and, in the moments, too, of his retirement, his miseries will rush upon him in view of the ruin he has wrought. The spectacles of injured innocence will yet rise up and plead their cause before him. The murderer, too, must share the general condemnation. He may flee the retributions of the civil law, but another hand *will* arrest him, and another tribunal will condemn.

Upon his soul is stamped the graven image of his murdered brother, crying for vengeance of his blood. That image will go with him by day and by night; ghastly and threatening will it look upon him.

But I forbear. Need I dwell upon the horrors of a stricken conscience? It is known and felt by all. But conscience may become seared. But then, when this happens, the deeds of virtue lose their relish, and this insensibility to all good, this negative punishment, is an evil quite as deplorable as absolute remorse. Indeed, when the conscience is gone, all is gone. The deeds of virtue meet not their reward, and stupified iniquity stalks abroad in utter desolation. Beware, then, beware of a conscience seared. You may not feel that lively compunction of guilt, but you will emphatically be poor, and miserable, and blind, and naked.

But I need not dwell upon a stricken conscience. The system of theology we espouse bids you look abroad upon the vast globe, and read a lesson of continual and ever-varied justice. Sin and misery, you find, go hand in hand. This is not theory, but fact. I would that I could dwell upon it, but I have other matters to present. In the drunkard's portion, in the gambler's fate, in riot, and debauchery, and every evil work, you behold the bitter ingredients of misery. The earth responds to the truth of it, and heaven has declared its judgments *upon* the heads of all who boast of their

iniquity. This is the Universalist's faith, and this is one reason why we may not sin in assurance of abounding grace. It is because the grace of God does not prevent the execution of his justice.

Another reason, which we shall barely mention, is, that a practice of all the opposite virtues secures that inward peace and outward joy which exalts and elevates the man. *Reverse* the argument thus far, and we then have a double reason for walking in the way of wisdom, which is peace.

But I must leave these considerations, as the apostle urged the leaving of the first principles of Christ, to go on to perfection. We can make use of the principle of fear, but we know that this is not the most powerful incentive to obedience. No; it may be the beginning of wisdom, but it is not the end of it. Another principle presents itself; and another reason why we may not sin in assurance of abounding grace, or do evil that good may come, is found in the nature of that grace and good itself. In other words, the Universalist's view of the divine goodness, as perceived in nature and in grace, presents the most powerful motive in the universe for securing obedience to the divine commands. To present this subject clearly, let us look again at the nature of the charge which is under consideration, which is urged against the purity of our faith. It is that it is a *licentious* theory; that it cuts off all moral restraint; that, in *t, it saps* the very foundation of true morality

and social order, and, should it universally prevail, would completely prostrate the cause of religion and virtue in the earth. We are not under any apprehensions that the objection may be stated too strongly; for the stronger you make it, the stronger you give us the argument against it. This, then, is the objection; and now we are prepared to meet and to destroy it.

There are two questions concerning this subject, and only two, which, when they are answered, will cover the whole ground, and settle forever the question in dispute:

I. What *is* true morality; or, if you please, true practical religion, — the sum and substance of all our duty?

II. What are the means or measures best adapted to produce it?

I. First, then, what *is* true morality — true practical religion — the sum and substance of all our duty? "Hear, O Israel! The Lord our God is one Lord; and thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength. This is the first commandment. And the second is like, namely, this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. There is none other commandment greater than these." What! none other commandment greater than these! No; "On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets,"—*all* that it and they have said with

regard to the duty of man; and, permit me to say, all that *can* be said, in truth, on this momentous subject.

I fix and rest upon this truth. I wish to dwell upon it briefly, but long enough to realize its importance and its wide-embracing principle. Let us have a sure and safe starting-place in the outset of this argument, that we may see it in all its clearness, and be prepared at least with one weapon, to repel the slanderous accusation against the holiness of our faith. I would have it understood what true morality and pure obedience consists in. For this is of vital importance to our argument in the outset; because, if we do not know the source and substance of all true obedience, in vain do we argue the licentiousness of any sentiment. We affirm, and that on inspired authority, that it is nothing more nor less than simple love to God and man. And when we say that this comprehends the sum and substance of all our duty, we mean — what undoubtedly the Saviour of the world meant — that, if these two commands are obeyed, all others, all the detail and circumstantial of moral duty, follow on as a matter of necessary course, perfecting the whole man, and causing him not only to run, but to run with delight, in the way of all the commandments of God.

Having made the affirmation, we are now prepared to prove it by a very brief recurrence to the *philosophy* and nature of mental operation.

1. With regard to the duties which we owe to God. Is it agreeable to what we know of the play of human feeling, to suppose that any person, under the influence of a supreme and ardent affection for his Maker, would be prompted to rebellion, irreverence, or ingratitude against him? The very question carries with it a moral contradiction. *Affection* and *rebellion* cannot exist at the same time, and towards the same object. I speak not of a *partial* reverence and affection for the God of heaven. I speak of a full and supreme attachment; and I say, with such a feeling, disobedience in any form cannot coexist. I have your assent, and I therefore dismiss the subject.

2. But it is with regard to the second commandment, the duties which we owe to our fellow-men, that the cry of licentiousness is particularly raised against our sentiments. "No endless hell! *All* to be saved!" Then, in a spirit truly mortifying, it is said, "Let us lie, steal, cheat, murder"—but stop! What can effectually prevent all this outbreaking? Suppose a man should happen to love his neighbor as himself, or to the full extent implied by this command; do you think he would cheat, rob, or murder him? Do we not see that it is here, here in these two great corresponding affections, that an effectual check is placed at once upon all manner of iniquity? Only get a man under the influence of these two great affections, and he is *more* secure than he would be were he

inclosed in walls of brass. He may break through prison walls to repeat his depredations; but I defy him to break through the strength of genuine love to injure any man. I conclude this part of the subject; and I think I have your full assent, that true morality — true practical religion — the sum and substance of all our duty, is simple love to God and man. So saith the Scriptures; and so in truth it is. There is, absolutely, *no* duty, moral, social, political, or religious, but what would flow spontaneously from such a full and free affection. Now,

II. What are the means or measures best adapted to produce it?

1. With regard to the love of God. Tell me, Christians, what is best adapted to promote love to the Creator. Speak, now, out of the honesty of your hearts. Is it, O, is it the doctrine of his endless wrath and hatred? I propose this question, because those who accuse Universalists of undermining the foundation of all true obedience, assign as the all-sufficient reason, that we hold not up the fear of endless punishment; which is the *effect* of enmity and hatred. But these same Christians seem to forget that what they call true obedience is all comprehended in, and flows from, simple love to God and man. I wish this point to be remembered. And now I do not ask if the threat of endless wo can ever make us outwardly *comply* with many requisitions, when the heart is

not in the service. I do not ask if it can ever make us *fear* God. But I ask, simply, if it can ever make us *love* God. Is it possible, by the threat of unmingled and abiding hatred, to produce unmingled and abiding love? Alas for the day when a point so simple is, by the corruptions of a false theology, made necessary to be argued in this nineteenth century of Christian light!

Tell me not of the love of benevolence, in distinction from complacency, which is exercised for all. Call not on the sinner to love the Lord his God, for the reason, merely, that benevolence is cherished for him, though complacency is not. In the name of reason, I ask, would you call upon a creature to love a benevolence that would damn him through the ages of eternity? Do not make such abuse of words. It is enmity, it is boundless wrath, it is utter extinction of all love, you preach to mortal men; and thus you are trying to gain upon the heart's affections!

To return to our former reasonings, love is the same in principle, wherever that divine influence operates in the universe of God. Now does it tend, in its operations on the earth, to diminish our love, and to kindle up our hatred, towards a fellow-being who looks with grace and benignity upon us? Now does not the same reasoning hold good when carried up to him who is our Creator? Carry it up, I say. Tell us, if by proclaiming his

love to the children of men, — by successfully laboring to convince them of their heavenly Father's goodness, — by the deep-settled assurance and the immovable confidence in the strength and infinity of that undying affection of our Creator, — do we, O, do we kindle up the fires of pure hatred, to defile the altar of the human heart?

Are we, then, undermining the foundations of all true obedience? If so, Christians, what are they doing, who, in this great work of promoting love to God, are declaring and depicting, in all the colors of mortal eloquence, his everlasting hatred?

2. What means are best adapted to produce obedience to the second command, — a genuine, brotherly affection for the children of humanity? The question, in part, is answered by the remarks already offered. He who loves his Maker most will have the most affection for his fellow-men. He who delights most in the Creator will delight most in the objects of his creation. If the doctrine of God's hatred, enmity, or wrath — call it either name you please — will not produce love to him, neither will it to the creatures he has formed.

Besides, this doctrine expressly teaches that all men are not the children of God, — that some are the children of the devil, (see our third lecture,) lumps of depravity, the objects of God's wrath, and the devoted victims of his hot displeasure. How, then, can it produce a fraternal and free affection

for all mankind? *When* will it? When the sun emits darkness; when the stream runs higher and purer than the fountain.

Mind you, I have not said that no believer in this doctrine is in *possession* of this love. All I have said is, that it is not this doctrine which produces it. It proceeds, as we shall show hereafter, from a better ingredient in these same Christians' faith.

Having arrived thus far in the stage of our argument, we may anticipate an objection. We may be accused of misrepresenting the subject. We have dwelt upon the threat of endless punishment, as the effect of endless enmity and hatred, and remarked upon the feebleness of this in exciting men to love their Maker and their fellow-men. But it may be said we have omitted the other half of this great gospel influence, — the promise of endless and unutterable joy as a reward, as well as the threatening of unceasing misery. Both these influences, we are reminded, must be brought to bear upon the sinner.

In reply, we would say, we are willing to take *both* these influences — denying to them, however, the appellation of *gospel* influences — and build our argument conjointly upon them. And here we are furnished with a splendid opportunity of observing the futility of these popular measures to induce men to love God and one another, according

to the two commandments. There are two ways in which the case may be made out.

1. Be it observed, that this unutterable, endless joy, which is affirmed to be the reward of the righteous who have forsaken their sins, is represented as the *effect* of the love of their Creator, (complacency, I suppose!) which, by *their* love, is reciprocated by him. This is really delightful! We had always thought the apostle had the right of the matter, when he said, "We love him because he first loved us." But the beautiful theory in question would *reverse* the matter, and make it out that God loves us because we *first loved him!* or that he hates us while we hate him, and begins to turn *when we turn*, and stops just where our love determines him!! This is really paying small regard to the unchangeable attributes of God, though it may be quite a felicitous way to induce men to govern the affections of the Almighty Ruler.

But our object is, not so much to show the absurdity of the theory, as the inefficiency of its practical influence in inducing obedience to the great commandment. Suppose, indeed, it were the fact, that God loves us when we love him, and not before. Then it would follow, that, while *alienated* from him in *rebellion*, we are the objects of the Almighty's hatred. And this is precisely what is preached to us. Now it is in *such* a con-

dition — a state of sin and hatred on our part — that we are called upon to love God. Evidently, then, the influence of God's love cannot be brought to bear upon such persons; for, according to the very doctrine which makes the appeal, God has no love for them *until* they love him. That is, none but the love of benevolence, so called, which would damn them through eternity! While in sin and hatred themselves, then, how are they to be brought to love their Maker? *His* love cannot influence them, for he does not love them yet. Where, then, is the mighty influence of the other half of this theory, which we were accused of keeping out of sight? The fact is this: — There *is* no other half of the theory, until the practical part of the matter is first performed by man! There is nothing but God's dreadful and overwhelming hatred to induce him to love God; and we ask you again, my friends, if this can do the gracious work.

I wish you to understand that the *promise* of God's love, when man begins to love him — say nothing of the inconsistency of the matter — is not sufficient. There, according to this doctrine, exists the Almighty; filled with hatred to the hating sinner; and now, how is it possible for the sinner to love a Being who cherishes such unbounded hate for him, even though the love of that Being should *afterward* be the reward? The thing is to get him to love that hateful Being *first!*

2. The utter futility and folly of these popular measures to induce obedience may now be seen in another light. My brethren, what is the nature of love? Is it any thing that can be forced, or extorted by any thing but a perception of loveliness in the object loved? This is an exceedingly simple question, but the state of popular opinion renders it necessary that it should be put. Many people seem to think that men can be *driven* or induced to love their Maker, by motives or considerations apart from his moral loveliness or beauty. I care not which you take, — whether the threatening of punishment, or the promise of reward. The thing to be accomplished is, to create in man the exercise of love. And I say, it is a moral impossibility to accomplish this, either by promises or threatenings. And the impossibility looks *greater* and more *hopeless*, when the sinner whom God *hates* is called upon to exercise this love. Would this threatened punishment, or promised reward, have any influence in changing the nature of the object to be loved? We conclude, therefore, that the popular measures for inducing men to love their Creator, or their fellow-men, are not only utterly vain and futile, but betray the grossest ignorance of some of the simplest operations of the human mind.

There is no way by which our partialist brethren can escape from this conclusion, but by *denying* outright that they ever *attempt* to make

men love their Maker and their fellow-men by holding out this threat of endless punishment. If they take this ground, then they must acknowledge one or the other of two things: either that, when the threat in question is put in requisition, they try to produce a different kind of obedience from what God requires, and only flows from love; or that the threat in question is altogether unavailing for the purpose. They may choose which horn of the dilemma they please. If they take the former, they must tell us, candidly, that they are not laboring to promote the will of God in the earth, by securing the obedience which his law requires: if they take the latter, they must acknowledge that the doctrine in question, if true, is "good for nothing," and that they are "wearying for very vanity." Choose which they please, they must choose one.

"But stop," says the hearer, "it cannot be that so many are mistaken, — that the mighty energies of 'infinite joy and endless wo,' which have so long been put in requisition, are so entirely unavailable in producing love and obedience. They must do something." Yes, my brethren, this is true. They *do* something. They produce both love and obedience. They drive men into many outward conformities, — keep men in the practice of many virtues which they might *not* follow were it not for that fear; which obedience is both unacceptable, and consistent with great love for sin; and

they produce much love for that *reward* held out for their attainment, which serves only to alienate the heart from the only proper object of its affections. Ah! here is the secret and end of the matter. Here the concealed abomination puts out its cloven foot. Too many Christians, it is feared, love the idea of a reward of endless happiness, and the idea of escape from endless torments, more than they do their Maker. And it is *such* love, and such obedience, which the doctrine of endless rewards and punishments is eminently adapted to produce. These truths, we know, break open the secrets of many hearts; but it is our *business* to dissect the human heart; and nowhere can the moral dissecting knife be applied with more success than in reference to the motives which prompt to human duty.

From the whole of this subject, as thus far developed, we may see clearly the following truths: that love to God and love to man is the sum and substance of all our duty; that, consequently, it is not the doctrine of God's *love* that is undermining all morality and religion; but (mark, now,) the opposite doctrine,—the doctrine of God's hatred, *so far as the first and second commands are concerned*, is actually undermining, or effectually *preventing*, the obedience of mankind!

Christians of all denominations, let us not now be misunderstood! God forbid that I should affirm *that no* believers in this doctrine do love their

Maker and their fellow-men. We affirm no such thing. What we say is, and that in truth which cannot be *gainsayed*, that it is not *this doctrine* which induces them to love God or man. No; I despise the thought. It is a mental and moral impossibility and absurdity. THE LOVE OF CHRIST is the prevailing theme, ever with those who "limit the Holy One of Israel." The abhorrent features of their faith are not realized in their exaltations for redeeming love. And it is love, after all, which creates in them any compliance with the two great commands. The simple idea of endless torments never did, and never *can*, produce one spark of love to the Creator or the creatures he has formed. On the contrary, so far as this idea is realized, so far as it becomes *operative* in the human mind, among the moral sentiments, it must harden the heart, and diminish that love for God and man which otherwise would be called into natural and healthy exercise. This it must do, from the very make and constitution of humanity.

Away, then, with the idea that the doctrine of God's unbounded and all-powerful grace is injurious to the cause of public morals! So far as the *opposite* doctrine affects a moral action related to the two commandments, it does indisputably prevent the obedience of mankind.

As a last resort, it may be said that the fear of the Lord in this light is the *beginning* of wisdom: it may arouse the sinner to conviction of his guilt;

and, *after* that, there may be presented the more powerful influence of love. Reply, — the fear of the LORD is the beginning of wisdom; but not the fear of the *devil*, or of *endless punishment*. The *premises* are thus destroyed on which this reasoning is founded. Besides, it is very questionable whether love is not the best motive to begin with. A *filial* fear, fear of offending God, Universalists acknowledge. *This* is *consistent* with love. A slavish fear of endless torment is not. A filial fear may be the beginning of wisdom. Such a fear is very nearly allied to love itself. It is the fear of a parent who never punishes but *in* love, and for the attainment of a good and holy end. In short, a filial fear of God, God's hatred of *sin* and undying love for the *sinner*, — these are the enginery of our moral power, by which the stubborn foe must bow, and the increase of a pure obedience rise.

How lucid, then, is the conclusion to which this subject leads us! Tell us no more of the licentiousness of our faith. Settle the question, first, what true obedience consists in. See that it is comprehended in, and flows from, two great corresponding affections; and then ask, what is best adapted to produce it? We may be in error; we claim not infallibility; we may have an *erroneous* theory, and so may our antagonists. But that we have a *licentious* one, — one calculated to promote iniquity, to cut off all moral restraint, to diminish, *in short*, our love to God and love to man, on

which all true obedience is founded, this is an accusation which we KNOW to be false, which falls harmless at our feet, and rebounds with tenfold vengeance against those systems of wrath and hatred which the wisdom of this world hath invented.

We have not quite finished the subject. Bear with me a little while, and I will now proceed to the last consideration. We now leave theory and proceed to fact. Beautiful in theory, it may and has been said, is the doctrine of God's love for the reformation of the world; but theorizing and actual experiment might clash in sorrowful destruction. In short, it has been asserted in a tone of confidence, that the mild ministrations of benignity and kindness may do for the more peaceable, refined, and cultivated, and the less criminal of mankind; but that there are certain hardened and abandoned villains whom nothing but horrible terror *will* subdue. These, it is said, need the appalling and the fearful, and the prospect of the most soul-quivering calamities. And so, in precise accordance therewith, the measures have been put in requisition. Those who think thus of human nature have acted up to their belief. And the pulpit, instead of a vehicle of gospel grace, has been converted to a citadel of Sinai, to hurl its thunders, and dart its lightnings from afar. The eloquence of these ambassadors is that of terror and alarm. The godlike messages of love have lost their efficiency

with them, at least in appearance. They must resort to some more effectual method. The earthquake, the thunderbolt and storm, — these are the enginery of their moral power, and the instruments to strike and subdue the heart.

Now we are not going to deny that there are "hardened villains," or sturdy, stout-hearted criminals. But it is a question with us, after all, whether they can be *softened* by the terrible measures proposed. We *deny* it outright; and if you have ever seen these measures resorted to and put in operation, you must yourselves have become convinced that such have mistaken the nature of man. Human nature is the same, the world over. There are various aspects of it, under various circumstances, but there is yet a universal principle in the heart that will not yield at brutish treatment, but may still, with proper means, be turned and wrought upon at will.

But we were to leave theory and proceed to fact. And, out of the numerous cases illustrative of our subject, we hardly know where to make the selection at first. Scriptural examples you are all familiar with; yet I would not leave the Holy Volume, to present, entirely, cases of profane occurrence. What but the kindness of Joseph brought tears of contrition and of gratitude from the eyes of that rebellious band of brethren? Reverse the circumstances. Imagine Joseph, on that *melting* occasion, to have acted the revengeful

tyrant, — to have assumed and maintained the repelling rigor of unforgiving hatred. Think you his brethren would have "wept upon his neck?" Ay, they might have wept, but they would have been the tears of congealed impenitence and fear. Else, perchance, they would have been overwhelmed with terror, and fled, in unreconciliation, away. Here is one instance, then, where the all-subduing power of kindness — kindness even against unbrotherly treachery and wickedness — took a gracious and a quick effect. What would hatred have done, what would revenge and retaliation have done, in the case which now has formed one of the most affecting and memorable stories of sacred history?

Take another case in the history of Saul and David. Whoever will read the history referred to, will not hesitate to allow that the malice of Saul against David was of the most inveterate and determined kind. He sought his death, and was bent upon it; and what, my hearers, saved him from the murderous plot? Was it the omnipotence of terror? 'T was a higher power than this. When David had secreted himself in a cave for security, with his followers with him, Saul accidentally entered, and placed himself, unwittingly, in the power of his enemy. The men of David perceived the condition of the king, and apparently exulted in the opportunity of destroying him. But did David *avail himself* of the opportune occasion?

He remained silent till Saul rose up to go away; then he called upon him in surprise, "My lord the king! behold, this day thine eyes have seen how that the Lord had delivered thee into mine hand in the cave; and some bade me kill thee; but mine eye spared thee. Moreover, see, yea, see the skirt of thy robe in my hand; for in that I cut off the skirt of thy robe, (which he did privily,) and killed thee not, know thou and see that there is neither evil nor transgression in mine hand; yet thou huntest my soul to take it. The Lord judge between me and thee, and the Lord avenge me of thee; but mine hand shall not be upon thee. As saith the proverb of the ancients, Wickedness proceedeth from the wicked; but mine hand shall not be upon thee: And it came to pass when David had made an end of speaking these words unto Saul, that Saul said, Is this thy voice, my son David? And Saul lifted up his voice and wept!" Behold the power of kindness even against your hard-hearted ones! "And Saul said to David, Thou art more righteous than I; for thou hast rewarded me good, whereas I have rewarded thee evil. And thou hast showed this day how that thou hast dealt well with me; forasmuch as, when the Lord had delivered me into thine hand, thou killedst me not. For if a man find his enemy, will he let him go well away? Wherefore, the Lord reward thee good for that thou hast done unto me *this* day." (1 Sam. xxiv.)

What but kindness, Christians, could have done this? What other power could have softened the hardness of his heart, and destroyed his murderous design, and called forth from his mouth the prayers of good for David? Here was one of your hard-hearted — villain, if you please to call him. Yet what but kindness would have thus miraculously wrought upon him? Can ye say, then, that there are some whom nothing but horrible terror *will* subdue? Rest assured, my brethren, that human nature is the same even in the hearts of the most desperate and cruel. There is, O, there is yet a latent spark which can be wrought upon by the demonstrations of tenderness, which no wickedness can vitiate, and no depravity extinguish.

To turn from the Bible to other testimony, to other facts, in support of our subject, it is enough, perhaps, if I barely mention the talismanic name of *Howard.* What did he do? He travelled all over England, Ireland, and Scotland, and a considerable part of the continent of Europe, illustrating and establishing the truth of our theory, — softening the asperities of revenge, converting obdurateness into penitency, resistance into compliance, vice into virtue, the worst and most inveterate of criminals and hopeless desperadoes into gentle, manageable, obedient subjects, by the simple yet all-powerful application of kindness; and this, too, where cruel treatment, stripes, and lashes — your modern, "*evangelical*," coercive measures — only

kindled up a still stouter defiance than ever. Go to the savages, if you want to talk of this; but tell it not in Gath, nor publish it in Askelon.

Take another case. I refer to the admirable Oberlin. A native of Strasburg, on the borders of France and Germany, of great characteristic and native benevolence of heart, his only ambition was to be useful to mankind. For this purpose, he undertook to civilize and moralize a half-barbarous race. He worked among the rudest materials, and amid the most formidable difficulties, both of a physical and moral nature. He attempted to fertilize the country where the soil was hard and uncongenial, the whole territory mountainous and barren, and the inhabitants, as before intimated, of a moral likeness to the natural aspect around. The place he thus selected for his operations was about twenty miles from the city of Strasburg, the place of his nativity and education. It was almost excluded from the rest of the world; but here this man of usefulness went, and formed the design of making the "desert blossom as the rose." He was the minister of a parish church; and, from the very character of his office, we might not imagine him to have gone with carnal weapons to subdue the barbarism, and civilize and Christianize the place. No; but he went with the all-conquering weapons of love and good-will. He met with resistance, and even combinations of enmity against *him*. But he gradually became successful, im-

proved the country, established infant schools, instructed in the arts, worked with the natives, and, as a pastor and teacher, achieved the noblest triumphs over the vices and habits of the people. We repeat, it was his godlike love and kindness, united with his perseverance, that wrought all these wonders, and earned for him a name and a praise in the annals of the world's benefactors. Remember, these were not the refined and cultivated, among whom he exercised his love, but a half barbarous race who fell before its all-subduing power. He, too, I am happy in stating, was a *Universalist* in faith and practice.

Take yet another case. I refer to the well known history of Penn. He worked with these same instruments among the *savages*. Here were the most stern, and terrible, and ferocious passions. And they were all conquered by love. When he came to this country, he came with the resolute purpose of putting into practical operation the godlike rule of "overcoming evil with good." And he found it eminently successful. He had no arms, no weapons of blood, no coat of mail. And yet he went among the savages, disarmed them, defeated them, with nothing under heaven but courage, and good-will, and kindness unto all. These were his arms; and they were all bright and gleaming from the armory above. At this late day, the name of Penn, the very name of him, will cause the tomahawk to drop, and the hatchet to be buried in the

earth. Where, then, are your uncultivated, unrefined, and hardened specimens of human nature, whom nothing but horrible terror *will* subdue? 'T is false. It contradicts the spirit of the holy word, and doubts the very power by which God through Christ will overcome the world.

Look yet further down in the scale of moral abasement. I refer to *criminals* — inmates of the prison — those whose natural passions have been nurtured and trained in the school of vice, and where the facilities of intellectual attainment have been turned to unholy use, and added to the terrible momentum which they have acquired in their onward course to ruin. There was a time when these hardened sons of iniquity were deemed altogether unmanageable by any other power than chains, and bolts, and bars, with the most unrelenting and unflinching rigor of severity. But, now, experiment has taught a different truth. Facts added to facts have proved that criminals are yet men; that they have hearts like other men; that they are not hopelessly and totally depraved; that *they* are sensible to the humane offices of kindness, and that this, in fact, is the only power by which they *can* be brought in subjection to authority. It is said of Captain Pillsbury, of the Connecticut state's prison, that "his moral power over the guilty is so remarkable, that prison breakers who can be confined nowhere else, are sent to him to be charmed *into* staying their time out. One," says the author

of the Retrospect of Western Travel, "was a gigantic personage, the terror of the country, who had plunged deeper and deeper into crime, for seventeen years. Captain Pillsbury told him, when he came, that he hoped he would not repeat the attempts to escape he had made elsewhere. 'It will be best,' said he, 'that you and I should treat each other as well as we can. I will make you as comfortable as I possibly can, and I shall be anxious to be your friend; and I hope you will not get me into difficulty on your account. There is a cell intended for solitary confinement, but we have never used it, and I should be very sorry ever to have to turn the key upon any body in it. You may range the place as freely as I do; if you trust me, I shall trust you.' The man was sulky, and for weeks showed only very gradual symptoms of softening under Captain Pillsbury's cheerful confidence. At length, information was given to the captian of this man's intention to break the prison. The captain called him and taxed him with it; the man preserved a gloomy silence. He was told that it was now necessary for him to be locked up in the solitary cell, and desired him to follow the captain, who went first, carrying a lamp in one hand, and the key in the other. In the narrowest part of the passage, the captain, who is a light, small man, turned round and looked in the face of the stout criminal. 'Now,' said he, 'I ask whether you have treated me as I deserved?'

have done every thing that I could to make you comfortable; I have trusted you, and you have never given me the least confidence in return, and have even planned to get me into difficulty. Is this kind? And yet I cannot bear to lock you up. If I had the least sign that you cared for me —' * * The man burst into tears. 'Sir,' said he, 'I have been a devil these seventeen years, but *you treat me like a man.*' 'Come, let us go back,' said the captain. The convict had the free range of the prison as before. From this hour he began to open his heart to the captain, and cheerfully fulfilled the whole time of his imprisonment, confiding to his friend, as they arose, all impulses to violate his trust, and all facilities for doing so which he imagined he saw.

"Another case was of a criminal of the same character, who went so far as to make an actual attempt. He fell and hurt his ankle very much. The captain had him brought in and laid on his bed, and had the ankle attended to, every one being forbidden to speak a word of reproach to the sufferer. The man was sullen, and would not say whether the bandage of his ankle gave him pain or not. This was done in the night, and every one retired when this was done. But the captain could not sleep. He was distressed at the attempt, and thought he could not have fully done his duty to any man who would make it. He was afraid man was in great pain. He arose and went

with a lamp to the cell. The prisoner's face was turned to the wall, and his eyes closed, but the traces of suffering were not to be mistaken. The captain loosened and replaced the bandage, and went for his own pillow to rest the limb upon, the man neither speaking nor moving all the time. Just as he was shutting the door, the prisoner started up and called him back. 'Stop, sir. Was it all to see after my ankle that you got up?' 'Yes, it was. I could not sleep for thinking of you.' 'And yet you never said a word of the way I have used you.' 'I do feel hurt with you; but I do not want to call you unkind while you are suffering as you now are.' The man was in an agony of shame and grief. All he could ask was to be trusted again when he should recover. He was freely trusted, and gave his generous friend no more anxiety on his behalf."

I might multiply similar cases, but I forbear. Those we have cited speak a language of their own. Where are your hardened villains whom nothing but horrible terror *will* subdue? Where are they? And yet this love and this kindness are hardly worth the mention compared with that of God. And this is the infinite love we preach. Is it licentious? Is it dangerous to public morals? Is it undermining the foundations of religion? If so, we must put the question, What are they doing, who are pursuing exactly a contrary course? Shame on the man who, in ignorance, hurls this

charge against the truth he does not know, but may yet feel! Suppose one of our modern ministers of *wrath* and *condemnation* had gone to these convicts in the prison. Here he would have met with his hardened villains, who, according to his theory, need some mightier power than that we preach. And he might have roused his eloquence by an appeal to the thunderbolt and storm. He would have uncapped the mouth of hell, and as its fabled horrors rose before them, would have bid them fear, and tremble, and obey. But would he have succeeded? No! not theory, but facts, speak in a tone of thunder, no! Then they are false ministers of unprofitable suffering. They may be honest, but truth will have it that they have mistaken God, and mistaken the nature of man. Horrible terror *will not* subdue. It may restrain, but it cannot subdue; at least, not in the subjection of Christ. It is neither the beginning of wisdom nor the end of it. It is neither the gospel nor the law. It may have a driving influence, but it never yet constrained one soul to duty or to God. It cannot be that it is the truth of heaven. Truth is not so absolutely worthless. Nor is it fitted for the abandoned of the earth. The *insane* and *lunatic* will reject it. For the power of kindness, and that alone, has been found effectual in hospitals of the mind, to turn the almost unearthly rebellion of the maniac into obedience, gentleness, and joy. *Who is* this power of terror fitted for,—this threat

of never-ceasing misery? Fitted for the fabulous monsters of a heathen world, for whom alone it is all worthy; fitted for an imagination girt about with darkness, and rioting in fabled pits of endless wo. It never saved, but has *made* its maniacs. It never softened, but has *hardened* many hearts. It never caused, but has *prevented*, obedience to the great commands of love. True, there are many worthy who assent to it; but they are not made so by the theory in question. We may safely turn the charge upon them which they have brought to us. The fear of hell has made "some melancholy, and others mad;" it has driven men to many performances of virtue, but it has not touched their hearts with love. It is therefore *good for nothing*, even should it be admitted true; for the very obedience which would be necessary to escape it cannot be promoted by it! But it is not true. And time is rapidly testifying that its kingdom is numbered, and it must pass away.

To conclude, — these are the enginery of our moral power: a filial fear of God our Father, and the Father of mankind; God's hatred of sin, but intense love for the sinner. Do not charge with licentiousness these godlike motives to obedience: they are all-powerful when felt, and none can sin with their full influence on him.

I bring these lectures to a close. I have spoken pointedly and plainly. If they shall be the means of *loosening one* soul from the holds of error, of turn-

ing *one* to truth and the faithful practice of its teachings, I shall be more than abundantly rewarded. May God grant that *many* may come, from the east and the west, from the north and the south, and sit down in the kingdom of God. And not till the universe is purified of evil, or the last lost soul returns in holiness to God, will Christ our Lord be satisfied, and the victory over sin complete.

APPENDIX.

[In anticipation of some objections which may be urged against the doctrine which we have labored to illustrate and establish, and which have not been noticed in the foregoing lectures, and for the presentation of some other facts for the consideration of the limitarian, I have thought proper to append the following.]

I. "*If the doctrine of universal salvation is true, there can be no use in preaching it.*" I must confess that this objection is both *flat* and *stale;* but as it is not so much our object to condemn folly, as to enlighten it, we must give it a passing notice. It is frequently the last objection given by an opponent, after having been driven the rounds in argument, and refuted, point after point. He will then look you wisely in the face, with a "Well, friend, if your doctrine is true, there is no use in preaching — that 's clear; for if all men are to be saved, unconditionally, what 's the use of preaching?" And then he takes his leave of you,

unless, perchance, he is stopped a little as we stop him now, to reason with him, and to state, —

1. That this is no objection to the *truth* of the doctrine, but only against its *utility*. And this is the reason why we did not notice it in our discourse upon the objections to the doctrine itself. Let this be remembered first, and, —

2. The objection destroys itself. It is based upon the supposition that the doctrine may be TRUE. If it is *true*, that is reason enough for preaching it. Would the objector have us preach a *falsehood*, even though it might appear of some utility? No indeed. If, then, our doctrine is true, that is the very reason why we should preach it.

3. The objection also supposes that the *only* use of preaching is to save men from an *endless hell*. And this, in fact, is the great object of all limitarian preaching. Now, if there were no other salvation than this, and all mankind were to be unconditionally saved from *this*, then, we confess, there would be no use in our preaching. We might then institute the following argument: there is no other salvation than deliverance from an endless hell; all mankind must experience this salvation; *therefore*, there is no use in our preaching to save them.

But suppose there happened to be *another* salvation. Suppose that Christ received the "name of Jesus, because he should save his people from *their sins*;" suppose that he was "sent to bless us,

in turning away every one of us from our *iniquities;*" suppose it was to "*opén our eyes*, and to turn us *from darkness* unto *light*, and from the power of Satan unto God, that we might receive forgiveness of sins, and an inheritance among them which are sanctified by faith." There would then, manifestly, be an appearance of wisdom in the preaching of the cross, and in bringing home to men's business and bosoms matters worthy of their grave attention.

Now this happens to be the case. We perceive that men are in the way of sin, of darkness, and of unbelief. We preach to open their eyes, and turn them to the light. We fear no endless hell, but we recognize a high and glorious salvation, — one which, we apprehend, fully justifies the use of the term, notwithstanding all the felt unmeaningness which, in our use of it, is felt by many to hang around it. It is, emphatically, to SAVE MANKIND that we preach the sentiments of our faith. And the Saviour himself came "to seek and to save those who *were* lost," not those who *should be* lost. We view the world, or a great part of it, in a lost condition. They are lost to truth, they are lost to virtue, they are lost to faith and hope, they are lost to happiness, they are lost from their Father's house,— they are lost, wofully lost, but not forever; and it is by the "foolishness of preaching" that we expect to save them. In the world's eye it is foolishness, but to those who have tasted of the

good word of God, and the powers of the world to come, the gospel we preach is the power of God, and the wisdom of God, to the salvation of every true believer.

Go, my friends, and contrast our condition with the condition of the heathen, if you want to know the utility of preaching, abstracted from the power of an endless hell. See them sunk in the grossest degradation, idolatry, sensuality, and ignorance; "without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful," and living in darkness that may almost be felt. Contrast their uncivilized and degraded state with the condition of those who have received the light and knowledge of God in the gospel of his Son, and say then, we beseech you, apart from all consideration of exposure to an endless hell, whether a great and special salvation hath not visited us. This is the salvation we preach. We seek to save men from ignorance,—ignorance of God and his government; from sin and its bitter consequences; from unbelief, and sorrow, and all the evils attendant upon mortal and imperfect man, which the gospel can alleviate or remove away forever. If our doctrine is true then, there is some use in preaching it.

We preach to *make men better*. And as to the power of our faith to do this, I refer to the closing lecture of the series, which, perhaps, the reader has just perused. We aim to inspire the virtuous *will, the* holy resolution, and to impel the crea-

ture to worship his Creator from thankfulness of heart. And is it foolishness in the eye of God? Is it vain and useless unto man? It may be foolishness to some, but they should not forget that, in days long past, when the world in wisdom towered high in its own estimation, "it pleased God, by the FOOLISHNESS OF PREACHING, to save them that believe." And may not the same salvation go forth now? Yes, and it will go forth, till the world is delivered from its folly, — till all obstacles are moved out of the way, — till "every valley shall be filled, and every mountain and hill shall be brought low; and the crooked shall be made straight, and the rough ways shall be made smooth; and all flesh shall see the salvation of God."

Again, we must now tell the objector that one very great use in preaching our faith is, to save mankind from the degrading and dishonorable conceptions which they have formed of Him who is the Father of all mercies. They have dishonored God by the ascription of a character that would disgrace the veriest tyrant upon earth. They have cast a cloud of blackness over all his government. There is not one of them who, if he had the power, would not do *better*, infinitely better, for mankind than they allow their God will do. Thus they exalt their own benevolence above that of the Almighty, and impiously revile his character with blasphemies too horrible to utter. This is plain, but it *is absolutely* true. I do not say they do it

intentionally; but they do it in ignorance of his adorable nature. And if I wanted to reproach my God, and to conjure up the foulest imaginable impiety, I would not, with horrid oaths, deny him; but I would say, in daring coolness, that he would inflict upon his helpless creatures, who owe their being to him, unintermitted and interminable torment. This I would do; and I should have no doubt that I had done the worst I could do. I know I am plain, and I mean to be plain on a subject of this nature: I would say it, did I die while my pen quivered in my hand.

Now, my friend, it is to save mankind from such dishonorable views of God that we preach our sentiments. And we *will* preach them till knowledge runs to and fro, and his name is glorified throughout the earth.

We have now one question to ask concerning the morals of this theory, and shall then dismiss the subject. Would those who bring the objection we are noticing be willing to acknowledge that, were it not for saving men from an endless hell, all their preaching and all they could preach would be foolishness? Then ENDLESS DAMNATION is the sum total of their wisdom! And, without this, they could not lift a finger to point to *God*, to *Christ crucified*, to *virtue*, or to *happiness!* And we believe this is not a *great ways* from the truth of the matter!

II. "*Universalism* MAY prove false. We *there-*

fore will not embrace it; for, if we did, we should give up two chances for one. If our doctrine proves false, yours will take us in; but if yours should happen to prove false, you have no security. We have two chances, and we will keep upon the safest side." So, friend, you are determined to disbelieve, in spite of evidence. You will not investigate, you will not "examine yourself whether you be in the faith," for fear you may be found *not* in it! that is, for fear you shall feel compelled, by evidence, to embrace a doctrine which, though *truer*, might not be so safe! This is wisdom — this is principle — this is noble!

Is not the side of truth unquestionably the safe side? Examine, then; and if you be convinced of error, renounce it immediately, and rest assured there is nothing safer than the truth.

But it may prove *false*. What then? Are you any more in danger by being *honestly* and *conscientiously* in error, — by believing a doctrine which you cannot help believing, from the force of evidence, and rejecting one which you were obliged to reject, on account of its manifest absurdity? Rest assured, if there is any absolute *sin* here, it is in striving to countenance and keep in favor with a doctrine which your understanding rejected, and your very soul abhorred. I repeat, if there is any sin here, and danger on that account, it is not in rejecting a doctrine which you felt obliged to reject, but rather in striving to favor one which

you could not find sufficient evidence to sustain, for the miserable consideration that it might be more safe. Remember this.

But let us see if it really would be more safe, or if you would have one more chance by believing in the opposite doctrine. What does this doctrine teach? That, from all past eternity, God has elected some to everlasting life, and reprobated others to everlasting death; that those thus elected and reprobated are made so, as the Confession of Faith says, "without any foresight of *faith* or *good works*, or any other thing in the creature as conditions or causes moving him thereto;" and that the *number* "thus predestinated and foreordained is *so certain*, that it cannot be either *increased* or diminished." What a glorious CHANCE here is! If *this* doctrine be true, and the main salvation is deliverance from an endless hell, it is certainly foolish to preach it. What think, friend, of two *chances* here. You might as well be a Universalist as not, if this is true, and despite of every danger. The fact is, there is no chance about it; for it is all absolute and "particular" "predestination" and "design," "without any foresight of *faith* or good works." So, Universalist or Partialist, if you are one of the elect, you will be saved; and if not, you will be damned, in *spite* of faith.

But, says the reader, this is an old-fashioned doctrine, and universally abandoned now. I beg *the reader's* pardon; I have heard it preached

myself, within three months, from a pulpit in this town — this veritable Newburyport. Remember that. It was preached to more than two thousand people.

But we are willing to take the objector on the other ground, — to admit that our eternal destiny is placed at our own disposal. And what then? Can *faith* save ye? Or can honest, conscientious opinion, made up from careful examination of the Bible, and the use of all the helps within your aid, — can such honesty and sincerity damn you through the ages of eternity? I pity the man who is so far lost in bigotry as this. But if faith cannot save ye, can *works*? Admit that they can. Admit that a good character is requisite for the attainment of salvation; or, rather, that a good character is salvation itself. And what then? Does the doctrine of endless damnation afford two chances here? I trow not. So far as the first and second commands are concerned, we have already proved it "good for nothing;" yea, worse than useless. I refer to the closing lecture of the series, where it has been amply demonstrated that the system of universal grace is all-sufficient in moral power; and it only needs to be reduced to practice, to keep the believer in the way of all the commandments of God. On the contrary, reduce partialism to practice, imitate its God of cruelty, enact the scenes on earth that God, it is said, will enact in eternity, and crime and cruelty would

overspread the earth. We do not say that such *is* the character of the believers in this doctrine generally: we rejoice that it is *not* reduced to actual, universal practice. But we do say that such *has* been its tendency; that the bloody inquisition, and other enormities, owe their origin to the doctrine of endless torment; and, in *every* case, so far as it becomes *operative* in inducing a moral action related to the two commandments, it does prevent obedience, harden the heart, create antipathy to God, and destroy a Christian sympathy for man. These are *facts* which cannot be controverted. So far as *chance* is concerned, then, whether by faith or works, or both, the substantial, enlightened, practical believer in the universality and efficiency of God's grace and love is still upon the safest side. I pray that he may remain there; and "not unto us, O Lord, not unto us, but unto thy name, give glory."

III. *It is objected to the system of our theology, to that part of it which relates to punishment, that it destroys the Christian doctrine of forgiveness, by teaching a full and complete punishment for every sin.* This objection is founded on one grand theological mistake. You cannot point to a single passage in the Bible which speaks of forgiveness of punishment. In Exodus xxxiv. 6, 7, the character of God is proclaimed in this way: "The Lord God, merciful and gracious, *forgiving iniquity, transgression* and *sin*, and that will *by no*

means clear the guilty." Here we find that sin may be forgiven, that is, blotted out, or remitted, while their punishment they could not flee from. Again, in Psalm xcix. 8, "Thou wast a God who *forgavest* them, though thou tookest *vengeance of their inventions.*" Here, also, we learn that God could *forgive* their sins, that is, cleanse them from iniquity, at the same time that he took vengeance for them. Also in Isaiah xl. 1, 2, "Comfort ye, comfort ye my people, saith your God. Speak ye comfortably to Jerusalem, and cry unto her, that her warfare is accomplished, that her *iniquity* is pardoned; for she hath *received of the Lord's hand double for all her sins.*" Here is an emphatic testimony, that sin may be adequately punished, and yet forgiven too. *After* the punishment is inflicted, the sin may be forgiven. If we should ask some Christians how this could be, they would ridicule the idea. The reason would be, they would be all the time thinking of forgiveness of punishment. And the forgiveness which our Christian clergy preach is generally represented, and generally understood, to be the forgiveness or remission of hell torments. But the Bible knows nothing about such a doctrine. It never teaches the forgiveness or remission of *punishment* for sins committed. It is the forgiveness of *sins;* by which is understood, the blotting out, or cleansing from, after due justice is administered. You see, then, that our system of theology does not destroy

the Christian doctrine of forgiveness, but maintains it. It only destroys the gross error of forgiveness of punishment. "He that doeth wrong *shall receive* for the wrong which he hath done; and there is no respect of persons." (Col. iii. 25.)

In human governments there is indeed such a thing as the power of pardon, — pardon of punishment. But this is owing to the imperfection of the government. Mistakes frequently occur with human judges, with regard to the degree of guilt which a criminal is involved in, and also with regard to the question of guilty or not guilty. And, under such circumstances, a pardon is granted, by which the punishment is remitted. But no such mistakes occur in the government of God. He readeth the secrets of the heart. He is intimately acquainted with all the facts in the case, can institute no punishment but what is just to be administered; and, under such a government, why should the punishment be remitted for a sin committed against full light and knowledge? Such forgiveness would be manifestly unjust. And God has never declared it to us. He is the gracious forgiver of our *sins;* and sin may be forgiven, *after* the just punishment is administered; that is, "remembered no more against us." Universalists, then, so far from destroying, are the only Christians who *maintain*, the Christian doctrine of forgiveness; for every other sect perpetuates the sin through all eternity.

IV. *It is objected, also, that our system renders unavailing the act of repentance.* It does not. It only declares that repentance will not absolve from the punishment of sins committed. But if repentance cannot save us from the just punishment of our sins, it may be asked, of what avail is it? In answer to this question, let it be observed how strangely perverted men's judgments are upon this subject, by a blind adherance to a favorite creed. Repentance has so long been represented as an exercise of the mind which will free us from the punishment of sins committed, which otherwise would have been inflicted, that it is deemed of no use at all if it cannot have this effect. What a blindness to all plain consequences is this! By your permission, I will illustrate this subject by an apt, though homely comparison. A man in trade, then, makes a bad bargain. He repents of it. Now of what use is his repentance? Does it help him out of his present difficulty? Does it enable him to escape from the loss he has sustained? No. He has got to suffer the evil of his own imprudence, and there is no help for him. Of what use, then, is his repentance? Why, it will learn him to look out better next time. That is the use of it. Just so, we apprehend, are the good consequences of gospel repentance. It never will atone for what is past. If an individual sins, he has got to suffer for it the whole penalty of the law. There is no remedy for him. You, then,

who hold to *endless* punishment, beware! He may repent in dust and ashes, but this will never satisfy justice for the sin he has committed. Why should it? He committed the sin against a full knowledge of the wrong. He knew the law; he knew he should violate it if he thus conducted; still, he hesitates not; he goes deliberately at work, and dares an open transgression. Under these circumstances, why should he go unpunished? Why should his repentance afterwards clear him from a wilful violation of a known law of God? You may talk about sorrow, and contrition, but this is nothing to the purpose. He had neither sorrow nor contrition when he ventured to rebel. With daring impiety, with a full knowledge of the law and its requirements, he goes about, despite of it all, and hardily lifts his hand against the almighty Ruler, in defiance of him! Now, afterward, let him sorrow and repent; but this cannot atone for high-handed crime against full light and knowledge. And we may depend upon it, that God, "who will by no means clear the guilty," will never let us off upon such easy terms as popular repentance. This sweeping expression, "no means," includes, or rather excludes, repentance and every thing else.

Let it not be said that Christ has borne the infinite penalty for us; and that, therefore, God can now free us by repentance and faith. For, notwithstanding this, the penalty, we are told, must be

inflicted upon *us*, but repentance will clear us! The argument, then, holds good against the whole system of popular penalty, repentance, and forgiveness.

But what, then, is the use of repenting? Is it of no use? Most assuredly it is. It is just as useful and necessary as the repentance of that man who made a bad bargain. It will learn us better for the future. This is the true use of repentance. It never can atone for what is past, but it will prevent future transgression, and *consequent* punishment for those future sins; for, if we no more transgress, we shall, of course, no more be punished. The punishment of sin is called the *wages* of it. "The wages of sin is death." The term *wages* comes from a word which signified the *daily pay* of a Roman soldier. Death, then, (not *eternal* death, which phrase is not in the Bible,) is the *pay*, the wages of sin. It is hardly *earned* in the labor of iniquity. Now the great Lawgiver never had the character of refusing to pay laborers their wages. No: "Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord." We may repent, and this will save us from future transgression and *consequent* punishment; but surely, by the act of our repentance, God will not prove so absolutely unjust as to withhold the hard earned wages of his subjects. We might wish to be excused from receiving such pay, but we should never have engaged to labor for it. The *great* Lawgiver must fulfil his part, and

render unto every one his due. Universalists, then, do not deny the necessity of repentance: they only deny one of its supposed, but erroneous and unjust, consequences.

V. *It is furthermore said, that we deny the necessity of the new birth.* We do not. We only deny that our eternal destiny hereafter is to depend upon our characters here. A more monstrous idea could not be conceived, upon the subject of our salvation. We believe in God, "who hath saved us, and called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus, before the world began." (2 Tim. i. 9.) We believe, also, that "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." And none shall say "Lo here! or lo there! for, behold, the kingdom of God *is within you.*" It is "not meat and drink; but righteousness and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost."

FACTS FOR LIMITARIANS.

I. It is a singular fact that St. Paul, from all that appears in the whole history of his *thirty years'* preaching, did not once use the term *hell* to a solitary individual, saint or sinner. To be sure, he made use of certain other expressions which are usually considered, in our day, as relating to endless punishment; but if hell, as commonly understood, is the *place* of punishment, it is a singular and wonderful fact that Paul the apostle, and the chiefest of all the apostles, never once uttered it to an individual! Query. What would be thought of a minister in our day, who should preach *thirty years*, and never once threaten his impenitent hearers with the punishment of *hell*? Answer me that. What would be thought of him?

II. It is also a singular fact that self-styled "Orthodoxy" is not now what it was fifty years ago. Then it was absolute and particular election and reprobation: now it is, quite generally, the *offer* of salvation unto all mankind. Then it was infant damnation: now it is, quite generally, salvation for infants by the death of Christ. Then it was *original*, *innate*, as well as total depravity: now it is getting to be infant purity *until* the age of accountability. Then it was a hell of literal, ele-

mentary fire: now it is a hell of conscience. Then it was one in a thousand saved: now it is by many, one in a thousand damned. Query: if this improvement goes on for fifty years hence, as fast as it has for fifty years past, how near will "Orthodoxy" be to destruction then?

III. It is another singular fact, with the mention of which we shall close our work, that all that is wanted to exterminate the doctrine of endless torment from the church is to *preach it faithfully.* "What!" says the reader, "do you mean to bring the charge of unfaithfulness against the whole body of the preachers of this faith?" We mean no more than just what truth compels us to affirm. We would not, certainly, thus represent the character of this whole ministry, had we not a sufficient reason; nor do we mean to say aught against their piety. But they know very well that, from motives which they know well enough how to appreciate, they are absolutely *afraid* to preach their doctrine fully and faithfully to a dying world. Start not, reader, for it is a solemn fact. You will now suspend all judgment upon the seeming boldness of this accusation, till the subject is placed in its true light before you.

Think, in the first place, of the abomination which these men preach. What imagination can conceive it? We have attempted to describe something of its horrors and enormities in the course of our lectures, but all attempts at de-

scription only show the utter poverty of language. I shall therefore now pass it over in silence, as something too horrid to conceive, too dreadful to relate, and too tremendous to reflect upon. Yet, if it is a truth, with what power ought it to be presented to the sinner's mind! And yet let us notice the reserve, and the delicacy, and the false refinement which seems to think *hell* a word "too harsh for ears polite." To be sure, all its public advocates are not of *this* retiring character. But if the abomination in question is true, what else should a Christian minister dwell upon? If we do indeed allow him time for the inculcation and enforcement of other doctrines and precepts, yet "hell and damnation" should be the all-engrossing theme, — ENDLESS damnation and ENDLESS *inconceivable wrath.* But what is the case? We do indeed hear them occasionally uttering the threatenings of "undying pains" — of "everlasting wo" — of "endless misery." We hear them talk, in coolness, of that "sad world," where "hope never comes, that comes to all." We hear of "groans" and "tears" and "never-dying pangs;" and, sometimes, a spirit more daring than the rest will attempt a minute and *brief description* of the torments which await the wicked. But, in the name of justice and humanity, I ask, what is all this compared with what might and ought to be given, if true, and still fall infinitely short of the reality? I once heard a minister of

the gospel (?) assign a reason *why* this doctrine was not more faithfully portrayed to perishing sinners, in accordance with its tremendous nature. "Because," said he to his flock, "it is as unpleasant to the speaker as to the hearer." Indeed! A faithful servant this! What! a minister of the gospel consult his own personal pleasure, and the pleasure of his hearers too, rather than their safety, when exposed to *such* a doom? No, no, this is not the reason. The reason is, the common sense and moral convictions of the people will not bear it! That is the reason, and the preachers of this doctrine KNOW it; and, to keep themselves in station, and keep alive the dreadful doctrine, they are obliged to cover it up, — to soften it down, — to be cautious about offending, — offending men by proclaiming the most important truth of God! They are obliged to be reserved, — to keep cool, — to preach but a *little* of what is deemed a soul-saving truth! Brother preacher, is not this a fact? Can you put your hand upon your heart, and *say* it is not a fact? But we tell you, if it is true, preach it. There is only one thing for you to do, — *preach it.* Mind not the *pleasure* of your hearers, when their endless destiny is at stake. *Preach your doctrine.* If it is true, it is tremendously true; and you had better preach it. Be faithful, and tire not in the work. Take up the subject from Sabbath to Sabbath, — sound it dreadfully around, — bring it to bear upon the congregation

with all the powers and terrors of mortal eloquence, — make them quail and tremble before it, — suffer them not to *sleep* with the whole battery of endless damnation discharged upon their heads, — lift up thy voice like a trumpet, — sound the alarm! wo! misery! lamentation! horror! — shrink not from duty, — let it come, — be not a man-pleaser, — shun not to "declare the whole counsel of God," — preach, O preach, from the dawning to the dying light, until the truth is felt, and stout hearts begin to shake with fear, and cry out in good earnest, "What shall I do to be saved?"

You *dare* not preach thus faithfully! Your congregations would not bear it; and, ere long, you would have nothing left but empty seats and bare walls to echo back the dolorous cry of boundless, fathomless, and endless wo. You know this to be a truth. You cannot deny it!

And now to the public I appeal, if that can be a truth which *owes its very existence* to a reserve in its advocates in the promulgation of it. Can that be a truth which, if preached boldly, faithfully and fully, as it ought to be preached, if true, would bring destruction to itself? Can that be truth which would need no opposition, but would, by faithful proclamation, ere long die a natural death, and be buried in oblivion's grave? No! none can pretend it. And it is for those who preach such sentiments to reflect well upon their ways.

But it may be said that "humanity would not

bear such a portrayal of misery: it would sink under it." Yes, it *would* sink under it. And this confession affords us the following argument. Deduct from *endless* punishment a sufficiency of horror which would leave a remainder that humanity might bear to be threatened with, which must leave the punishment limited, and of wholesome restraint, and then you will have the *Universalist's* principle for effecting moral reformation in the world. This would be a punishment that might be preached with faithfulness and good effect. So, this confession of the limitarian explodes his doctrine and establishes ours!

But it is manifest — and with this conclusion I leave the subject to the reader's mind — that all that is wanted to exterminate the doctrine of endless torment from the church is to *preach it faithfully*. Then would it fall, and great would be the fall thereof: the heavens would rejoice, and the earth be glad. Amen.

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
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